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The public prosecutor is responsible for the
enforcement of the laws against those who disobey
them. Unlike his opposing counsel, whose primary
duty is to his client, the prosecutor represents all
of the people within his jurisdiction. This creates
in the prosecutor's office a position unique to that
basic part of our judicial system, the adversary
process; for it means that the accused can expect,
and indeed must demand, the prosecutor to
represent his interests insofar as he, too, is a mem-
ber of the prosecutor's broad constituency.
As a result, the prosecutor is forced to operate
with one hand on the throttle and the other hand
poised firmly on the brake. His primary duty is to
earnestly and vigorously present the govern-
ment's case, using every legitimate means to
bring about a conviction.m2 It is not sufficient to
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University School of Law July 31-August 5,1972.
NOTE: Cases noted where the conviction was re-
vetsed solely on the basis of closing argument are
marked with an asterisk (*).
'Taylor v. United States, 413 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Jennings v. United States, 364 F.2d 513 (10th
Cir. 1966); Jones v. United States, 358 F.2d 383 (8th
Cir. 1966); United States ex rel. Lusterino v. Dros,
260 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.N.Y. 1966); Kellar v. State,
226 Ga. 432, 175 S.E.2d 654 (1970); People v. Oden,
20 Ill. 2d 470, 170 N.E.2d 582 (1960); State v. Smith,
187 Neb. 152, 187 N.W.2d 753 (1971); State v. Wal-
ton, 5 Wash. App. 150, 486 P.2d 1118 (1971).
2Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935);
Taylor v. United States, 413 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir.
1969); White v. United States, 394 F.2d 49 (9th Cir.
1968) (counsel not required to remain neutral); Jen-
nings v. United States, 364 F.2d 513 (10th Cir. 1966);
Jones v. United States, 358 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1966);
United States v. Bronston, 326 F. Supp. 469 (S.D.N.Y.
1971) (not obliged to dwell on matters which mitigate
the thrust of government's proof); State v. Hughes,
104 Ariz. 535, 456 P.2d 393 (1969) (no duty of prose-
cutor to point out evidence favorable to defendant);
State v. Gauger, 200 Kan. 515, 438 P.2d 455 (1968);
State v. Smith, 187 Neb. 152, 187 N.W.2d 753 (1971);
State v. Huson, 73 Wash. 2d 660, 440 P.2d 192, cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1096 (1968).
convict, however; for if justice has not been done,
his "clients" have been poorly represented. There-
fore, the prosecutor's duty is to convict only the
guilty and, moreover, to do so in a manner con-
sistent with recognized principles of justice.3
The net effect of this formulation of the prose-
cutor's obligations is the creation of a special ten-
sion in the government's presentation of its
criminal case. This is most dearly manifested in
the last stage of the trial, the dosing arguments.4
The jury, reflecting its confidence in the office of
the prosecutor and its respect for the individual
prosecutor in particular, properly regards him as
unprejudiced and impartial. 5 Thus he must
refrain from doing anything intentionally or
unintentionally which might improperly influence
the jury and deny the defendant a fair trial.6
The purpose of prosecutorial dosing argument,
3 ABA CODE OF PsorsssioNAL REsPoNsIBILITY,
CANON 5; Lusterino v. Dros, 260 F. Supp. 13 (S.D.
N.Y. 1966); People v. Burnett, 27 Ill. 2d 510, 190
N.E.2d 338 (1963).
4 Se People v. Cunningham, 123 Ill. App. 2d 190,
260 N.E.2d 10 (1970) (rule that prosecutor must treat
accused fairly applies to closing argument as well as
to the introduction of evidence).
SHall v. United States, 419 F.2d 582 (5th Cir.
1969); United States v. Grossman, 400 F.2d 951 (4th
Cir. 1968); People v. Askar, 8 Mich. App. 95, 153
N.W.2d 888 (1967); Roberson v. State, 185 So. 2d
667 (Miss. 1966). The duty to maintain a modicum
of impartiality and fairness raises the question whether
it is ever proper for a prosecutor actively engaged in a
trial to participate in the same trial in any other capac-
ity. In Pitman v. State, 487 P.2d 716 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1971), the court affirmed the conviction of a
lawyer for perjury. A dissenting opinion asserted that
the defendant had been denied a fair trial, since the
prosecutor testified in the case in chief, became a
rebuttal witness and was qualified as an expert, in-
terrogated all but two witnesses, and made the closing
arguments. In accord with the dissent in Pitman is
State v. Hayes, 473 S.W.2d 688 (Mo. 1971). See also
Horner v. Florida, 312 F. Supp. 1292 (M.D. Fla. 1967),
where the court disapproved prosecution by a prose-
cutor who had formerly been the defendant's attorney.
6 Taylor v. United States, 413 F.2d 1095 (D.C. Cir.
1969); Jennings v. United States, 364 F.2d 513 (10th
Cir. 1966); People v. Pecora, 107 - App. 2d 283,
246 N.E.2d 86, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1028 (1969);
Roberson v. State, 185 So. 2d 667 (Miss. 1966); State
v. Polsky, 82 N.M. 393, 482 P.2d 257, cert. denied,
82 N.M. 377, 482 P.2d 241 (1971); State v. Walton,
5 Wash. App. 150, 486 P.2d 1118 (1971).
LIMITATIONS ON CLOSING ARGUMENT
not unlike that of the defense in this regard, is to
enlighten the jury and to help the jurors remember
and interpret the evidence.7 Its precise value is
difficult to determine, although courts long ago
recognized defense dosing argument as a consti-
tutional right, "as much a part of the trial as the
hearing of evidence."' Nevertheless, the value of
dosing argument to both prosecution and defense
can be assessed when considered with reference to
the other stages of the trial. While not many cases
are won or lost through argument alone, it can be
a decisive factor, particularly if the case is a close
one. Since counsel is rarely certain which case is
close it is unwise and impractical to overlook this
last opportunity to plead a case.9
The restrictions on closing argument do not pre-
vent vigorous presentation of the prosecutor's case
to the jury. The prosecutor may, of course, dis-
cuss the evidence, pointing out discrepancies and
conflicts in the testimony, and argue that the
evidence in the record supports and justifies a
conviction.'" He may also dwell on the evil results
of the crime, urge a fearless administration of the
law, and comment on the conduct of the accused."
Furthermore, summation style, content, and
presentation vary with each advocate and are not
prohibitively limited.U There is no uniform legal
7 United States v. Sawyer, 443 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir.
1971); State v. Whiters, 206 Kan. 770, 481 P.2d 992
(1971).
3 United States v. Sawyer, 443 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir.
1971) (constitutional right to summation in sixth
amendment); United States ex rd. Spears v. Johnson,
327 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (excellent discus-
sion of the importance of summation; court granted
habeas corpus relief on basis of due process clause
where judge found petitioner guilty in bench trial
without permitting argument); Moore v. State, 7 Md.
App. 330, 254 A.2d 717 (1969) (fact that counsel
did not assert right to argue did not constitute waiver);
Commonwealth v. McNair, 208 Pa. Super. 369, 222
A.2d 599 (1966) (bench trial). The right to make a
closing argument is recognized equally in bench and
jury trials.3"In those cases where counsel can make the dif-
ference, it is the closing argument more often than any
other single stage of the case that determines who wins
and who loses." J. KAPLAN & J. WArrz, TnE TRIAL
OF JACK RuBa 310 (1965) (hereinafter cited as WALTz).
°Bridges v. State, 227 Ga. 24, 178 S.E.2d 861
(1970) (right and duty to argue version of what evi-
dence at trial proves); State v. Brown, 94 Ida. 352,
487 P.2d 946 (971 ; People v. Bundy, 295 Ill. 322,
129 N.E. 189 (1920).
"1Terhune v. State, 117 Ga. App. 59, 159 S.E.2d
291 (1967); People v. Hairston, 46 Ill. 2d 348, 263
N.E.2d 840 (1970).
2 United States v. Lewis, 423 F.2d 457 (8th Cir.
1970); United States v. Lawler, 413 F.2d 622 (7th
Cir. 1969); United States v. Dibrizzi, 393 F.2d 642
(2d Cir. 1968); Tenorio v. United States, 390 F.2d
96 (9th Cir. 1968); State v. Brooks, 107 Ariz. 320,
standard against which remarks can be measured. 3
It is recognized that a successful argument depends
upon a skillful discussion of facts and law, and,
especially in a criminal case, the argument, "to be
palatable, may require the lubrication not only of
appealing organization and presentation, but of
emotion as well." 14 Thus, oratory and picturesque
language and illustration are each within the
boundaries of permissible argument. s
But great latitude and freedom of expression
can create problems, thereby emphasizing the
precarious position of the prosecutor:
When a prosecutor ... oversteps the bounds of
strict legal propriety, the defense is quick to use the
incident as reason for an appeal to a higher court.
But if the defense lawyer does the same thing, to
secure acquittal, there is no appeal. Once cleared,
no defendant may be retried, no matter how
flagrant his attorney's actions. So, many defense
counsel do everything short of punishable contempt
to provoke a prosecutor into a remark ... which
an appellate court might call erroneous influence
on a jury. 6
While misconduct during summation does not
always require the reversal of conviction," it is
487 P.2d 387 (1971); Fisher v. State, 241 Ark. 545,
408 S.W.2d 894 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 821 (1967);
People v. Pike, 71 Cal. 2d 595, 455 P.2d 776, 78 Cal.
Rptr. 672 (1969); People v. Brengettsy, 25 Ill. 2d 228,
184 N.E.2d 849, cert. denied, 372 U.S. 948 (1962);
State v. Potts, 205 Kan. 47, 468 P.2d 78 (1970); Kin-
nett v. Commonwealth, 408 S.W.2d 417 (Ky. Crim.
App. 1966); State v. Hudson, 253 La. 992, 221 So.2d
484 (1969); Cannon v. State, 190 So. 2d 848 (Miss.
1966); State v. Pace, 80 N.M. 364, 456 P.2d 197
(1969); State v. Maynor, 272 N.C. 524, 158 S.E.2d
612 (1968); State v. Stephens, 24 Ohio St. 2d 76, 263
N.E.2d 773 (1970); State v. Berganthal, 47 Wis. 2d
668, 178 N.W.2d 16 (1970).
3 Smith v. State, 282 Ala. 268, 210 So. 2d 826
(1968).
14 WAL 'z, supra note 9, at 310. An excellent dis-
cussion of the closing arguments in the Ruby trial
appears at pages 310-36.
15 Williams v. United States, 371 F.2d 141 (10th
Cir. 1967) (proper to use a "metaphorical illusion,"
here an unreported "rabbit story," as illustrative of
circumstantial evidence); People v. Womack, 252
Cal. App. 2d 761, 60 Cal. Rptr. 870 (1967); State v.
Potts, 205 Kan. 47, 468 P.2d 78 (1970); State v.
Gauger, 200 Kan. 515, 438 P.2d 455 (1968); State v.
Hamilton, 249 La. 392, 187 So. 2d 417 (1966) (law
does not hold counsel to niceties of grammar); Cooper
v. State, 490 P.2d 762 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
16 Waite, How Ethical are These Lawyers?, RAimzxs
DIGEsT 56-60 (November, 1957), quoted in 2 F.
INBAu, J. TxompsoN & C. SowLE, CASES AND COMt-
IEN Fs ON CmwIINA, JUsTIcE: CnuaNAL LAW An-
amnsTRATIoN 1191-92 (3d. ed. 1968).
"State v. Whiters, 206 Kan. 770, 481 P.2d 992
(1971).
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well established that improper argument alone
may be sufficient grounds for reversal.18 But
according fair treatment to the defendant does
not require advocacy compromise. A summation
may be highly damaging to the accused and still
be within the bounds of propriety.19 Vigorousness
and fairness are complementary qualities in an
effective presentation, at least where the goal to
be achieved is what it should be, a just conviction
of the guilty.
This article will focus on the limitations which
the courts, in an effort to enforce adherence to
the duties outlined above, have imposed on prose-
cutorial closing argument in the less academic
atmosphere of the criminal trial. The basic pur-
pose of the article is to present, in abbreviated
form, the law in this area as reflected in relatively
recent court decisions. While no conscious effort
was made to exclude analysis and critique, these
were at most only secondarily important.
Henceforth the terms "proper" and "improper"
are used to characterize the general judicial atti-
tude toward a particular prosecutorial comment.
Cases noted where the conviction was reversed
solely on the basis of closing argument are marked
with an asterisk (*).20
TIE JUDICIAL ROLE IN REGULATING
CLOsiNG ARGUmENT
The trial judge is given, and must exercise, con-
siderable discretion in evaluating the propriety of
argument and in curing any alleged defects.2' The
'&United States v. American Radiator and Stand-
ard Sanitation Corp., 433 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1970).
Of the approximately 1300 cases researched in pre-
paring this article, over 10 percent were reversed on
argument alone. In a good many more cases closing
argument was also a factor. For a discussion of appel-
late review, see generally notes 250-67 infra, and
accompanying text.
19 Evans v. Illinois, 24 Ill. 2d 215, 181 N.E.2d 80,
cert. denied, 372 U.S. 922 (1963).
20 Because of the breadth of this study it is possible
that some cases were inadvertently omitted. Never-
theless, an attempt was made to include all appro-
priate cases, including those which conflict with the
general view.
11 United States v. Sawyer, 443 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir.
1971); United States v. Smith, 433 F.2d 1266 (5th
Cir. 1970); United States v. Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas,
427 F.2d 969 (10th Cir. 1970); United States v. Mills,
366 F.2d 512 (6th Cir. 1966); Parrott v. State, 246
Ark. 672, 439 S.W.2d 924 (1969); People v. Wilson,
66 Cal. 2d 749, 427 P.2d 820, 59 Cal. Rptr. 156 (1967);
Lee v. People, 170 Colo. 268, 460 P.2d 796 (1969);
State v. Reed, 157 Conn. 464, 254 A.2d 449 (1969);
Hart v. State, 227 Ga. 171, 179 S.E.2d 346 (1971);
State v. Hephner, 161 N.W.2d 714 (Iowa 1968);
State v. Hamilton, 249 La. 392, 187 So. 2d 417 (1966);
Nelson v. State, 5 Md. App. 109, 245 A.2d 606 (1968);
basic reason for this is the trial court's superior
position to judge the effect of counsel's remarks or
conduct. In accordance with general principles of
review, an appellate court will not interfere unless
it finds an abuse of discretion on the part of the
trial judge which prejudiced the defendant and
deprived him of a fair trial.2
The trial court's discretionary control also
covers more specific aspects of the summation.-
First, it decides when the arguments will be made,
that is, how soon after both sides have rested or
after the jury instructions have been given, de-
pending upon the jurisdiction.n Second, the court
sets the time limits for the arguments, normally
allowing equal time to both sides.24 What is a
reasonable time is usually a function of a number
of factors, including the amount and character of
the testimony and other evidence, the complexity
of the issues, and the time already consumed in
hearing the case. It is generally better for the court
to be indulgent 'rather than frugal in granting
time,2 but even when it is frugal, the reviewing
court will place special emphasis on whether the
time limits were strictly enforced.
26
State v. Johnson, 277 Minn. 230, 152 N.W.2d 768,
cerl. denied, 390 U.S. 990 (1967); Carr v. State, 208
So. 2d 886 (Miss. 1968); State v. Richards, 467 S.W.2d
33 (Mo. 1971); State v. Mayberry, 52 N.J. 413," 245
A.2d 481 (1968); State v. Pace, 80 N.M. 364, 456 P.2d
197 (1969); State v. Williams, 276 N.C. 703, 174
S.E.2d 503 (1970); State v. Henderson, 156 N.W.2d
700 (N.D. 1968); State v. Gairson, 484 P.2d 854 (Ore.
App. 1971); State v. Peterson, 255 S.C. 579, 180
S.E.2d 341 (1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 860 (1971);
Hunter v. State, 222 Tenn. 672, 440 S.W.2d 1 (1969);
State v. Lane, 4 Wash. App. 745, 484 P.2d 432 (1971).
2' United States v. Davis, 260 F. Supp. 1009 (E.D.
Tenn. 1966); Hunter v. State, 222 Tenn. 672, 440
S.W.2d 1 (1969). See generally cases cited in note 21
supra.
11 United States v. Prentiss, 446 F.2d 923 (5th Cir.
1971) (not an abuse of discretion to refuse defense
counsel permission to argue on the same day that
couit gave its oral charge).
2United States v. Salazar, 425 F.2d 1284 (9th Cir.
1970); United States v. Gleeson, 411 F.2d 1091 (10th
Cir. 1969) (restricting to one hour where three de-
fendants and four-day trial); People v. Fairchild,
254 Cal. A pp. 2d 831, 62 Cal. Rptr. 535, cerl. denied,
391 U.S. 955 (1967); Hart v. State, 227 Ga. 171, 179
S.E.2d 346 (1971); State v. Kay, 12 Ohio App. 2d
38, 230 N.E.2d 652 (1967) (good discussion of this
point).
5Tumer v. State, 220 So. 2d 295 (Miss. 1969).
In addition, it follows from the recognition of the de-
fense summation as a constitutional right that the
judge's discretion should not be so exercised that the
right to argue is effectively denied.2
6Batsell v. United States, 403 F.2d 395 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1094 (1968) (limiting to one hour
proper, especially where the defense was allowed
forty minutes extra); People v. Stout, 66 Cal. 2d 184,
[(Vol. 64
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Additionally, the trial court may decide whether
the summation shall be split among members of
the prosecution team,27 and also whether the de-
fendant who is represented by counsel may him-
self participate in the summation.2
LIMITATIONS UPON PROSECUTORIAL
CLOSING ARGUMENT
THE RELATIONSHIP OF OPENING ARGUMENT TO
REBUTTAL ARGUMENT
The prosecution usually makes the first closing
argument and is generally granted rebuttal time
in which to respond to the defense dosing argu-
ment.2 9 All essential points must be fairly stated
in the opening argument so that the defense has
an adequate opportunity to respond30 During the
rebuttal the prosecutor may in turn only respond
to the defense summation. No new line of argu-
ment may be introduced.31 Contradiction of the
424 P.2d 704, 57 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1967) (time limit not
error where not enforced); Robinson v, State, 415
S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967) (even if prosecutor
exceeded time limit, no error where he concluded
three sentences, or 123 words, after objection).
2 State v. Davis, 462 S.W.2d 798 (Mo. 1971) (let-
ting another prosecutor make rebuttal argument was
within the discretion of the trial court).
8 Thompson v. State, 194 So. 2d 649 (Fla. App.
1967) (where defense counsel made opening argument,
it was proper to refuse defendant permission to make
rebuttal argument); People v. Johnson, 45 Ill. 2d 38,
257 N.E.2d 3 (1970) (where court carefully determined
that defendant wished to make his own closing argu-
ment, it was not an abuse of discretion to refuse de-
fense counsel permission to argue thereafter).
21 This is because the government has the heavy
burden of overcoming the presumption of innocence.
Statutes adopting this procedure have been held con-
stitutional against challenge on due process and right
to counsel grounds. United States ex rd. Parsons v.
Adams, 336 F, Supp. 340 (D. Conn.), a'fd per curian,
456 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1971); Preston v. Statej 260 So.
2d 501 (Fla. 1972). The order of argument may be
reversed where the defense has not put on a case.
However, in State v. Lee, 277 N.C. 205, 176 S.E.2d
765 (1970), the court held that where there were
several defendants and only one offered evidence, it
was proper for the prosecution to open and conclude,
in spite of a statute which gave the defense this right
where the defense put on no case.
30 State v. Peterson, 423 S.W.2d 825 (Mo. 1968)
(in opening argument prosecutor did not mention
punishment, but in final argument asked for maximum
sentence after defense did not mention punishment;
held, there was prejudicial error even though the de-
fendant was only given a three-year sentence)*.
31 State v. Randall, 8 Ariz. App. 72, 443 P.2d 434
(1968); People v. Bundy, 295 Ill. 322, 129 N.E. 189
(1920); People v. McFadden, 31 Mich. App. 512,
188 N.W.2d 141 (1971). But see Hart v. State, 227
Ga. 171, 179 S.E.2d 346 (1971) (no abuse of discretion
in refusing to restrict rebuttal to matters raised by
defense in argument).
original argument by the prosecution rebuttal is
also not permitted since this would, in effect, con-
stitute a new line of argument to which the defense
would have no opportunity to reply.2 If defense
counsel waives its summation the trial court may
in its discretion determine whether or not the
prosecution may make any further argument.
COlnENTING ON THE LAW
Since the purpose of argument is to enlighten
the jury, the prosecutor may comment on the
applicable principles of law during summation,
emphasizing the theory of the government's case
and the criminal law and perhaps the purposes of
the particular statutes involved.34 However, it is
improper for the prosecutor to misstate the law,35
2 State v. Fair, 467 S.W.2d 938 (Mo. 1971) (prose-
cutor in opening argument said he would not ask for
the death penalty, then in dosing argument told the
jury it could inflict the death penalty after the defense
did not argue punishment)*; State v. Wadlow, 450
S.W.2d 200 (Mo. 1970) (error to permit argument
regarding punishment in rebuttal where not raised by
defense). See Hayes v. State, 470 S.W.2d 950 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1971) (court in its discretion may allow
defense attorney to respond to matters improperly
discussed by prosecutor in rebuttal).
2 2People v. Wilder, 119 ll. App. 2d 422, 256 N.E.2d
103 (1970) (proper to permit rebuttal where defendant
waived argument but record revealed that defense
counsel did argue); Moore v. State, 461 P.2d 1017
(Okla. Crim. App. 1969).
4 United States v. Weiser, 428 F.2d 932 (2d Cir.
1968); People v. Lopez, 249 Cal. App. 2d 93, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 441 (1967); People v. Sanchez, 65 Cal. 2d 814,
423 P.2d 800, 56 Cal. Rptr. 648 (1967); People v.
June, 34 Mich. App. 313, 191 N.W.2d 52 (1971).
32United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54 (7th Cir.
1971) (misstating burden of proof on insanity); United
States v. Gambert, 410 F.2d 383 (4th Cir. 1969) (that
case would have been dismissed if allegations of in-
dictment not proved)*; United States v. Moriarty,
375 F.2d 901 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 388 US. 911
(1967) (misstating law regarding involuntariness of
confession); United States v. Murphy, 374 F.2d 651
(2d Cir. 1967) (arguing that grants of immunity should
be taken as evidence that a crime was committed);
Evalt v. United States, 359 F.2d 534 (9th Cir. 1966)
(misstating results of verdict of not guilty by reason of
insanity)*; DeFranze v. State, 46 Ala. App. 283, 241
So. 2d 125 (1970) (misstating rules of evidence);
State v. Makal, 194 Ariz. 475, 455 P.2d 450 (1969)
(arguing defendant should be found guilty without
regard to issue of insanity)*; State v. Sorensen, 104
Ariz. 503, 455 P.2d 981 (1969) (misstating law regarding
introduction of character testimony)*; State v. Cortez,
101 Ariz. 214, 418 P.2d 370 (1966) (arguing that judge
would have directed verdict were the evidence insuf-
ficient to convict); People v. Modesto, 66 Cal. 2d
695, 427 P.2d 788, 59 Cal. Rptr. 124 (1967), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 1009 (1967) (misstating law regarding
insanity); People v. Asta, 251 Cal. App. 2d 64, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 206 (1967) (suggesting that court in admitting
evidence had weighed it for the jury); Washam v.
State, 235 A.2d 279 (Del. 1967) (arguing that judge
would have directed verdict were the evidence insuffi-
19731
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at least when done intentionally, 6 or to correctly
state irrelevant law,3 7 since this only confuses the
jury and prejudices the accused. In any event, the
prosecutor must not instruct the jury on the law,
since this is the exclusive task of the court.
While all jurisdictions permit comment upon the
law within these bounds, there is some conflict
concerning the propriety of actually reading to the
jury from cases, texts, or statutes. Jurisdictions
which prohibit reading assert that this rule estab-
lishes a standard of propriety separating the im-
partial role of the judge from the adversary role
of counsel, thus insuring that the role of the judge
cdent to convict); People v. Weinstein, 35 Ill. 2d 467,
220 N.E.2d 432 (1966) (repeatedly misstating the
burden of proof); State v. Kirtdoll, 206 Kan. 208,
478 P.2d 188 (1970) (failing to state all elements of
offense); State v. Shilow, 252 La. 1105, 215 So. 2d 828
(1968) (misstating burden of proof); People v. Lewis,
37 Mich. App. 548, 195 N.W.2d 20 (1972) (misstating
law regarding insanity)*; State v. Molatore, 474
P.2d 7 (Ore. App. 1970) (that acquittal on prosecution
for sale of narcotics would constitute double jeopardy
for possession prosecution)*; State v. Gosser, 50 N.J.
438, 236 A.2d 377 (1967) (should find defendant
guilty even if believed him not guilty by reason of
insanity); People v. Fields, 27 App. Div. 2d 736,
277 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1967) (jury should be governed by
moral law "Thou Shalt Not Kill"); State v. Myers,
26 Ohio St. 2d 190, 271 N.E.2d 245 (1971) (misstating
nature of presumption)*; Levasseur v. State, 464
S.W.2d 315 (Tenn. 1971) (misstating sentencing law).
But see Meyer v. Commonwealth, 472 S.W.2d 479
(Ky. Ct. App. 1971) ("Thou Shalt Not Kill" proper
in response to defense argument on the cruelty of the
death penalty). See Murray v. State, 249 Ark. 887,
462 S.W.2d 438 (1971); People v. Hall, 1 Ill. App. 3d
949, 275 N.E.2d 196 (1971) (misstating law not error
where defense counsel interrupted before thought
completed).36 Parker v. State, 221 A.2d 599 (Del. 1966) (state-
ment not calculated to mislead jury); People v. Pecora,
107 l. App. 2d 283, 246 N.E.2d 865, cert. denied,
397 U.S. 1028 (1969) (unintentional misstatements
generally not error); Day v. State, 2 Md. App. 334,
234 A.2d 894 (1967) (that argument not entirely ac-
curate is of little moment if not false or plainly pre-
judicial).
7 State v. Harris, 258 La. 720, 247 So. 2d 847 (1971)
(where penalty is responsibility of judge alone, sen-
tencing law is not proper subject of argument); State
v. Hagerty, 251 La. 477, 205 So. 2d 369 (1967) (proper
to refuse to permit reading of irrelevant statutes).
See Clay v. State, 122 Ga. App. 677, 178 S.E.2d 331
(1970) (trial court did not err in overruling defense
objection to recital from previous case-law construc-
tion of statute that a strong presumption arises that
charge is true when a party does not explain or refute
evidence, even though there was a statutory prohibi-
tion to give substance of the statute in a criminal case,
where defense counsel did not state the basis for his
objection).
11 State v. Smith, 422 S.W. 2d 50 (Mo. 1967). Cf.
People v. Malone, 126 Ill. App. 2d 265, 261 N.E.2d
776 (1970) (proper to refuse defense counsel permission
to comment on the meaning of reasonable doubt).
in instructing the jury is not usurped by counsel
and the impartiality of the forum not destroyed 9
Nevertheless, it may be permissible to read from
the instructions when they are given prior to the
arguments.40
Jurisdictions which hold that it is within the
trial court's discretion to permit the reading of the
law from approved texts or reported cases from
the jurisdiction's appellate courts, which are
usually the courts of last resort, do so on the
premise that counsel's alternative statements of
correct law may be helpful to the jury rather than
confusing.41 When reading is permitted the court
must be careful to insure that: (1) any reading and
discussion of cases are kept within reasonable
limits, both as to the number read and the time
consumed;42 (2) only cases on point from the juris-
diction or statements of law in accord with such
are read;43 and (3) the purpose of the reading is
solely to clarify the law in the case and not to
prejudice the jury against the accused.
4"
When counsel desires to read from cases to the
jury, or when there is a question regarding the
accuracy or relevancy of a proposed statement of
law, the court should be given an opportunity in
advance to designate the portions which may be
read and the principles which may be discussed. 5
39 People v. June, 34 Mich. App. 313, 191 N.W.2d
52 (1972) (reading statute improper); State v. Shelton,
71 Wash. 2d 838, 431 P.2d 201 (1967).40 See State v. Kearney, 75 Wash. 2d 168, 449 P.2d
400 (1969) (should not reverse solely because law
read to jury from source other than instructions).
41 United States v. Sawyer, 443 F.2d 712 (D.C. Cir.
1971); People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543, 421 P.2d
401, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 850 (1967);
Wilson v. State, 223 Ga. 531, 156 S.E.2d 446 (1967)
(proper to read from United States Supreme Court
opinion); People v. Preston, 341 Ill. 407, 173 N.E. 383
(1930); Phillips v. State, 6 Md. App. 56, 250 A.2d
111 (1969) proper to refer to opinions, including
lower court opinions if none from appellate courts
exist, and texts, since in Maryland jury is judge of
law as well as facts).
4 People v. Spaulding, 309 Ill. 292, 141 N.E. 196
(1923).
4 People v. Lloyd, 304 Ill. 23, 136 N.E. 505 (1922)
(improper to read from a federal lower court decision in
state prosecution).
"Higgenbotham v. State, 124 Ga. App. 489, 184
S.E.2d 231 (1971) (portion sought to be read not
germane to issues); McKeever v. State,. 118 Ga. App.
386, 163 S.E.2d 919 (1968) (same); People v. Andrae,
305 Il. 530, 137 N.E. 496 (1922) (proper to refuse
prosecutor permission to read from opinion in prior
prosecution of defendant for murder, though the case
arose from the same incident, since the questions of
law were distinct); People v. Rees, 268 DIL. 585, 109
N.E. 473 (1915) (error to read from opinion which
held evidence sufficient to convict one jointly indicted
with defendant)*.
41United States v. Sawyer, 443 F.2d 712 (D.C.
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If counsel's view of the law differs from the court's
view, only the latter should be presented.
COMMENTING ON THE EVIDENCE
A trial is a patchwork of bits and pieces of evidence.
A jury may not appreciate the significance of many
of these scraps until they have been pieced to-
gether by an artful advocate."4
The prosecution and defense counsel are likely to
take very different, possibly diametrically opposed,
approaches to piecing together the evidence in
dosing argument. Hence, as noted previously, the
court must confer great latitude in the manner,
style, and content of summation.
47
The general rule regarding comment on the evi-
dence is that such comment is proper if it is either
proved by direct evidence or is a fair and reason-
able inference from the facts and circumstances
proved and has bearing on an issue."1 The prose-
cutor is permitted to argue from his own under-
standing and interpretation of the evidence 4" and
Cir. 1971); People v. Calpito, 9 Cal. App. 3d 212, 88
Cal. Rptr. 64 (1970) (the practice of reading portions
of proposed instructions during argument is dis-
couraged, but within trial court's discretion); People v.
Spaulding, 309 111. 292, 141 N.E. 196 (1923).4 6WALTz, supra note 9, at 311.
47 Note 12, supra, and accompanying text.
48 United States v. Cotter, 425 F.2d 450 (1st Cir.
1970); United States v. Borwing, 390 F.2d 511 (4th
Cir. 1968); United States v. Dibrizzi, 393 F.2d 642
(2nd Cir. 1968); Wakasan v. United States, 367 F.2d
639 (8th Cir. 1966); McCain v. State; 46 Ala. App.
627, 247 So. 2d 383 (1971); Gafford v. State, 440
P.2d 405 (Alaska 1968); State v. Propp, 104 Ariz.
466, 455 P.2d 263 (1969); People v. Hines, 66 Cal.
2d 348, 425 P.2d 557, 57 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1967);
Wesley v. United States, 233 A.2d 514 (D.C. Ct. App.
1967); Manor v. State, 223 Ga. 594, 157 S.E.2d 431
(1967) (where defense counsel wanted to amend his
opening statement after prosecutor did not offer to
prove certain matters which had been proved in prior
murder trial, it was not error to restrict argument to
evidence which was submitted at second trial); People
v. Porterfield, 131 IM. App. 167, 268 N.E.2d 537
1971); State v. Potts, 205 Kan. 47, 468 P.2d 78
1970); Hunt v. Commonwealth, 466 S.W.2d 957
(Ky. Crim. A p. 1971); State v. Smith, 257 La. 1109,
245 So. 2d 327 (1971); People v. Gill, 31 Mich. App.
395, 187 N.W.2d 707 (1971); State v. Coleman, 186
Neb. 571, 184 N.W.2d 732 (1971); State v. Mayberry,
52 N.J. 413, 245 A.2d 481 (1968); State v. Santillanes,
81 N.M. 185, 464 P.2d 915 (1970); People v. Griffin,
29 N.Y.2d 91, 272 N.E.2d 477, 323 N.Y.S.2d 964
(1971); State v. Stephens, 24 Ohio St. 2d 76, 263
N.E.2d 773 (1970); Cooper v. State, 490 P.2d 762
(Okla. Crim. App. 1971); State v. Pitts, 256 S.C. 420,
182 S.E.2d 738 (1971); State v. Kindvall, 191 N.W.2d
289 (S.D. 1971); Briggs v. State, 463 S.W.2d 161
(Tenn. App. 1970), cerl denied, 400 U.S. 997 (1971).
49 United States v. Baskin, 449 F.2d 729 (3d Cir.
1971); State v. Jackson, 258 La. 632, 247 So. 2d 558
(1971).
the defense cannot be heard to complain merely
because the prosecutor's reasoning is faulty or his
deductions illogical, though the defense may defi-
nitely make such points in its own summation. 0
An inference is defined as "a process of reason-
ing by which a fact or proposition sought to be
established is deduced as a logical consequence
from other facts, or a state of facts, already proved
or admitted."'" For example, where there was
testimony that a fingerprint was found in a red
substance, and that the victim was severely
beaten, the inference that the print was left in
blood was proper.5 Similarly, it was within bounds
to argue that someone other than the accused
punched his time card where there was testimony
that there was no way of knowing who punched a
particular card;E that the defendant loaded his
gun with buckshot where such was recovered from
the victim's body;" and that, in view of testimony
from a witness that she heard the sound of some-
thing hitting the wall and then the sound of the
child crying, the defendant, despite his denials,
threw his stepchild against the wall. 5 But there is
some question whether it is proper to comment on
the poor financial status of the accused as a pos-
sible motive for robbery or a similar offense.
56
When the prosecutor is merely restating the
evidence or testimony his remarks are entirely
proper. 67 Also appropriate is comment on the evil
results of the crime if apparent from the evidence.
50People v. Washington, 71 Cal. 2d 1061, 458
P.2d 479, 80 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1969).
51 BIACK's LAw DicrcoNARv 917 (Rev. 4th ed.
1968).
52 People v. Gill, 31 Mich. App. 395, 187 N.W.2d
707 (1971).
0 United States v. Alexander, 415 F.2d 1352 (7th
Cir. 1969).
54 Patrick v. State, 245 Ark. 923, 436 S.W.2d 275
(1969).55 People v. Winstead, 90 Ill. App. 2d 167, 234
N.E.2d 175 (1967).
56 Compare People v. Fleming, 54 Ill. App. 2d 457,
203 N.E.2d 716 (1964) (comment on indebtedness
proper) with McAllister v. State, 44 Ala. App. 511,
214 So. 2d 862 (1968) (reference to former afluence
improper); State v. Copeland, 94 N.J. Super. 196,
227 A.2d 523 (1967) (no evidence of impecuniosity
should be admitted or commented upon when it will
tend to prove motive or willingness to commit crime);
People v. Moore, 26 App. Div. 2d 902, 274 N.Y.S.2d
518 (1966) (reference to fact defendant a welfare re-
cipient improper).
5 United States v. Izzi, 427 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1970)
(accusation that defendant had sought to diguise his
handwriting in given exemplar was based on expert
testimony); Palmore v. State, 283 Ala. 501, 218 So.
2d 830 (1969) (argument that defendant had tortured
victim where injuries were shown); People v. Hines,
66 Cal. 2d 348, 425 P.2d 557, 57 Cal. Rptr. 757 (1967).
u People v. Daugherty, 43 Ill. 2d 251, 253 N.E.2d
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Conversely it follows from the general rule that
the prosecutor's remarks are improper if not based
directly on the evidence, 59 if not reasonably in-
ferred from the evidence, 60 or if they relate to
389 (1969) (stating that prosecuting witness could be
considered a passive homosexual as a result of de-
fendant's taking indecent liberties with him where
unsupported by the evidence); People v. Oparka, 85
Ill. App. 2d 33, 228 N.E.2d 291 (1967) (remarks that
it would be a long time before rape victim recovered
from the shock to her nervous system was improper);
State v. Fleury, 213 Kan. 888, 457 P.2d 44 (1969)
(argument that rape victim suffered mental impair-
ment improper where no evidence; two judges in
dissent thought the argument was prejudicial error).
19 United States v. Hoskins, 446 F.2d 564 (9th Cir.
1971) (reference to conversation prosecutor had with
witness before trial improper, but not reversible error
where the witness at trial testified to everything prose-
cutor had said); United States v. Small, 443 F.2d 497
(3d Cir. 1971) (asserting defendant bad been a fugitive
for six weeks once he knew that he was wanted where
not supported by evidence)*; Hanley v. United States,
416 F.2d 1160 (5th Cir. 1969) (going outside record
to describe person as defendant's brother-in-law);
Homer v. Florida, 312 F. Supp. 1292 (M.D. Fla. 1967)
(facts not in record and unsupported charges)*;
State v. Williams, 107 Ariz. 262, 485 P.2d 832 (1971)
(reference to increase in crime rate in city where not in
evidence); Wooten v. State, 224 Ga. 106, 160 S.E.2d
403 (1969) (should not introduce any new fact into
record in argument); People v. Romero, 36 Ill. 2d
315, 223 N.E.2d 121 (1967) (unfounded assertions
that defendant started his girlfriend on heroin and
made a trip to get drugs); People v. Griffin, 29 N.Y.2d
91, 272 N.E.2d 477, 323 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1971) (where
identification in issue, argument that defendant had
recently inflicted wound above his eye to create a
distinguishing facial mark, where not sustained by
evidence and where jury obviously considered it,
requesting a magnifying glass to examine a photo-
graph of defendant)*; Bates v. State, 483 P.2d 1384
(Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (stating that defendant's
adoptive parents thought him lazy and shiftless where
no evidence). See People v. Rhone, 267 Cal. App. 2d
652, 73 Cal. Rptr. 463 (1968) (report of National
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders not a proper
subject of comment); People v. Donovan, 35 App.
Div. 2d 934, 316 N.Y.S.2d 121 (1967) (reference to
Senate Rackets Investigation Committee, and Vito
Genovese family irrelevant and highly prejudicial).
6o People v. Farrell, 349 Ill. 129, 181 N.E. 703
(1932) (assertion that it was natural to presume that
piano boxes transported by defendant contained gaso-
line; where no evidence); State v. Iverson, 251 La.
425, 204 So. 2d 772 (1967) (had sheriff not taken state-
ment on night of offense, defendant would have claimed
at trial that victim was armed); State v. Jones, 277
Minn. 174, 152 N.W.2d 67 (1967) (where evidence
showed that co-defendant's accomplice shot with right
hand, and defendant was left-handed, improper to
argue: "It may be a little awkward to handle a rifle
or shotgun with either hand, but this isn't true with
a handgun. We know this from* television by the old-
timers when they were in spots like this."); State v.
Polsky, 82 N.M. 393, 482 P.2d 257 (Ct. App. 1971)
(argument that accused contra6ted hepatitis from
injecting himself with heroin was improper where
prosecutor was not permitted to elicit testimony that
hepatitis could be so contracted and the crime charged
matters outside the issues' in the case.6' Such
comments are speculation and conjecture which
may confuse and mislead the jury.62 Furthermore,
argument going beyond the evidence tends to
make the prosecutor a witness. His unsworn testi-
mony and personal beliefs, although worthless as
a matter of law, can be "dynamite" to the jury
because of the special regard the jury has for the
prosecutor, thereby effectively circumventing the
rules of evidence.2
For these same reasons" it is improper to refer
was selling narcotics); People v. Schatz, 37 App. Div.
2d 584, 322 N.Y.S.2d 802 (1971) (suggesting defend-
ants had motive for burning their own building and
that it was over-insured where the only evidence was
to the contrary)*.
61 United States v. Craft, 423 F.2d 829 (9th Cir.
1970) (stating defendant refused induction after trip
to induction center where charge was failing to report
for induction); Maguire v. United States, 358 F.2d
442 (10th Cir. 1966) (even if jury believed defendant,
his conduct would amount to extortion, where ex-
tortion was not charged); Carr v. State, 44 Ala. App.
40, 202 So. 2d 59, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 969 (1967)
(reference to "Thou Shalt Not Kill" in robbery
prosecution where victim died of unrelated causes);
People v. Washington, 71 Cal. 2d 1061, 458 P.2d 479,
80 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1969) (that defendant was seeking
a sexual thrill when he searched a female robbery
victim during the commission of a prior crime)*;
People v. McMillan, 130 Il. App. 2d 633,264 N.E.2d
554 (1970) (referring to defendant as "turning on
teeny hoppers" where charge was possession)*; Killie
v. State, 14 Md. App. 465, 287 A.2d 310 (1972) (in-
troducing homosexuality during argument in drug
possession prosecution)*; People v. Plautz, 28 Mich.
App. 621, 184 N.W.2d 761 (1970) (asserting defendant
had stolen property where charge was receiving and
concealing, where otherwise there was no way to infer
possession in county in which case tried)*; State v.
Polsky, 82 N.M. 393, 482 P.2d 257, (Ct. App. 1971);
State v. Young, 7 Ohio App. 2d 194, 220 N.E.2d 146
(966) (repeatedly arguing that defendant was guilty
of aiding and abetting murder where charge was har-
boring a felon)*; Barron v. State, 479 P.2d 614 (Okla.
Grim. App. 1971) (where charge was drunk driving,
argument that defendant had run over and killed boy,
which did not occur)*; Dishman v. State, 460 S.W.2d
855 (Tenn. App. 1970) (arguing sale of narcotics
where crime charged was possession); Johnson v.
State, 467 S.W.2d 247 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (use of
"riot" in prosecution for injuring property belonging
to another); Kemph v. State, 464 S.W.2d 112 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1971) (referring to seduction of murder
victim's sister where no evidence of such)*.
62Kirk v. State, 227 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. 1969);
Hanlon v. State, 441 P.2d 486 (Okla. Crim. App.
1968); People v. Schatz, 37 App. Div. 2d 584, 322
N.Y.S.2d 802 (1971).
6 2United States v. Cotter, 425 F.2d 450 (1st Cir.
1970); Rhodus v. People, 160 Colo. 407, 418 P.2d 42
(1966) (argument based upon prosecutor's own ex-
perience in many cases, improper); Wilson v. State,
261 Md. 551, 276 A.2d 214 (1971); Peopl6 v. Schatz, 37
App. Div. 2d 584, 322 N.Y.S.2d 902 (1971); People v.
Allen, 26 App. Div. 2d 573, 271 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1966).
" State ex rd. Black v. Tahash, 280 Minn. 155,
158 N.W.2d 504 (1968) (what is inadmissible directly
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to specific evidence which was never introduced"
or to the existence of other evidence not in the
record.66 It is also improper to refer to evidence
which was excluded by the court,67 except in cer-
tain instances where there is testimony regarding
the excluded or unintroduced evidence.65 It may
cannot be injected by indirection; the prosecution is
not permitted to implant insinuations and innuendoes
which suggest to the jury that there exists other evi-
dence of guilt which is not admissible).
65 United States v. Hestie, 439 F.2d 131 (2d Cir.
1971) (comment on Jencks Act report); Reichert v.
United States, 359 F.2d 278 (D.C. Cir. 1966) (refer-
ences to witness's statement which was not in evi-
dence)*; People v. Laursen, 264 Cal. App. 2d 932,
71 Cal. Rptr. 71 (1968) (accomplice's confession, not
in evidence)*; State v. Hopper, 251 La. 77, 203 So.
2d 222 (1967) (there were many pictures which could
not be shown to the jury); People v. Hider, 12 Mich.
App. 526, 163 N.W.2d 273 (1968) (argument that
inadmissible police report would speak for itself if
defense cared to introduce it); People v. Tucker, 33
App. Div. 2d 823, 305 N.Y.S.2d 569 (1969) (reference
to inadmissible prior statement by witness)*.66 United States v. American Radiator and Standard
Sanitation Corp., 433 F.2d 174 (3rd Cir. 1970) (im-
plying the existence of damaging evidence outside the
record); State v. Hunt, 8 Ariz. App. 514, 447 P.2d
896 (1968) (there were certain things that could not
be introduced); Songer v. State, 464 P.2d 763 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1969); Joyner v. State, 436 S.W.2d 141
(Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (there were many things
that could not be introduced at trial, and the prose-
cutor was mad and sorry that he could not bring them
in)*; State v. Ranicke, 3 Wash. App. 892, 479 P.2d
135 (1970) (that case could have gone on for two weeks
had prosecution presented all the evidence iii detail
and two hundred witnesses could have been ealled)*.
See State v. Smith, 187 Neb. 152, 187 N.W.2d 753
(1971) (explaining police failure to search premises
because they were prevented by law from doing so).
Garris v. United States, 390 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (use of excluded evidence in argument not
waived by failure to object); Bowers v. Coiner, 309 F.
Supp. 1064 (S.D. W. Va. 1970) (argument the de-
fendant "brandished that gun" and "upon this evi-
dence" jury should convict, where gun had been
displayed during testimony by police officer but had
then been ruled inadmissible)*; People v. Brown, 3 Ill.
App. 3d 1022, 279 N.E.2d 765 (1972)*; People v.
Carpenter, 131 Ill. App. 2d 187, 266 N.E.2d 478
(1970) (abstract only); State v. Perry, 274 Minn. 1,
142 N.W.2d 573 (1966) (references to polygraph test);
State v. Polsky, 82 N.M. 393, 482 P.2d 257 (Ct. App.
1971); People v. Adams, 21 N.Y.2d 397, 235 N.E.2d
214,288 N.Y.S.2d 255 (1968)*; State v. Green, 70 Wash.
2d 955, 425 P.2d 913 (1967), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1023
(1967) (alluding to fact defendant would not talk to
detective when arrested, where detective's statement
was inadmissible). See United States ex rd. Garcia v.
Follette, 417 F.2d 709 (2d Cir. 1969) (reference to gun
which had been excluded was trial error w'ithout con-
stitutional dimension).
G People v. Sheets, 251 Cal. App. 2d 759, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 777 (1967) (referring to tan coat on back seat of
defendant's car where the coat was not in evidence
but there was testimony regarding it); State v. Potts,
205 Kan. 47,468 P.2d 78 (1970) (impeaching statement
where question and answer were in record) ; People v.
Ruppuhn, 25 Mich. App. 62, 180 N.W.2d 900 (1970)
be improper to refer to evidence which was im-
properly admitted, 69 or to evidence which was
excluded by an agreement between counsel. 0 When
there is more than one defendant, and evidence is
admitted but restricted to use against less than all
of the co-defendants, the prosecutor's remarks
must conform to the restrictions71
In conformity to the general rule and the enun-
(mentioning blood and hairpiece where neither was in
evidence, but there was testimony regarding them);
State v. Olek, 288 Minn. 235, 179 N.W.2d 320 (1970)
(state may comment on physical evidence which for
technical reasons was excluded if there is properly ad-
mitted testimony referring to the excluded object);
Dickey v. State, 444 P.2d 373 (Wyo. 1968) (where
knife defendant admitted was his was shown to jury
and testimony regarding it given, proper to refer to
it in argument whether it was admitted or not).69 United States v. Guglielmini, 384 F.2d 602 (2d
Cir. 1967) (argument based on evidence which should
not have been admitted was improper); State v.
Madison, 281 Minn. 170, 160 N.W.2d 680 (1968),
cerfl. denied, 390 U.S. 990 (1968) (improper to admit
testimony regarding identification of defendant from
police pictures and to permit comment). See Lenz! v.
State, 456 S.W.2d 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (argu-
ment proper if evidence admissible); State v. Hoover,
257 La. 877, 244 So. 2d 818 (1971) (referring to report
as in evidence when not but testimony was. Compare
Jackson v. State, 465 S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1971) (proper
to use and refer to physical evidence in argument, and
absent a showing of inadmissibility it must be as-
sumed that the evidence was properly before the jury)
with State v. Propp, 104 Ariz. 466, 455 P.2d 263
(1969) (the fact that evidence might have been ex-
cluded if objected to does not preclude the prosecutor
from referring to it in argument). Precluding comment
on improperly admitted evidence may require too
much foresight on the part of the prosecutor, though.
v0 People . Mwathery, 103 Ill. App. 2d 114, 243
N.E.2d 429 (1968) (where the prosecutor agreed not to
refer to a certain statement but did so anyway, the
court said this action might amount to reversible error,
but reversed on other grounds). In United States v.
Spenard, 438 F.2d 717 (2d Cir. 1971), the court held
that it was proper to argue to the jury that there was
no insanity issue in the case regardless of the fact that
(1) the government had previously agreed to dismiss
the case if the defendant would accept a commitment
to a state hospital, or (2) the government had a record
of the defendant's prior mental disorder. The court
reasoned that to hold otherwise would deny the govern-
ment the opportunity to attempt to dispose of a case
by trial or plea, on pain of being barred from subse-
quent prosecution. These two cases are not inconsistent,
since .M1wathery concerned an explicit agreement re-
garding the conduct of the trial, while Spenard in-
volved at best an implicit understanding in pre-trial
negotiations. For cases recognizing the general validity
of agreements between counsel, see United States v.
Paiva, 294 F. Supp. 742 (D.D.C. 1969) and Common-
wealth v. Benton, 356 Mass. 447, 252 N.E.2d 891
(1969).
7 People v. McKendall, 30 App. Div. 2d 717, 290
N.Y.S.2d 987 (1968) (reading portions of co-defendant's
confession and suggesting that the "other person"
mentioned in it was the defendant, where the court had
restricted the evidence to the co-defendant who made
the confession)*.
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ciated policies, it is naturally improper to misstate
the evidencer or contradict the record.n These
may not be grounds for reversal, however, where
the mistake is slight or inadvertent.
74
72 United States v. Stanley, 455 F.2d 644 (4th Cir.
1972); Haynes v. United States, 427 F.2d 152 (9th
Cir. 1970) (asserting that defendant's prior conviction
was for possession of heroin rather than marijuana);
Corley v. United States, 365 F.2d 884 (D.C. Cir.
1966) (erroneous account of alibi testimony where the
case was close)*; Smith v. State, 282 Ala. 268, 210
So. 2d 826 (1968) (arguing that fingerprints were
present when they were not)*; People v. Graves, 263
Cal. App. 2d 719, 70 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1968) (misstating
defendant's testimony as to prior convictions); People
v. Durant, 105 Ill. App. 2d 216, 245 N.E.2d 41 (1969),
a.ff'd sub. nora. People v. Wilson, 46 IB. 2d 376, 263
N.E.2d 856 (1970) (attributing to victim statements
not in record); State v. Miner, 14 Ohio St. 2d 232, 237
N.E.2d 400 (1968) (misstating testimony of officer
so that it seemed victim had identified defendant,
when he had not done so)*; Mills v. State, 12 Md. App.
449, 279 A.2d 473 (1971) (attributing testimony to
defendant rather than witness); Smith v. State, 446
S.W.2d 317 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (in prosecution for
raping niece, stating that she was the defendant's
daughter); State v. Ross, 290 A.2d 38 (Vt. 1972) (argu-
ment that defendant was an alcoholic, where no such
evidence, in drunk driving prosecution)*. See also
State v. Jenkins, 249 S.C. 570, 155 S.E.2d 624 (1967).
73 Miller v. Pate, 386 U.S. 1 (1967) (referring to
blood on shorts when prosecution knew it was actually
paint)*; United States v. Guajardo-Melendez, 401
F.2d 35 (7th Cir. 1968) (arguing that testimony of
undercover agent implicated defendant when it did
not); King v. United States, 372 F.2d 383 (D.C. Cir.
1966) (stating psychiatrist's testimony in a fashion
plainly contrary to record)*; Smith v. State, 282 Ala.
268, 210 So. 2d 826 (1968) (argument that one of de-
fendant's fresh fingerprints was found on window
shade at scene of crime, where no evidence)*; Kirk v.
State, 227 So. 2d 40 (Fla. App. 1969) (assertion that
defense had represented witness who had not been
called as vital to its case where false)*; State v. Heph-
ner, 161 N.W.2d 714 (Iowa 1968) (that chief prosecu-
tion witness was acquitted with defendant when he was
not); People v. Green, 27 III. 2d 39, 187 N.E.2d 708
(1963) (asserting informer not still a government
employee when federal agent had testified that he
was); People v. Kirby, 4 Mich. App. 201, 144 N.W.2d
651 (1966) (argument that defendant was not ever in a
certain city, as his alibi asserted, was not only an ex-
pression of opinion but contrary to information in
prosecutor's possession); State v. Streitz, 276 Minn.
242, 150 N.W.2d 33 (1967) (that defendant had failed
to take intoximeter test where defendant's testimony
indicated that he had consented but was not given
test)*; State v. Ward, 457 S.W.2d 701 (Mo. 1970)
(misstating that defendant's parole has been revoked);
People v. Williams, 37 App. Div. 2d 686, 323 N.Y.S.2d
377 (1971) (after using a prior statement to impeach
vitness, prosecutor argued that witness had testified
as set forth in statement)*; Barron v. State, 479 P.2d
614 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); State v. McGee, 52
Wis. 2d 736, 190 N.W.2d 893 (1971) (assertion that
the only eyewitness had testified where the evidence
showed that there were others). See also Bates v.
State, 483 P.2d 1384 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).
4 United States v. Hudson, 432 F.2d 413 (9th Cir.
1970) (where piosecution stated carelessly his recol-
There is one recognized exception to the rule
that remarks not based in the evidence are im-
proper; such remarks are proper if they concern
matters of general knowledge or experience.
7 5
Usually such comments are made by the prosecu-
tor for illustrative purposes or dramatic effect and
refer to historical facts, public personalities,
principles of divine law, biblical teachings, or
prominent current events in the community or the
nation.76 In addition, the statements may also be
lection of evidence, where there was no such evidence,
it was not error because prosecution correctly stated
that jury's recollection was to control, court gave the
correct instruction, and defense counsel took ad-
vantage of an opportunity to reply to the alleged mis-
statement); People v. Beivelman 70 Cal. 2d 60, 447
P.2d 913, 73 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1968) (unintentional
misstatement); Fernandez v. People, 490 P.2d 690
(Colo. 1971) (misstatements not error where done
honestly and unintentionally and three witnesses
correctly stated facts); People v. Weaver, 18 Ill. 2d
108, 163 N.E.2d 483 (1960) (misstatements not a
material factor in conviction); People v. Pecora, 107
Ill. App. 2d 283, 246 N.E.2d 865, cert. denied, 397
U.S. 1028 (1969); Wickware v. Commonwealth, 444
S.W.2d 272 (Ky. Grim. App. 1969) (slightly inaccurate
statement); State v. Hoover, 257 La. 877, 244 So.2d
818 (1971); Commonwealth v. Martin, 357 Mass.
190, 257 N.E.2d 444 (1970) (stating substantially
what witness had said, though with some inadvertent
errors); People v. Padula, 34 Mich. App. 302, 191
N.W.2d 73 (1971) (not intentionally inaccurate);
State v. Davidson, 44 Wis. 2d 177, 170 N.W.2d 755
(1969) (calling defendant wrong name).
75 United States v. Browning, 390 F.2d 511 (4th
Cir. 1968); State v. Williams, 107 Ariz. 262, 485 P.2d
832 (1971); People v. Smith, 118 Ill. App. 2d 65, 254
N.E.2d 596 (1969) (abstract only) (exhorting the
jury to use their own experience in use of telephone in
weighing evidence given by defense witness in regard
to phone going dead was proper and did not constitute
the giving of expert testimony by the prosecutor
though no evidence on the point was in the record);
State v. Smith, 257 La. 1109, 245 So. 2d 327 (1971).
See Embrey v. State, 283 Ala. 110, 214 So. 2d 567
(1968); Bagley v. State, 247 Ark. 113, 444 S.W.2d
567 (1969); State v. Maynor, 272 N.C. 524, 158 S.E.2d
612 (1968). See also cases cited in notes 76 & 77 infra.
76 United States v. Weiser, 428 F.2d 932 (2d Cir.
1969); Wright v. State, 279 Ala. 543, 188 So. 2d 272
(1966) (Biblical analogy); Robinson v. State, 249 So.
2d 872 (Ala. Crim. App. 1971) (reference to recent
fire bombings in city in arson prosecution); Martin
v. State, 223 Ga. 649, 157 S.E.2d 458 (1967) (argu-
ment that returning defendant to society someday
would be greater danger than threat of world com-
munism and Viet Cong); People v. Lion, 10 Ill. 2d
208, 139 N.E.2d 757 (1957) (comment upon character
testimony for defendant that "Alger Hiss, the con-
victed communist, had some perfect testimonials,"
was said to be perhaps improper). But see United
States v. Cotter, 425 F.2d 450 (1st Cir. 1970) (argument
at time of first moon landing in income tax evasion
case that if people do not pay their taxes there will
be no more moon landings, improper); McKeever v.
State, 118 Ga. App. 386, 163 S.E.2d 919 (1969) (de-
fendant more of a threat to lives of people of Atlanta
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permitted where they concern the interpretation
of the evidence in the case. 7
PROSECUTORIAL CONDUCT DURING ARGUMENT
General Actions
The considerable latitude permitted the prose-
cutor in commentary is equally applicable to his
conduct during summation. Thus it is generally
proper for him to move freely about the court-
room. However, the prosecutor should not sit in
the witness chair while delivering his argument
since it might give the jury the impression that the
argument is testimonial in nature or possibly
suggest the truth of the statements made.78 Also
because of the potential impact on the jurors,
addressing individual jurors has been repeatedly
disapproved." Similarly, remarks directed to the
defendant are not condoned."
As indicated above, in some circumstances the
prosecutor may read the law to the jury from re-
ported cases or approved texts. 7 It is also proper
than Viet Cong, improper); State v. Spence, 271 N.C.
23, 155 S.E.2d 802 (1967) (proper to refuse defense
counsel permission to argue the Sacco-Vanzetti case
and history of the M'Naghten rule); State v. Jacob-
sen, 74 Wash. 2d 36, 442 P.2d 629 (1968) (while gen-
erally proper to refer to matters of common knowledge,
and problems of auto deaths, legislative concern with
such, and attempts to enforce the law, these references
were improper in drunk driving prosecution). See
also Paramore v. State, 229 So. 2d 855 (Fla. 1969)
(parole a matter of common knowledge); Graham v.
State, 422 S.W.2d 922 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (same).
7 7United States ex rd. Coleman v. Mancusi, 423
F.2d 985 (2d Cir. 1970) (proper to argue that gun had
to be cocked before firing, even though no expert
testimony, where it was obvious from introduction
of the weapon); Shadle v. State 280 Ala. 379, 194 So.
2d 538 (1967) (that color of defendant's hair had been
and could be changed); People v. Washington, 71
Cal. 2d 1061, 458 P.2d 479, 80 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1969)
(age of victim); Brinkley v. State, 233 A.2d 56 (Del.
1967) (that in photograph rust marks and bullet
holes would appear the same); People v. Smith, 118
Ill. App. 2d 65, 254 N.E.2d 596 (1969).
78 United States v. Ziak 360 F.2d 850 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 385 U.S. 834 4966). Cf. Rivers v. State,
226 So. 2d 337 (Fla. 1969) (reading defendant's state-
ment to jury while seated in witness chair was not a
comment on defendant's failure to testify).
79 People v. Sawyer, 256 Cal. App. 2d 66, 63 Cal.
Rptr. 749 (1967) ("sir" and "ma'am" improper);
People v. Davis, 46 Ill. 2d 554, 264 N.E.2d 585 (1970);
People v. Comparetto, 193 N.W.2d 626 (Minn. 1971);
Ford v, State, 227 So. 2d 454 (Miss. 1969); State v.
Zadick, 148 Mont. 296, 419 P.2d 749 (1966); Mont-
gomery v. State, 447 P.2d 469 (Okla. Crim. App.
1968).
80 Pendergrast v. United States, 416 F,2d 776 (D.C.
Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 926 (1969) (improper to
refer to defendant as "Mr. Defendant"); People v.
Hotz, 261 11. 239 (1914).8 1See notes 34 & 45, supra, and accompanying text.
to read from and comment upon books, records,
or documents which are properly before the court,
7
though any reference to a change of venue in the
case is disallowed. 7 Counsel's recollection may be
refreshed from the stenographer's minutes,1 but it
is proper to read from the transcript only when
the defense concurs that the matter is not in dis-
pute. 1 Where the testimony is disputed, reading is
not permitted, on the theory that the jury will
decide the thrust of such testimony.8 While the
prosecutor may refer to a memorandum or per-
sonal notes regarding the defense summation,87 it
is not proper to read testimony from a personal
memorandum rather than the transcript since the
memorandum may emphasize the prosecutor's
version of the testimony.7
Use of Real and Demonstrative Evidence
The use of and reference to admitted real evi-
dence is widely recognized as proper, so long as
the action portrayed conforms with that indicated
in the record. 89 For example, it was permissible
82 Posey v. United States, 416 F.2d 545 (5th Cir.
1969) (confession of codefendant); People v. Bote,
376 11. 264, 33 N.E.2d 449 (1941) (statutory definitions
of offenses, where same appeared in instructions);
State v. McNeal, 167 N.W.2d 674 (Iowa 1969) (in-
dictment); State v. Rouse, 256 La. 275, 236 So. 2d
211 (1970) (bill of information amended during trial).
See People v. Gambos, 5 Cal. App. 3d 187, 84 Cal.
Rptr. 908 (1970) (proper to refer to establishment of
necessary element of offense by stipulation).
8 People v. Munday, 280 Ill. 32, 117 N.E. 286
(1917).
4 People v, Birger, 329 Ill. 352, 160 N.E. 564 (1928);
Partin v. Commonwealth, 445 S.W.2d 433 (Ky. Crim.
App. 1969) (just prior to argument, prosecutor listened
through earphone to portion of tape recording of
testimony, then referred to it in argument).
85 People v. DeStefano, 85 Ill. App. 2d 274, 229
N.E.2d 325, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 997 (1967). See
State v. McConnell, 178 N.W.2d 386 (Iowa 1970)
(proper to give interpretation of what prosecutor
thought witness meant by answer, where court refused
to permit reading from record).
"6 People v. Smith, 105 Ill. App. 2d 8, 245 N.E.2d
23 (1966) (reading from transcript and commenting on
defendant's testimony).
8 People v. Beil, 322 Ill. 434, 153 N.E. 639 (1926).
8 People v. Willy, 301 Ill. 307, 133 N.E. 859 (1921).
89.People v. Brisco, 15 Mich. App. 428, 166 N.W.2d
475 (1968) (exposure of knife which was dumped from
an envelope on counsel table within sight of jurors
who noticed it was prejudicial error where the knife
had been ruled inadmissible); Jackson v. State, 465
S.W.2d 642 (Mo. 1971); Commonwealth v. Glover,
446 Pa. 492, 286 A.2d 349 (1972) (display of a knife
not in evidence during argument was improper but
not reversible error where the jury knew no knife was
involved in the case). But see People v. Morris, 10
Mich. App. 526, 159 N.W.2d 886 (1968) (conduct of
prosecutor in using in demonstration a gun which had
been suppressed was improper blit not prejudicial
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for the prosecutor, in describing an event, to pick
up and swing a two-wheeled hand cart, suggesting
the manner in which the wounds were inflicted,
where this was in accord with the testimony.90 It
was also proper for the prosecutor, in attempting
to demonstrate the manner in which the defend-
ant's fingerprints were left on a door at the scene
of the crime, to show how the door had been
pushed back and forth, since there was testimony
to this effect. 9' Furthermore, the prosecutor was
permitted to jump repeatedly for about two
minutes in a loud and noisy manner on a piece of
paper he had thrown on the floor where such con-
formed with the description of the defendant's
treatment of the victim.Y On the other hand, it
was error for the prosecutor to stand before the
jury for three minutes holding a sawed-off shotgun
in his hands since the conditions of the crime had
not been adequately recreated.93
It may also be proper for the prosecutor to
demonstrate the government's theory of the crime
where there is no affirmative testimony but his
action conforms to the state of the evidence. Thus,
it was permissible for the prosecutor to rub a
pistol with a shirt, both of which were in evidence,
to demonstrate his theory supporting the reason
why no prints were found on the gun.9s
The primary question to be asked concerning
reference to or use of real evidence is whether the
manner of reference or use is such that the juror's
fears and prejudices will be aroused in a way which
impairs reasoned judgment.95 While reference to
and exhibition of some pieces of real evidence98 or
where defendant's motion that gun be removed from
courtroom was granted and there was no indication to
jury that the weapon was the one which was sup-
pressed).
90 Bradburn v. State, 269 N.E.2d 539 (Ind. 1971).
91 People v. Speck, 41 Ill. 2d 177, 242 N.E.2d 208
(1968).
9 Wright v. State, 422 S.W.2d 184 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1967). The trial court reported to the appellate
court that it could not determine the impression the
jury may have received from this demonstration. The
defense attorney, apparently grasping at straws, ob-
jected, "'We object to this outrageous thing, and
furthermore the evidence was that he was not on his
chest, but that he was on his stomach."
S93People v. Wicks, 115 Ill. App. 2d 19, 252 N.E.2d
698 (1969).
4 People v. Roberts, Ill. App. 2d-, 272 N.E.2d
768 (1971).
95See State v. Dillon, 93 Ida. 698, 471 P.2d 553
(1970) and State v. Hopper, 251 La. 77, 203 So. 2d
222 (1967), both discussing the admissibility of par-
ticularly gruesome photographs in criminal cases.
96 People v. Speck, 41 Ill. 2d 177, 242 N.E.2d 208
(1968) (where identification in issue, showing jury
police drawing/of suspect and asking jury to compare
the repetition of an earlier demonstration are
proper during argument,9 7 the prosecutor must be
careful to avoid unfair lengthy demonstration or
emphatical comment.9
It is clear that the use of demonstrative evi-
dence-visual aids not actually admitted into evi-
dence-is appropriate.9 9 The general requirements
for the use of demonstrative evidence are that the
conditions shown by the exhibit do not vary sig-
nificantly from those that existed at the time of
the events in _question, and that the exhibit con-
stitutes a "true and fair representation" of what it
purports to show.sO As a general proposition,
it with defendant); People v. Moore, 35 Ill. 2d 399,
220 N.E.2d 443, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 861 (1967) (dis-
play of gun); People v. Robinson, 106 III. App. 2d 78,
246 N.E.2d 15 (1969) (photo of deceased in morgue
showing bullet holes, in bench trial).
97 United States v. Higuchi, 437 F.2d 835 (9th Cir.
1971) (contention that court abused its discretion in
permitting prosecutor to use an overhead projector as a
visual aid during argument in prosecution for trans-
porting forged checks was "completely without merit");
State v. Orzen, 83 N.M. App. 458, 493 P.2d 768 (Ct.
App. 1972) (no abuse of discretion in permitting
prosecutor to show motion picture film in evidence
during argument and to stop and reverse film and
comment upon what was shown). However, the prose-
cutor should keep in mind the time limitations, and
may not have an opportunity to fully repeat a demon-
stration during argument. See notes 24-26, supra,
and accompanying text.
98 People v. Wicks, 115 Ill. App. 2d 19, 252 N.E.2d
698 (1969); Adler v. State, 248 Ind. 193, 225 N.E.2d
171 (1967) (in robbery prosecution, thumbtacking
picture of robbery victim's body to a board which
jury could see for 45 minutes while instructions were
read, and then showing it again and discussing it
during argument, was error); Joyner v. State, 436
S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (discussing danger
of pistol, pointing it at defendant and pulling trigger,
improper).
99 State v. Logan, 156 Mont. 48,473 P.2d 833 (1970)
(proper to let prosecutor use a chart not in evidence
but based on evidence as a visual aid in connection
with bullet holes in body of victim, illustrating compu-
tations made by state in connection therewith); State
v. Woodards, 6 Ohio St. 2d 14, 215 N.E.2d 568 (1966)
(proper during argument to use a bottle, straw, pen,
dowel, and a pair of calipers, none of which were in
evidence, in a demonstration, in rape prosecution
where there was only circumstantial evidence); Garcia
v. State, 428 S.W.2d 334 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 1968)
(while discussing penetration and presence of sperm in
vagina, prosecutor went to blackboard and made a dot
which was supposed to be a sperm, and asked jury to
observe it and see if it moved; proper as an illustration
of medical testimony); State v. Richardson, 44 Wis.
2d 75, 170 N.W.2d 775 (1969) (where prosecutor was
discussing identification, argument as to whether
either or both of police officers in courtroom had
mustache did not compel mistrial on ground of in-
troduction of new evidence, even if officers were
turned away from the jury until the argument was
made and then simultaneously turned around).
100 D. LOUISELL, J. KAPLAS7 & J. WALTz, EviDENcE
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courts apply the same rules regarding these ques-
tions in criminal cases as they do in civil cases. T'
COMMENTING ON WITNESSES
The examination of witnesses is likely to take
up a good part of any trial. Commentary on the
testimony, character, and credibility of the wit-
nesses will often require a proportional amount of
the prosecutor's summation. Proper remarks by
the prosecutor are those which are reasonably
justified by the evidence or testimony, and are
restricted to presenting an interpretation of the
testimony, pointing out conflicts and inconsisten-
cies, and discussing the reliability of the wit-
nesses.1'2
The ultimate issue of credibility is for the jury
alone.I° For the same policy reasons previously
discussed,10 4 the prosecutor's personal beliefs and
opinions as to the truthfulness of the testimony
and the character of the witnesses must be avoided;
otherwise the veracity of the prosecutor may be
placed in issue.1 5
1304-05 (Appendix A) (2d ed. 1972). See Cady, Ob-
jections to Demonstrative Evidence, 32 Mo. L. REv.
333 (1967), and articles cited therein; M. BELTI,
MoDERN TiAm §§ 360-85 (1954).
101 State v. Woodards, 6 Ohio St. 2d 14, 215 N.E.2d
568 (1966).
10 Chatman v. United States, 411 F.2d 1139 (9th
Cir. 1969); Gibson v. United States, 403 F.2d 569
(D. C. Cir. 1968) (may question whether witness telling
truth but only to remind jury that credibility is for
them alone); People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d.529, 421 P.2d
393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966); Valdez v. People, 168
Colo. 429, 451 P.2d 750 (1969) (proper to comment on
how well and in what manner a witness measures up
to the tests of credibility); Fulks v. State, 481 P.2d
769 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); State v. Edwards, 471
P.2d 843 (Ore. App. 1970); State v. Pitts, 256 S.C.
420, 182 S.E.2d 738 (1971); State v. Walton, 5 Wash.
App. 150, 486 P.2d 1118 (1971). See Barron v. State,
479 P.2d 614 (Okla. Crim. A pp. 1971). But see United
States v. Jones, 433 F.2d 1107 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (argu-
ments regarding veracity of witnesses improper).
101 Gibson v. United States, 403 F.2d 569 (D.C.
Cir. 1968).
101 See People v. Montevecchio, 32 Mich. App. 163,
188 N.W.2d 186 (1971). See also notes 62 & 63 supra,
and accompanying text.
101 United States v. Hoskins, 446 F.2d 564 (9th
Cir. 1971) (repeatedly asserting personal belief in
accuracy of testimony of government witnessei was
improper, but here not deliberate and at any rate in-
vited); United States v. Miceli, 446 F.2d 256 (1st
Cir. 1971) (that accomplice of defendant who testified
for government had made an arrangement to testify
truthfully); United States v. American Radiator and
Standard Sanitation Corp., 433 F.2d 174 (3d Cir. 1970)
(personally vouching for credibility); United States v.
Daniel, 422 F.2d 816 (6th Cir. 1970) ("I believe him,
and I submit to you that this aspect of his testimony
is worthy of belief"); Clark v. United States, 391
Within these limitations the prosecutor may
comment favorably 108 or unfavorably1 07 on any
F.2d 57 (8th Cir. 1968); United States v. Murphy,
374 F.2d 651 (2d Cir. 1967) ("I think" may be proper
phrase where it is clear that prosecutor is merely
introducing a statement of what conclusions he is led to
by the evidence); Stout v. People, 171 Colo. 142,
464 P.2d 872 (1970) (complaining witnesses in rape
were good and fine girls and not types defendant and
his witnesses said they were); People v. Montevecchio,
32 Mich. App. 163, 188 N.W.2d 186 (1971) (remarks
characterizing defendant as a professional whose
friends had perjured themselves in testifying as to
defendant's alibi were made as factual statements
which would lead jury to believe prosecutor believed
defendant guilty)*; People v. Stroble, 31 Mich. App.
94, 187 N.W.2d 474 (1971) (personal bdief that de-
tective had told truth); People v. Poe, 27 Mich. App.
422, 183 N.W.2d 628 (1970) (personal belief that
prosecution witness not entitled to credibility); People
v. Hickman, 34 App. Div. 2d 831, 312 N.Y.S.2d 644
(1970) (where case rested entirely on credibility,
vouching for such credibility and stating personal
knowledge whether there were other eyewitnesses)*;
People v. Davis, 29 App. Div. 2d 556, 285 N.Y.S.2d
719 (1967) (opinion as to truthfulness of complainant's
testimony); Sisk v. State, 487 P.2d 1003 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1971) (stating personal belief in validity of
testimony to reinforce it); Shepard v. State, 437 P.2d
565 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967) (argument that a witness
was a "plant and we know it"); State v. Gairson, 484
P.2d 854 (Ore. App. 1971); State v. Walton, 5 Wash.
App. 150, 486 P.2d 1118 (1971).
It would seem to follow that it is equally inap-
propriate for the prosecutor to place his veracity in
issue more directly, as by taking the stand and testi-
fying, but this does not appear to be the rule. United
States v. Brown, 451 F.2d 1231 (5th Cir. 1971) (vouch-
ing for credibility and giving personal opinion)*;
Patriarca v. United States, 402 F.2d 314 (1st Cir.)
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1022 (1968) (if witness whose
testimony was attacked by defense was lying, so were
FBI and United States Attorney's Office); Terry v.
Commonwealth, 471 S.W.2d 730 (Ky. Crim. App.
1971) (personal knowledge that persons referred to by
alibi witness were "rotten to the core"); State v. Hud-
son, 253 La. 992, 221 So. 2d 484 (1969) (prosecutor
had tried enough capital cases and had a good enough
reputation in courtroom that he would not tell a
witness what to say on the stand and try to fool jurors);
Beal v. State, 432 S.W.2d 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968)
(where evidence contained prosecutor's testimony that
defendant's general reputation for truth and veracity
was bad, proper to state personal knowledge that de-
fendant was an habitual liar; one dissent argued that
the prosecutor had gone beyond his own testimony).
See People v. Smith, 26 App. Div. 2d 588, 272 N.Y.S.2d
33 (1966) (placing veracity of coprosecutor in issue by
telling jury it would have been his duty to inform them
if he had made any promises to defendant's accomplice
to induce him to testify)*. See also United States v.
D'Antonio 362 F.2d 151 (7th Cir.) cert. denied, 385
U.S. 900 4966) (prosecutor determined truth of wit-
nesses before he put them on stand, improper); and
State v. Dobbin, 251 Ore. 56, 444 P.2d 541 (1968)
(state vouches for credibility of all witnesses it calls,
improper). Cf. note 6 supra, and cases discussed
therein.
10, United States v. Crisp, 435 F.2d 354 (7th Cir.
1970) (that government witness has testified truthfully
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witness who testified for either the government'0 8
or the defense. 09 This includes comment upon the
was proper where prosecutor did not say or insinuate
that his statement was based upon personal knowledge);
United States v. Guiliano, 383 F.2d 30 (3d Cir. 1967)
(regarding testimony of informers with admitted
records, "It takes a thief to catch a thief"); United
States v. DeAlesandro, 361 F.2d 694 (2d Cir. 1966)
(to acquit defendant jury would have to find witnesses
perjurors); Jackson v. State, 359 F.2d 260 (D.C.Cir.
1966) ("reputable" officers and "very sweet" com-
plaining witness); Valdez v. People, 168 Colo. 429,
451 P.2d 750 (1969) (very accurate); Commonwealth
v. Gerald, 356 Mass. 386, 252 N.E.2d 344 (1969)
(that there was not one bit of conduct on part of wit-
ness that rang with anything but truth); Common-
wealth v. Soroko, 353 Mass. 254, 230 N.E.2d 922
(1967) (that in any criminal case, witness should be
given credit for testifying was proper); State v. Burgess,
290 Minn. 480, 185 N.W.2d 537 (1971) (according a
citizen credit for doing his civic duty is not the same
as an expression of personal opinion that a witness is
credible); State v. Rhinehart, 70 Wash. 2d 649, 424
P.2d 906 (1967) (witness had nothing to gain by in-
forming police he had committed sodomy with de-
fendant). But see United States v. Jenkins, 436 F.2d
140 (D.C.Cir. 1970) (that if complaining witness had
made any prior inconsistent statement, then defense
would have used it to impeach was improper); Wright
v. United States, 391 F.2d 542 (9th Cir. 1968) (that
chief government witness was a government employee
and therefore eminently credible, improper); Friedman
v. United States, 381 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1967) (that
if complaining witness had made any prior inconsistent
statement, then defense would have used it to im-
peach was improper).
"17 United States v. Warren, 447 F.2d 278 (2d Cir.
1971) (that after defendant was caught, the best way
for him to get out of his predicament was to hire the
best scientists in the country to present their theories
that he was psychotic and lost contact with reality
during the crime); United States v. Strauss, 443 F.2d
986 (1st Cir. 1971) (defense witnesses members of
criminal element); United States v. Blue, 440 F.2d
300 (7th Cir. 1971) (prosecutor said he was not asking
jury to believe that government witnesses were "nice
people"); United States v. Graydon, 429 F.2d 120
(4th Cir. 1970) (suggesting defendant's alibi witness
had given false testimony); United States v. Lyon,
397 F.2d 505 (7th Cir. 1968) (in prostitution prosecu-
tion, that evidence was cluttered with disgusting,
shocking, maybe dirty, disrespectful, dishonest testi-
mony and ideas); People v. Marino, 95 Ill. App. 2d
369, 238 N.E.2d 245 (1968), af'd, 44 Ill. 2d 562, 256
N.E.2d 770 (1970) (evidence justified references to two
policemen as the "I don't remember twins" and to
police chief as "shifty," and accusation that the three
were corrupt); People v. Poe, 27 Mich. App. 422,
183 N.W.2d 628 (1970) (remark that prosecutor did
not consider testimony of government witness reliable
could not prejudice defendant); People v. Williams,
11 Mich. App. 62, 160 N.W.2d 599 (1968) (using phrase
"ring around a rosy" to describe situation where de-
fendant had testified for his witness in a witness's
case); State v. Pitts, 256 S.C. 410, 182 S.E.2d 738
(1971) (discrediting government witness's testimony
as to defendant's appearance). But see United States
v. Arendale, 444 F.2d 1260 (5th Cir. 1971) (saying
government considered defense witness such a scoundrel
that he had to be watched, improper); People v.
inconsistent accounts of the crime,"0 possible
sources of bias,"' and prior convictions,m as well
as participation in the crime"3 and courtroom
conduct."4 It has also been considered appropriate
to make reference to invocation of the fifth amend-
ment by the witness,"1 at least in those instances
Nicolaus, 65 Cal. 2d 866, 423 P.2d 787, 56 Cal. Rptr.
635 (1967) (should not argue personalities, here re-
garding doctor who testified for defense); Fulks v.
State, 481 P.2d 769 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (de-
fendant's family "tried to frame up a story" and jury
should not let them "come in here with some trumped
up perjury defense" improper).
"I Jones v. United States, 358 F.2d 383 (8th Cir.
1968). See also United States v. Blue, 440 F.2d 300
(7th Cir. 1971); Day v. State, 2 Md. App. 334, 234
A.2d 894 (1967) (proper to make derogatory remarks
about prosecution and defense witnesses); State v.
Pitts, 256 S.C. 420, 182 S.E.2d 738 (1971).
01 State v. Jackson, 201 Kan. 795, 443 P.2d 279
(1968) (a matter about which a defense witness is
properly questioned is a proper subject for comment).
no People v. Weinstein, 35 Ill. 2d 467, 220 N.E.2d
432 (1966), after remand, 110 Ill. App. 2d 382, 249
N.E.2d 687 (1969) (accounts by defendant while
testifying).
"'People v. Washington, 71 CaL 2d 1061, 458
P.2d 479, 80 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1969) (doctor hired by
defense was defense-oriented); People v. Winstead,
90 I1. App. 2d 167, 234 N.E.2d 175 (1967); jump v.
Commonwealth, 444 S.W.2d 723 (Ky. Crim. App.
1969) (that defendant's witnesses, who were his friends,
were naturally going to be friendly to him and might
try to slant their testimony); State v. Rose, 270 N.C.
406, 154 S.E.2d 492 (1967) (defendant's brother was
more likely to fabricate than was rape victim); State v.
Litterlough, 6 N.C. App. 36, 169 S.E.2d 269 (1969)
(witness was "living in sin" with defendant).
"I United States v. Guiliano, 383 F.2d 30 (3d Cir.
1967).
" James v. People, 161 Colo. 105, 420 P.2d 229
(1966) (witness had "pleaded himself out"); Herzig v.
State, 213 So. 2d 900 (Fla. App. 1968) (testimony
highly questionable and witness had already been
charged with and probably would be tried for a similar
offense arising from the same incident); People v.
Magby, 37111. 2d 197,226 N.E.2d 33 (1967).
"1 State v. Dillon, 93 Ida. 698, 471 P.2d 553 (1970)
(referring to fact that a defense witness was in court-
room during the testimony of one witness in violation
of sequester); State v. Edwards, 471 P.2d 843 (Ore.
App. 1970) (giving evasive answers); State v. Ruud,
41 Wis. 2d 720, 165 N.W.2d 153 (1969) (where several
defense witnesses appeared in court in "outlandish"
costumes, proper to refer to them as defendant's
"hippie friends").
"I United States v. Ceniceros, 427 F.2d 685 (9th
Cir. 1970) (where there was good reason to believe the
fifth amendment privilege was being misused to create
an unjustified inference favorable to the party calling
the witness, the prosecutor properly noted this in his
argument); United States ex rd. Irwin v. Pate, 357
F.2d 911 (7th Cir. 1966) (where there was no good
reason to believe that state defendant's refusal to
answer question was legally permissible, prosecutor
could properly comment on the refusal to testify);
State v. Polsky, 82 N.M. 393, 482 P.2d 257 (Ct. App.
1971) (remarks proper where related only to defense
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in which the prosecutor did not know that such
action would be taken until the witness was called
to the stand.116 There is some question concerning
the propriety of characterizing a witness as liar or
perjurer, however, even if accurate.
17
If justified by the evidence, reference to the fact
that a witness was afraid to testify and was given
protection may be condoned."' However, when a
witness does not testify, it is improper to suggest
witness's credibility, with no inference drawn regarding
the defendant).
116 Lawrence v. Wainwright, 445 F.2d 281 (5th
Cir. 1971) (cannot call witness closely identified with
the defendant knowing witness will invoke fifth amend-
ment); Cain v. App, 442 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1971) (in
part prejudicial error to call witness knowing he would
invoke fifth amendment, and then to capitalize on
such in argument); Bowles v. United States, 439
F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (improper for either counsel
to refer to lack of testimony from witness counsel
knew would invoke the privilege; here, it was the de-
fense which wanted to put a witness whom defendant
claimed committed the crime on the stand, and the
lower court's denial of permission was affirmed. Bazelon,
C. J., and Wright, J., dissented, arguing that this was a
different situation. from that where the government
wishes to call the witnesses); United States v. Krechev-
sky, 291 F. Supp. 290 (D. Conn. 1967) (improper for
prosecutor to call witness knowing he will refuse to
testify, and then to comment on the refusal); State v.
Johnson, 243 Ore. 532, 413 P.2d 383 (1966) (calling
witness who was alledged accomplice and then com-
menting)*; Mathis v. State, 469 S.W.2d 796 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1971) (calling co-indictee without knowing
what he would testify is prosecutorial misconduct).
See United States v. Tierney, 424 F.2d 643 (9th Cir.
1970) (reference to grant of immunity to witness "so
he couln't hide behind the fifth amendment" was not a
comment on defendant's failure to testify); Cota v.
Arizona, 304 F. Supp. 876 (D. Ariz. 1969) (comment on
witness's refusal to testify was not prejudical to de-
fendant where the facts sought in the questions to the
witness were proved by other witnesses). But see Price
v. State, 37 Wis. 2d 117, 154 N.W.2d 222 (1967) (proper
to call witness knowing he will invoke privilege if fact
is not emphasized in argument).
u7 People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P.2d 393, 55
Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966) (repeated references to de-
fendant's wife as a perjuror, and suggestion that perjury
bore directly on issue of guilt, improper); People v.
Conover, 243 Cal. App. 2d 38, 52 Cal. Rptr. 172
(perjuror, improper); State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646,
157 S.E.2d 335 (1967) (should not call any witness a
liar). But see People v. Drury, 250 Ill. App. 547 (1928),
af'd. 335 I0. 539, 167 N.E. 823 (1929) (perjuror justi-
fied by evidence). See Crowe v. State, 400 S.W.2d
766 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (improper to state that a
witness could be bribed).
'18 People v. Paine, 250 Cal. App. 2d 517, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 753 (1967) (that witness was terrified of the de-
fendant and his prior statement was more correct);
People v. Hynes, 26 Ill. 2d 472, 187 N.E.2d 252 (1962)
(fear, and protection given). But see People v. Glick-
man, 27 Ill. App. 2d 379, 169 N.E.2d 815 (1960)
(unfounded references to fear of witnesses to testify
improper); People v. Roberts, 26 App. Div. 2d 655,
272 N.Y.S.2d 625 (1966) (unfounded implication that
what the testimony would have been since this is
dearly beyond th6 evidence in the case.ns
COhMENTING ON THE DEFENDANT
Failure to Testify at Trial
The United States Supreme Court has said that
where the defendant does not testify at trial,
the Fifth Amendment, in its direct application to
the Federal Government and its bearing on the
States by reason of the Fourteenth Amendment,
forbids either comment by the prosecution on the
accused's silence or instructions by the court that
such silence is evidence of guilt."u
The basic policies underlying this rule are the
preservation of official integrity and morality
requiring the government to independently prove
its case, and the respect for and desirability of
individual privacy."'
Several different standards have been espoused
by lower courts to aid them in determining whether
a transgression of this rule has occurred in particu-
lar situations. The federal courts and some state
courts, adopting the above language, state the test
in terms of the intention of the prosecutor and the
an important witness was not called because his life
would have been endangered, improper).
119 United States v. Lawler, 413 F.2d 622 (7th Cir.
1969) (where defense counsel argued that seller of
narcotics could not be obtained as defense witness,
improper to say that defense did not subpoena seller
because it knew he would assert fifth amendment);
State v. Levy, 160 N.W.2d 460 (Ia. 1968) (testimony
of defendant's wife would be damaging)*; People v.
Fields, 27 App. Div. 2d 736, 277 N.Y.S.2d 21 (1967)
(that murder victim would have testified against de-
fendant but for his death)*; Robinson v. State, 489
P.2d 1358 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (testimony of de-
fendant's wife would have been damaging). See State
v. Hodnett, 82 N.M. 710, 487 P.2d 138 (Ct. App.
1971) (not misconduct where postconviction hearing
showed that testimony of witnesses would not have
been favorable to defendant, where prosecutor did
not call them at trial and then commented on the
failure of the defense to call them).
m Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 615 (1965).
nt Tehan v. U.S. ex rd. Schott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966);
United States v. Broadhead, 413 F.2d 1351 (7th Cir.
1969) (every defendant has the right not to testify,
but to simply put the prosecution to its proof); People
v. Hardy, 271 Cal. App. 2d 322, 76 Cal. Rptr. 557
(1969) (preventing the exercise of a citizen's consti-
tutional privilege from being judicially emphasized as
affirmative evidence of guilt); Jones v. State, 197 So.
2d 308 (Fla. App. 1967) (preventing even the slightest
suggestion of guilt); Kaneshiro v. Belisario, 51 Hawaii
649, 466 P.2d 452 (1970) (applying no comment rule
to civil paternity proceeding on constitutional grounds).
See McKay, Sdf-Incrimination and the New Privacy,
1967 SUP. CT. REv. 193.
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character of his commentary: was the language
used by the prosecutor manifestly intended to be,
or of such a character that the jury would natu-
rally and necessarily take it to be, a comment on
the defendant's failure to testify?22 In contrast,
in Texas the language is viewed entirely from the
standpoint of the jury, and the implication that
the language might be construed as an implied or
direct allusion to the defendant's failure to testify
must be dear.124 An even more restricted approach
is taken in Alabama, where there must be almost
direct identification of the defendant as the indi-
vidual who has failed to testify; covert references
are construed against the defendant, regardless of
possible jury inference.2
4
Under any formulation of the standard it is
clear that a blatant and obvious reference to the
failure of the accused to testify at trial is improper,
whether the remark is made in positiveni or nega-
122 United States v. Chaney, 446 F.2d 571 (3d Cir.
1971); United States v. White, 444 F.2d 1274 (5th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Tierney, 424 F.2d 643
(9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Gatto, 299 F. Supp.
697 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Martinez v. People, 162 Colo.
195, 425 P.2d 299 (1967). See United States v. Miceli,
446 F.2d 256 (1st Cir. 1971) (proper, absent direct or
indirect focus); People v. Mills, 40 Ill. 2d 4, 237 N.E.
2d 697 (1968) (whether the reference was intended or
calculated to direct the attention of the jury to de-
fendant's failure to testify); State v. Flores, 76 N.M.
134, 412 P.2d 560 (1966)*.
m Overstreet v. State, 470 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1971).
124 King v. State, 45 Ala. App. 348, 230 So. 2d 538
(1970). But see State v. Acosta, 101 Ariz. 127, 416
P.2d 560 (1966) (any direct or indirect statement
amounting to an allusion to defendant's failure to
testify may be reversible error).
2 Smith v. Decker, 270 F. Supp. 225 (N.D. Tex.
1967) (reading portion of charge to jury which stated
no inference from failure to testify)*; Miller v. State,
240 Ark. 590, 401 S.W.2d 15 (1966) (that defendant
had chosen not to take the stand and that was his
privilege)*; People v. Stout, 66 Cal. 2d 184, 424 P.2d
704, 57 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1967)*; Carter v. State, 199
So. 2d 324 (Fla. App. 1967) (defendant had constitu-
tional right not to testify and exercise of that right
cannot be held against him)*; State v. Raymond, 258
Ia. 1339, 142 N.W.2d 444 (1966)*; People v. Hopkins,
124 Ill. App. 2d 415, 259 N.E.2d 577 (1970) (that any
defendant had the right to take the stand)*; State v.
Jones, 80 N.M. 753, 461 P.2d 235 (Ct. App. 1969)
(there is no testimony at all from either one of these
sterling defendants)*; State v. Smith, 10 Ohio App.
2d 186, 226 N.E.2d 807 (1967) ("this man never took
the stand to tell you that")*; Sisk v. State, 487 P.2d
1003 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (twice saying there was
not testimony to refute what victims said, and recog-
nizing there were no eyewitnesses, and "the defendant
did not make an announcement in your presence that
he did not need to take the stand, but he has that
right")*. Compare Jacobs v. United States, 395 F.2d
469 (8th Cir. 1968) (where four defendants, arguments
that there are only four people in courtroom who know
tive 2 6 manner. But the propriety of many other
types of remarks which would appear to highlight
the prohibited comment equally effectively is left
open.
Statements which fall within this middle ground
and are often deemed proper generally relate to
the state of the evidence in the case where no
defense has been presented. Included within this
category are comments to the effect that the
government's case is uncontradicted, 12  uncontro-
verted, 2 undenied, 129 or unrefuted, 130 or that the
where missing merchandise is and they are not about
to tell, was not a comment on failure to testify)*; Lock-
lear v. United States, 393 F.2d 729 (5th Cir. 1968)
(inadvertent remark that jury should determine guilt
or innocence by defendant's attitude on witness stand,
where defendant did not testify); White v. State, 118
Ga. App. 515, 164 S.E.2d 158 (1968) (in opening aigu-
ment-"We don't know what his defense is going to
be. We haven't heard from him in this case"-proper
where it did not carry with it the notion of an adverse
inference) with State v. Spring, 48 Wis. 2d 333, 179
N.W.2d 841 (1970) ("We have not had the benefit of
any statement on the part of the defendant" improper).
n6 Dill v. State, 10 Md. App. 362, 270 A.2d 489
(1970) ("if there are reasons why innocent people do
not testify before the court, I do not know what they
would be")*; State v. Waddell, 11 N.C. App. 577,
181 S.E.2d 737 (1971) ("Now I'm not commenting on
the defendant's failure to testify, I'm only asking why
they did not produce any explanation.")*. But see
United States v. Tierney, 424 F.2d 643 (9th Cir. 1970).
m United States v. Miceli, 446 F.2d 256 (1st Cir.
1971) (no testimony in defendant's favor on a point
in issue); United States v. Persico, 425 F.2d 1375
(2d Cir. 1970); United States v. Heithaus, 377 F.2d
484 (3d Cir. 1967) (uncontradicted and undenied);
United States v. Parisi, 365 F.2d 601 (6th Cir. 1966);
Gore v. State, 45 Ala. App. 131, 226 So.2d 674 (1969)
(uncontradicted and no one has denied); Moore v.
State, 244 Ark. 1197, 429 S.W.2d 122 (1968) (un-
contradicted and undenied); People v. Stout, 66 Cal.
2d 184, 424 P.2d 704, 57 Cal. Rptr. 152 (1967) (de-
fendant's failure to discredit or contradict state's
proof of venue where in issue); People v. Palmer, 47
Ill. 2d 289, 265 N.E.2d 358 (1969); Williams v. State,
464 S.W.2d 244 (Ky. Crim. App. 1971) (uncontro-
verted and undenied and no defense presented);
State v. Craig, 406 S.W.2d 618, (Mo. 1966); State v.
Botts, 184 Neb. 78, 165 N.W.2d 358 (1969); Watts v.
State, 487 P.2d 981 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971). But see
State v. McElroy, 96 N.J. Super. 582, 233 A.2d 677
(1967) (that there had not been one scintilla of evi-
dence on behalf of the defendant to contradict the
state's case)*.
United States v. Day, 384 F.2d 464 (3d Cir.
1967); Ruiz v. United States, 365 F.2d 103 (10th
Cir. 1966); United States ex red. Baskerville v. Frit4
329 F. Supp. 33 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); People v. Erickson,
254 Cal. App. 2d 395, 62 Cal. Rptr. 108 (1967). But
see Osgood v. State,- 192 So. 2d 64 (Fla. App. 1966)
(The witness "told you right here, and it's uncontro-
verted before you now, that these defendants told him
they committed the crime.")*.
129 Gore v. State, 45 Ala. App. 131, 226 So. 2d 674
(1969); Williams v. State, 464 S.W.2d 244 (Ky. Crim.
App. 1971); Foster v. Commonwealth, 415 S.W.2d
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government's witnesses were not shaken by cross-
examinationhi When making such statements,
however, the prosecutor must exercise care, for if
the defendant is the only person who could con-
tradict or deny the evidence, the comment is
improper.m If it is apparent that there are other
witnesses who could contradict the government's
case, the remark is within bounds.m When it is
not clear to the jury that there were other wit-
nesses, jurisdictions disagree as to propriety."
4
Jurisdictions also differ on the question whether
373 (Ky. Cim. App. 1967) (no witness had taken the
stand to deny); State v. Hampton, 430 S.W.2d 160
(Mo. 1968).
"I United States v. Guiliano, 383 F.2d 30 (3d Cir.
1967); People v. Northern, 256 Cal. App. 2d 28, 64
Cal. Rptr. 15 (1967); State v. McDavis, 463 S.W.2d
809 (Mo. 1971).
"I Parks v. Wainwright, 429 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir.
1970) (nothing had been adduced on cross-examination
to contradict the testimony on direct); Woodside v.
State, 206 So. 2d 426 (Fla. App. 1968); Parks v. State,
206 So. 2d 431 (Fla. App. 1968). See Cook v. State,
43 Ala. App. 304, 189 So. 2d 595 (1966) (all witnesses
agreed on testimony).
- United States v. Flannery, 451 F.2d 880 (1st Cir.
1971)*; Holden v. United States, 388 F.2d 240 (1st
Cir. 1968); Padgett v. State, 45 Ala. App. 56, 223 So.
2d 597 (1969)*; White v. United States, 248 A.2d 825
(D.C. Ct. App. 1969); Osgood v. State, 192 So. 2d
64 (Fla. App. 1966); People v. Jacoboni, 34 Mich.
App. 84, 190 N.W.2d 720 (1971); People v. Alexander,
26 Mich. App. 321, 182 N.W.2d 1 (1970); State v.
Costello, 415 SW.2d 816 (Mo. 1967); State v. Hart,
154 Mont. 310, 462 P.2d 885 (1969)*; State v. Dy-
mond, 110 N.H. 228, 265 A.2d 9 (1970); People v.
Yore, 36 App. Div. 2d 818, 320 N.Y.S.2d 601 (1971);
Commonwealth v. Reichard, 211 Pa. Super. 55, 233
A.2d 603 (1967)*. But see People v. Stanbeary, 126
Ill. App. 2d 244, 261 N.E.2d 765 (1970) (such remark
proper).
"'United States v. Cusumano, 429 F.2d 378 (2d
Cir.) cert denied, 400 U.S. 830 (1970); Ruiz v. United
States, 365 F.2d 103 (10th Cir. 1966); United States v.
Gatto, 299 F. Supp. 697 (E.D. Pa. 1969); State v.
Skinner, 251 La. 300, 204 So. 2d 370 (1967); People v.
Marr, 13 Mich. App. 642, 164 N.W.2d 678 (1968);
Glass v. State, 411 S.W.2d 728 (Tex. Crim. App.
1967).
lu Rodriguez-Sandoval v. United States, 409 F.2d
529 (1st Cir. 1969) ('uncontroverted" was plain error
where not clear from the record that there was some-
one other than defendant who could have been called as
a witness, especially since the prosecutor hammered
the point home at least five times)*; State v. Sinclair,
49 N.J. 525, 231 A.2d 565 (1967) (should clearly ap-
pear that someone other than defendant could have
taken the stand). But see United States v. Handman,
447 F.2d 853 (7th Cir. 1971) (referring to accomplice's
testimony as uncontradicted where nothing in record
showed anyone other than defendant could deny it)*;
United States ex rd. Leak v. Follette, 418 F.2d 1266
(2nd Cir. 1969) (not error even if in practical fact,
though not in theory, no one other than defendant
could have contradicted); United States v. O'Brien,
255 F. Supp. 755 (E.D. Mich. 1965) (even where in
fact only defendant could contradict, not error unless
the prosecutor may add that the defendant was
present at the scene of the crime."'
Even more direct comments concerning the
defense are permitted. For example, the prosecu-
tor may be permitted to state positively that the
evidence is uncontradicted by referring to the
fact that no defense was presented,3 6 or by com-
menting on the difference in the order of argument
when the defense presents no evidence.m More-
over, statements may be made regarding the
defense attorney which would be prohibited if
made about the defendant,"" such as a statement
jury would be likely to conclude from the statement in
the context of the argument that such was the situ-
ation); State v. Ashby, 77 Wash. 2d 33, 459 P.2d 403
(1969) (other persons could conceivably have denied
statement, though not clear from the record).
15 People v. Durham, 13 Il1. App. 2d 1033, 269
N.E.2d 348 (1971) (proper); Commonwealth v. French,
357 Mass. 356, 259 N.E.2d 195 (1970) (same). See
State v. Shilow, 252 La. 1105, 215 So. 2d 828 (1968)
(absence of evidence to contradict the state's version of
defendant's whereabouts); Johnson v. State, 9 Md.
App. 327, 264 A.2d 280 (1970) (where prosecutor was
merely reviewing the evidence, proper to ask, "If
defendant was not at the scene of the crime, where was
he?"); Barron v. State, 479 P.2d 614 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1971) ("if he was there why didn't he just say
it?" was a comment on defendant's alibi, not his
failure to testify). But see People v. Baker, 7 Mich.
App. 471, 152 N.W.2d 43 (1967) (where person with
whom defendant allegedly committed acts of gross
indecency testified, improper for prosecution to argue
that only two people knew what happened and one of
them testified).
136 United States v. Broadhead, 413 F.2d 1351
(7th Cir. 1969) (defense offered no evidence except
from cross-examination); McCracken v. State, 431
P.2d 513 (Alaska 1967); People v. Kostos, 21 Ill. 2d
496, 173 N.E.2d 466 (1961); Williams v. State, 464
S.W.2d 244 (Ky. Crim. App. 1971); State v. Huddel-
ston, 462 S.W.2d 691 (Mo. 1971). See State v. Martin,
85 S.D. 587, 187 N.W.2d 576 (1971) (that if one doesn't
have any evidence to talk about he tries to make out
complaining witness to be a liar). But see State v.
Murphy, 13 Ohio App. 2d 159, 234 N.E.2d 619 (1967)
("Have you heard anything from the defense? Did they
tell you anything? Did you hear any reference or any
testimony on behalf of this defendant?")*; Lime v.
State, 479 P.2d 608 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) ("there
is no excuse and they offer no excuse for the manner in
which this was done")*; State v. Persiano, 91 N.J.
Super. 299, 220 A.2d 116 (1966) ("Normally we have
two sides to a story. Here, we only have one side.
There is no defense.").
17 Williams v. State, 200 So. 2d 636 (Fla. App.
1967), denial of habeas corpus a ff'd. sub. nom. Williams
v. Wainwright, 416 F.2d 1042 (5th Cir. 1969) (that
defendant was entitled to opening and final arguments
where he puts on no evidence or testimony "other than
perhaps his own," and prosecution's summation would
be sandwiched since defendant put on no evidence).
See Taylor v. United States, 390 F.2d 278 (8th Cir.
1968) (order of opening statements and closing argu-
ments and when defense might have a chance to speak
was proper comment).
m Hollbrook v. United States, 441 F.2d 371 (6th
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to the effect that defense counsel did not prove
during the trial what he had alleged he would in
his opening statement.3 9
An interesting situation arises when the defend-
ant appears pro se. While it has been held im-
proper to point out that the defendant is so appear-
ing, the prosecutor is permitted to refer to and
discuss what the defendant says as an advocate.
Any other approach would render nugatory the
prosecutor's valuable right to attack the defense's
theory of the case, obviously permitted when the
defendant is represented by counsel. The jury may
also be told that the defendant counsel's presenta-
tion is not evidence but argument only.140 If the
defendant persists in making statements which
amount to the offering of testimony not presented
during trial the prosecutor may then respond
directly to the defendant's failure to testify.'
4'
Cir. 1971) (that "jury was entitled to hear from the
defendants," where context indicated that prosecution
was referring to defense counsel); McCracken v. State,
431 P.2d 513 (Alaska 1967) (counsel could say nothing
on behalf of his client); Lipscomb v. State, 467 S.W.2d
417 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (failure of defense counsel
to express claim of innocence); Barrientes v. State,
462 S.W.2d 292 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (counsel
"can tell us," referring to where defendant received
items connected with burglary); Bass v. State, 427
S.W.2d 624 (Tex. Cim. App. 1968) (counsel had not
explained how marijuana seeds got into defendant's
pocket); Meyer v. State, 416 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1967) (counsel "makes the insinuation that this
defendant has told him he wasn't guilty, but he won't
take the stand under oath and tell you that"). Compare
Taylor v. State, 279 Ala. 390, 185 So. 2d 414 (1966)
("I think you believe what the witness said is true,
you haven't heard anyone say here that it wasn't
except the attorney who was representing the 4le-
fendant", and "Are you going to let the man say or
let the attorney say, 'I am not guilty of this crime'?")
with State v. Hart, 154 Mont. 310, 462 P.2d 885 (1969)
(counsel failed to offer any evidence to controvert
incriminating testimony of state's witness, was indis-
tinguishable from a prohibited reference where de-
fendant was the only one who could contradict)*
and Commonwealth v. Cami, 443 Pa. 253, 277 A.2d
325 (1971) (improper to say jury had never heard
counsel ask defendant whether he was responsible for
the crime).
1M9 State v. McGonigle, 103 Ariz. 267, 440 P.2d 100
(1968); Gathright v. State, 245 Ark. 840, 435 S.W.2d
433 (1968) (proper to say there was no testimony on a
point on which counsel had said there would be);
State v. Marshall, 15 Ohio App. 2d 187, 239 N.E.2d
755 (1968). But see People v. Levy, 28 Mich. App. 339,
184 N.W.2d 325 (1970) (improper to say counsel had
failed to prove what he had said he would).
'40 People v. Garrison, 252 Cal. App. 2d 511, 60
Cal. Rptr. 596 (1967).
"I United States v. Warner, 428 F.2d 730 (8th Cir.
1970) (inquiring whether jury had heard from the
witness stand most of what defendant said in argu-
ment was probably erroneous, but remarks would
have been proper if applied to counsel not defending
When there are multiple defendants not all of
whom testify, the courts generally hold that refer-
ence to the fact that some testified is improper,
since attention is thereby directed to those who
did not.4 2 If such a reference warrants a reversal,
it is unclear whether the convictions of those who
testified must be reversed along with the convic-
tions of those who did not."4
There is one special relaxation of the prohibition
on comment on the defendant's failure to testify
at trial. Where the recent unexplained possession
of stolen property raises a presumption of guilt, the
prosecutor may so state.'4
himself, and were cured by court); United States ex
rd. Miller v. Follette, 397 F.2d 363 (2d Cir. 1968),
aff'g State ex rd. Miller v. Follette, 278 F. Supp. 1003
(E.D.N.Y. 1968) (proper to remark that witnesses
who testified under oath were to be believed rather
than petitioner who did not so testify); Petition of
DuBois, 84 Nev. 562, 445 P.2d 354 (1968) (proper
that defendant had had an opportunity to take stand
where defendant made many improper comments);
State v. Schultz, 46 N.J. 254, 216 A.2d 372, cert.
denied, 384 U.S. 918 (1966) (persistent remarks by
defendant appearing pro se which amount to unsworn
testimony is waiver of self-incrimination privilege);
State v. Polk, 485 P.2d 1241 (Ore. App. 1971) (proper
to say defendant had made unsupported statements
and jury should not consider them as evidence be-
cause defendant was not under oath).
'4 United States v. Wertz, 447 F.2d 451 (9th Cir.
1971) (argument that co-defendant confessed and
suffered through grueling cross-examination and defend-
ant should do so as well)*; Scott v. Perini, 439 F.2d
1066 (6th Cir. 1971) (comment on co-defendant's
failure to testify visited.a constitutional wrong on de-
fendant who testified at trial)*; Doty v. United States,
416 F.2d 887 (10th Cir. 1969) (statement that evi-
dence was uncontradicted as to all the defendants
except for the two who testified)*; Collins v. United
States, 383 F.2d 296 (10th Cir. 1967)-(where two of
three defendants testified, comment on failure of one
to testify required the reversal of his conviction alone)*;
United States v. Edwards, 366 F.2d 853 (2d Cir.
1966) (co-conspirator uncontradicted, improper);
People v. Haran, 27 Ill. 2d 229, 188 N.E.2d 707 (1963)
(refusal of co-defendants to testify and drawing ad
verse inference to defendant)*; People v. Mirenda,
23 N.Y.2d 439, 245 N.E.2d 194, 297 N.Y.S.2d 532
(1969) (that three of five defendants testified)*.
See United States v. Haili, 443 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir.
1971) ("you know why he was hesitant to testify
in this case" referred to co-defendant who testified,
not to defendant who did not, but was improper
anyway); Moody v. United States, 376 F.2d 525 (9th
Cir. 1967) (improper to say defendant's accomplice
was not rebutted). But see State v. Tollett, 71 Wash.
2d 806, 431 P.2d 168, cert. denied, 392 U.S. 914 (1967)
(inadvertent comment that "all testified-excuse me,
not testified" was improper); State v. Burrell, 102
Ariz. 136, 426 P.2d 633 (1967) (where counsel for
both defendants elicited common defense through
testimony of co-defendant, it was harmless to say that
the defendant "has said nothing").
"' See Collins v. United States, 383 F.2d 296 (10th
Cir. 1967).
'" United States v. Davis, 437 F.2d 928 (7th Cir.
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Testinmtny at Trial
The defendant who testifies at trial is subject to
cross-examination and impeachment, 1 5 and the
prosecutor may comment on this testimony 46 in
accordance with the same rules applicable to
comments on the testimony of other witnesses.147
Remarks should be restricted to the defendant's
credibility.' Characterizing the testimony is
proper if the characterization is based on the evi-
dence and is not an assertion of personal belief. 49
1971) (that possession had not been adequately ex-
plained, and guilt could be inferred from that alone);
Bretti v. State, 192 So. 2d 6 (Fla. App. 1966); Aiken v.
State, 226 Ga. 840, 178 S.E.2d 202 (1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 982 (1970); People v. Tate, 45 Mll. 2d 540,
259 N.E.2d 791, cert. denied, 401 U.S. 915 (1970);
State v. Branch, 465 P.2d 821 (Mont. 1970); State v.
Richard, 109 N.H. 322, 251 A.2d 326 (1969) (proper
to urge jury to consider such where prosecutor ex-
pressly recognized privilege not to testify and only
urged jury to consider absence of evidence from other
sources to explain possession); State v. DiRienzo, 53
N.J. 360, 251 A.2d 99 (1969); Rodriguez v. State, 417
S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967) ("this is what's
called a recent unexplained possession of stolen goods
case").
4- Gruenwald v. United States, 353 U.S. 391 (1956).
146 Chatman v. United States, 411 F.2d 1139 (9th
Cir. 1969); State v. Jackson, 258 La. 632, 247 So. 2d
558 (1971); Gray v. State, 463 P.2d 897 (Alaska 1970).
14 Reilly v. State, 212 So. 2d 796 (Fla. App. 1968);
State v. Davison, 457 S.W.2d 674 (Mo. 1970). But see
People v. Marino, 95 Ill. App. 2d 369, 238 N.E.2d
245 (1968), affd, 44 Ill. 2d 562, 256 N.E.2d 770 (1970).
48United States v. Deloney, 389 F.2d 324 (7th
Cir. 1968); State v. Dutton, 106 Ariz. 463, 478 P.2d 87
(1970) (proper to comment on inconsistencies); People
v. Forbis, 109 Ill. App. 2d 220, 248 N.E.2d 298 (1969);
State v. Whiters, 206 Kan. 770, 481 P.2d 922 (1971);
Dreitz v. Commonwealth, 477 S.W.2d 506 (Ky.
Crim. App. 1972) (argument that defendant testified so
well because of his extensive experience in courtrooms
on trial for prior crimes)*; Commonwealth v. Stout,
356 Mass. 237, 249 N.E.2d 12 (1969) (suggesting that
state's case was so strong that defendant and his
lawyer had decided he should give up his constitutional
right not to testify, improper); State v. Harrison, 72
Wash. 2d 737, 435 P.2d 547 (1967).
"5TDavison v. United States, 368 F.2d 505 (9th
Cir. 1966) ("lies"); United States v. Nemetz, 309 F.
Supp. 1336 (V.D. Pa. 1970) (defendant's testimony
was incredible in view of the evidence); State v.
Totress, 107 Ariz. 8, 480 P.2d 668 (1971); People v.
Goodwin, 261 Cal. App. 2d 723, 68 Cal. Rptr. 247
(1968) (incredible though expected after a plea of not
guilty); People v. Sinclair, 27 Ill. 2d 505, 190 N.E.2d
298 (1963) ("cock and bull story"); Raimondi v.
State, 12 Md. App. 322, 278 A.2d 664 (1971) (defendant
and his witnesses were "political bosses, dishonest and
unworthy of belief"); Carr v. State, 208 So. 2d 886
(Miss. 1968) ("fantastic"); State v. Rose, 270 N.C.
406, 154 N.E.2d 492 (1967) (would not believe any-
thing defendant said); Hoover v. State, 449 S.W.2d 60
(Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (a "bunch of hogwash").
But see Gibson v. United States, 403 F.2d 569 (D.C.
Cir. 1968) (a recent fabrication to lure the jury and
Where the defendant's testimony refutes only
part of the government's proof, silence with regard
to other damaging evidence which is within the
defendant's knowledge is subject to adverse
comment. 50 But if the defendant's testimony is
topically restricted, the prosecutor may not
comment on the failure to testify on other mat-
ters.15' Similarly, where there are several defend-
ants and only some of them assert a particular
defense, the prosecutor must restrict any com-
ments accordingly. 52
It should be noted that it is not necessary for
the defendant to formally take the stand in order
for some comment to be proper. A mere "testi-
monial appearance" by the defendant may open
the door for comment on his failure to deny other
evidence or to take the stand.ln Nonetheless, in
hoodwink them, improper); Harris v. United States,
402 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (a lie and fabrication,
amounted to a personal opinion of defendant's guilt
and was improper); Maguire v. United States, 358
F.2d 442 (10th Cir. 1966); People v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d
529, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr. 385 (1966); State v.
Squires, 248 S.C. 239, 149 S.E.2d 601 (1966) ("If
you believe I told him that I hope you will turn him
loose," improper).
"I Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917);
Reilly v. State, 212 So. 2d 796 (Fla. App. 1966);
People v. Jackson, 103 Ill. App. 2d 209, 243 N.E.2d
551 (1968), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 957 (1969) (failure to
respond to question asked by prosecutor proper);
Chandler v. State, 7 Md. App. 646, 256 A.2d 695
(1969) (where testimony vague and evasive, proper
to argue, that defendant was lying and should not be
believed).
M Calloway v. Wainwright, 409 F.2d 59 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 909 (1969) (where defendant
took stand solely for the purpose of testifying on
voluntariness of his confession, defendant did not
waive privilege, and error for prosecutor to comment on
failure to testify on anything other than voluntari-
ness)*; People v. Eaton, 275 Cal. App. 2d 584, 80 Cal.
Rptr. 192 (1969) (where defendant took stand only to
testify regarding pre-trial identification, and prosecutor
did not cross-examine otherwise, improper to comment
that defendant did not deny charges against him);
Young v. People, 488 P.2d 567 (Colo. 1971) (comments
on defendant's failure to deny prosecution witnesses,
and his invocation of privilege when questioned about
the crime, were proper where nothing in record re-
vealed any ruling by court that defendant could take
stand solely to testify on issue of voluntariness of his
confession, and it was not reasonably apparent that
defendant has been misled).
192 United States v. Leach, 429 F.2d 956 (8th Cir.
1970).
I," Compare United States ex rd. Mitchell v. Pinto,
438 F.2d 814 (2d Cir. 1971) (where defendant did not
testify, he did not waive privilege by rising and standing
next to a witness to demonstrate his resemblance to
him) with State v. Fioravanti, 46 N.J. 109, 215 A.2d 16
(1965), denial of habeas corpus affd, 404 F.2d 675
(2d-Cir. 1967) (appearance by defendant in trousers
supposed to have been worn by the robber but which
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those jurisdictions where the defendant may sub-
mit an unsworn statement to the court without
waiving the privilege, it has been held that the
prosecutor, although able to discuss, criticize, and
comment on the statement, may not comment
directly on the decision to make such a statement
rather than take the stand.15
Other Crimes
A common method to impeach a witness is to
elicit testimony or otherwise demonstrate that the
witness has been previously convicted of a crime
or crimes. When the defendant testifies, or does
not testify but attempts to show his good charac-
ter and reputation, the prosecutor may use this
method of impeachment and in summation refer
to the prior crimes.155 The evidence must be
properly before the court, and no comment should
be made if no evidence has been brought for-
ward,156 or if the evidence was improperly ad-
mitted.'-'
did not fit defendant, in support of claim that de-
fendant's companion committed robbery, constituted
a testimonial appearance warranting judge's comments
that defendant had failed to deny other evidence).
See People v. Garrison, 246 Cal. App. 2d 343, 54 Cal.
Rptr. 731 (1966), cert. denied,,389 U.S. 915 (1967)
(while it is proper to refer to a demonstration which is
in evidence, improper to refer to defendant's refusal to
put on stocking mask until state's witnesses had left
courtroom).
1 Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570 (1961) (under
Georgia law, prosecutor may comment on anything
defendant says in unswom statement); Prather v.
State, 223 Ga. 721, 157 S.E.2d 734 (1967); Crowe v.
State, 117 Ga. App. 648, 161 S.E.2d 514 (1968)*.
See Johnson v. State, 122 Ga. App. 542, 178 S.E.2d
42 (1970).
155 State v. Brooks, 197 Ariz. 320, 487 P.2d 387
(1971) (defendant tended to flirt with the truth, and he
did so the previous week and a jury found him guilty,
proper where defendant testified as to his recent
conviction); People v. Jones, 123 Ill. App. 2d 123,
260 N.E.2d 8 (1970) (proper to refer to defendant as a
"twice convicted fellow" and a "convicted stickup man"
where two prior convictions in evidence); Jefferson v.
State, 452 S.W.2d 462 (Mo. 1970) (proper to refer to
robbery and kidnapping where in evidence in robbery
prosecution); State v. Laurence, 423 S.W.2d 807 (Mo.
1968); People v. LeBeause, 34 App. Div. 2d 596, 308
N.Y.S.2d 270 (1970) (proper to refer to conviction
admitted by defendant in testimony); Kennedy v.
State, 443 P.2d 127 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968); Poole v.
Commonwealth, 211 Va. 262, 176 S.E.2d 917 (1970)
(may introduce evidence of prior crime to attack
defendant's character if he has testified or has attempted
to show his good character).
156 United States v. Schartner, 426 F.2d 470 (3d Cir.
1970) (improper to permit reading of a portion of
defendant's statement which mentioned a prior con-
viction); Rogers v. United States, 411 F.2d 228 (10th
Cir. 1969) (references to jail stays are improper where
no convictions shown); Homer v. Florida, 312 F.
Prosecutors often attempt three rather subtle
methods of calling juror attention to the defend-
ant's prior crimes in cases in which no such evi-
dence was presented. The first is to refer to the
accused's "rap sheet" or to the appearance of his
picture in police files. Each of these has been con-
demned repeatedly by the courts.'" The second
method, comment upon testimony that a witness
met the defendant during incarceration, is also
improper. 59 The third, equally improper in most
cases, is suggestion that the defendant is an
habitual criminal or professional miscreant."'
Supp. 1292 (M.D. Fla. 1967); People v. Rolon, 66 Cal.
2d 690,427 P.2d 196, 58 Cal. Rptr. 596 (1967) (reference
to prior conviction of defendant for-burglary where
defendant now pleaded not guilty to present burglary
charge, where it was provided by statute that if
defendant admits prior conviction and now pleads not
guilty, no reference can be made to prior conviction)*;
People v. Laursen, 264 Cal. App. 2d 932, 71 Cal.
Rptr. 71 (1968) (that defendant was ex-con); Washam
v. State, 235 A.2d 279 (Del. 1967); Shumate v. Com-
monwealth, 433 S.W.2d 340 (Ky. Crim. App. 1968)
(that defendants had committed same crime bifore
and would do it again and were professionals where no
evidence); Commonwealth v. Balakin, 356 Mass. 547,
254 N.E.2d 422 (1969) (referring to certain defendants
as more reprehensible than others in such a way as to
suggest prior criminal records); People v. Milkovich,
31 Mich. App. 582, 188 N.W.2d 124 (1971) (reference
to defendant's four-page driving record); People v.
Askar, 8 Mich, App. 95, 153 N.W.2d 888 (1967);
People v. Schatz, 37 App. Div. 2d 584, 322 N.Y.S.2d
802 (1971) (that each defendant had a long history of
arson where no evidence); Tooley v. Commonwealth,
448 S.W.2d 683 (Tenn. App. 1969) (reference to rape
in unrelated murder prosecution); State v. Shuttle,
126 Vt. 379, 230 A.2d 794 (1967).
157 People v. Helm,84 Ill. App. 2d 322, 227 N.E.2d
792 (1967), aff'd. 40 Il.. 2d 39, 237 N.E.2d 433 (1968)
(court martial conviction should not have been read
to jury and commented upon).
1" Shaddox v. State, 244 Ark. 747, 427 S.W.2d 198
(1968) (rap sheet)*; Jones v. State, 194 So. 2d 24
(Fla. App. 1967) (mug shots)*; People v. Marra, 27
Mich. App. 1, 183 N.W.2d 418 (1970) (reference to
photo of defendant identified by complaining witess as
being in "mug file"); State v. Madison, 281 Minn.
170, 160 N.W.2d 680, cert. denied, 390 U.S. 990 (1968)
(defendant had been identified by victim from police
file photos); People v. Wright, 21 N.Y.2d 1011, 238
N.E.2d 330, 290 N.Y.S.2d 930 (1968) (defendant had
been identified by victim from police file photos)*;
Humphrey v. State, 452 P.2d 173 (Okla. Crim. App.
1969) ("rap sheet" and prior convictions)*. But cf.
Bridges v. State, 202 So. 2d 225 (Fla. App. 1967)
(referring to pictures posted in police station did not
infer prior convictions or bad character).
159 Barfield v. United States, 391 F.2d 251 (5th Cir.
1968); People v. Dunn, 26 App. Div. 2d 285, 275
N.Y.S.2d 285 (1966) (witness's testimony that de-
fendant said he had met co-defendant while they were
being returned to prison)*.
160 People v. Tyson, 130 Ill. App. 2d 140, 264 N.E.2d
403 (1970) ("professional auto thief" where only one
prior conviction shown, improper); Lynch v. Common-
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Even if the evidence is properly in the record
the prosecutor must be cautious not to assume
facts in connection with the prior crimes beyond
those shown by the evidence.l& Similarly, the
prosecutor must confine his remarks to the pur-
poses for which the proof was admitted, which
usually restricts his comments to the credibility of
the defendant.'62 The only exception in which the
remarks may relate more directly to guilt is where
the evidence of prior similar convictions is consid-
ered probative of intent or motive to commit the
present offense.'6
The prosecutor is not restricted to referring
only to prior cases in which a conviction of the
defendant was obtained. Consistent with the
above limitations, comments on indictments and
wealth, 472 S.W.2d 263 (Ky. Crim. App. 1971) ("pro-
fessional" improper where no evidence, though possibly
warranted by other information known to prosecutor);
Shumate v. Commonwealth, 433 S.W.2d 340 (Ky.
Crim. App. 1968); State v. Nickens, 403 S.W.2d 582
(Mo. 1966) ("repeater")*; State v. Miller, 271 N.C.
646, 157 S.E.2d 335 (1967) ("habitual storebreakers")*;
State v. Foster, 2 N.C. App. 109, 162 S.E.2d 583
(1968) ("professional hoods or crooks")*. See People v.
Hardy, 271 Cal. App. 2d 322, 76 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1969)
("pros" proper where evidence showed that defendants
were engaged in systematic operations); Collins v.
State, 220 Tenn. 23, 413 S.W.2d 683, cert. denied, 389
U.S. 824 (1967) (professionals proper where defendants
testified they were employed to burglarize store).
' Baker v. State, 43 Ala. App. 550, 195 So. 2d 815
(1966) (improper to state details of admitted convic-
tions where not in evidence); Davis v. State, 214 So. 2d
41 (Fla. App. 1968) (where defendant admitted prior
conviction, but no evidence as to the specific nature of
the crime was admitted, argument that "less than 44
days after he got out of prison he is back robbing and
doing the very same thing for which he was put in there
the first time")*.
16 State v. Coury, 4 Ariz. App. 339, 420 P.2d 582
(1966); People v. Asta, 251 Cal App. 2d 64, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 206 (1967) (prosector stated that defendant had
prior convictions for similar offense and judge did
little to dispel impression that jury could consider such
as evidence of guilt); People v. Forbis, 109 Il. App. 2d
220, 248 N.E.2d 298 (1969); Conway v. State, 7 Md.
App. 400, 256 A.2d 178 (1969) (prosecutor stated that
defendant had prior convictions for similar offense and
judge did little to dispel impression that jury could
consider such as evidence of guilt)*; State v. Cheek,
413 S.W.2d 231 (Mo. 1967); State v. Sinclair, 57
N.J. 56, 269 A.2d 161 (1970); People v. Childers, 28
App. Div. 2d 725, 281 N.Y.S.2d 706 (1967) (prosecutor
stated that defendant had prior convictions for similar
offense and judge did little to dispel impression that
jury could consider such as evidence of guilt)*; Cantrell
v. State, 463 S.W.2d 145 (Tenn. App. 1970) (discussion
of parole was irrelevant to credibility).
16 United States v. Williams, 435 F.2d 1001 (5th
Cir. 1970) (evidence of other like offenses may be
admitted to show criminal intent); Patterson v. United
States, 361 F.2d 632 (8th Cir. 1966) (evidence of
other like offenses may be admitted to show criminal
intent).
on other law violations which the defendant
admits are proper.'"
Conduct, Character and Appearance of the De-
fendant
The prosecutor may wish to discuss the defend-
ant's conduct for two reasons. First, actions in the
course of the crime and the investigation of it may
be probative of guilt. Second, evidence of conduct
in general may refute the accused's assertion of
good character and reputation.
The same rule governing comments on the evi-
dence is applicable to comments on the character
of the defendant-the remarks must be based in
the evidence or be reasonable inferences there-
from.'65 The statements may relate to the ac-
cused's conduct in the course of or after the crime
which is the basis for the prosecution.166 Whether
166 United States v. Williams, 435 F.2d 1001 (5th
Cir. 1970) (admitted violations of law for which
defendant had not been arrested or prosecuted);
State v. Allison, 1 N.C. App. 623, 162 S.E.2d 63 (1968)
(in bench trial, stating that several other cases were
pending against the defendant). But see Rogers v.
United States, 411 F.2d 228 (10th Cir. 1969); People v.
Lewis, 25 Ill. 2d 396, 185 N.E.2d 168 (1962) (both
defendants well-known in a certain part of the city
because of their many arrests, improper).
165 Sablan v. People of Territory of Guam, 434
F.2d 837 (9th Cir. 1970) (comment on defendant's
conduct after crime improper where no evidence);
United States v. Cook, 432 F.2d 1093 (7th Cir. 1970)
(prosecution can comment legitimately and speak fully
though harshly about defendant's action and conduct
where supported by the evidence); Van Nattan v.
United States, 357 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1966) (defendant
a dope addict where no evidence of such in robbery
prosectuion); State v. McGill, 101 Ariz. 320, 419 P.2d
499 (1966) (same); Smith v. State, 118 Ga. App. 464,
164 S.E.2d 238 (1968) (that defendant was "pushing
women" in burglary prosecution, the only evidence
being that defendant was an informer in prostitution
cases)*; People v. Smith, 24 ll. 2d 198, 181 N.E.2d 77
(1962); Webb v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.2d 397
(Ky. Crim. App. 1970) (suggesting that defendant a
draft evader improper).
166 People v. Talbot, 64 Cal. 2d 691, 414 P.2d 633,
51 Cal. Rptr. 417 (1967) (brutality of defendant's acts
and that he had never shown remorse, proper); People
v. Mentola, 47 fll. 2d 579, 268 N.E.2d 8 (1971) (flight);
People v. Sawyer, 42 Il1. 2d 289, 251 N.E.2d 230,
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 928 (1969); People v. Carter, 38
Ill. 2d 496, 232 N.E.2d 692, cert. denied, 391 U.S. 965
(1967) (confession); Commonwealth v. Brown, 354
Mass. 337, 237 N.E.2d 53 (1968) (calling defendant an
"expert in furs" proper where evidence showed de-
fendant had advised co-defendant which furs to take
during robbery of furrier); State v. Mastrian, 285 Minn.
51, 171 N.W.2d 695, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1049 (1969)
("merchant of murder" where defendant had hired
another to kill); Hoover v. State, 449 S.W.2d 60 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1969) (defendant had never shown any
remorse, improper); State v. Dixon, 20 Utah 2d 248,
436 P.2d 805 (1968) (flight); State v. Barnhardt, 73
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or not the defendant testifies at the trial, the
prosecutor may be able to refer to the defendant's
pre-trial statements or to conversations with law
enforcement officers.117 The prosecutor may also
conament on the accused's conduct in court,
168
as well as conduct at other times and places.16 9
Wash. 2d 936, 442 P.2d 959 (1968) (defendant had
never shoin any remorse, improper); State v. Noyes,
69 Wash. 2d 441, 418 P.2d 471 (1966) (illicit sex rela-
tions with witness).
167 United States v. Chaney, 446 F.2d 571 (3d Cir.
1971) (an exculpatory statement made with the intent
to divert suspicion or mislead the police, when shown
to be false, may have probative force and be com-
mented upon); United States v. Smith, 441 F.2d 539
(9th Cir. 1971) (statement to FBI agent properly in
evidence); United States v. Toler, 440 F.2d 1242 (5th
Cir. 1971) (at no time had defendant denied filing a
pre-trial statement in evidence, not a comment on
defendant's failure to testify); United States v. Bias-
sick, 422 F.2d 652 (7th Cir. 1970) (agent's testimony
not denied); Vitali v. United States, 383 F.2d 121 (1st
Cir. 1967) (proper to draw inference of ownership of
premises where stolen goods found from defendant's
conversation with officers ind his conduct at time of
arrest); Hayes v. United States, 368 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.
1966) (statements made when informed crime com-
mitted compared with alibi at trial); Wright v. State,
279 Ala. 543, 188 So. 2d 272 (1966) (pre-trial state-
ments); Shaddox v. State, 244 Ark. 747, 427 S.W.2d
198 (1968) (that defendant had made statement to
witness); People v. Gills, 241 Cal. App. 2d 711, 50 Cal.
Rptr. 872 (1966) (conversation with arresting officer);
People v. Asey, 85 Ill. App. 2d 210, 229 N.E.2d 368
(1967) (pre-trial questioning); State v. Whiters, 206
Kan. 770, 481 P.2d 992 (1971) (inconsistencies in
defendant's testimony and explanation at time of
arrest); Commonwealth v, Belton, 352 Mass. 263, 225
N.E.2d 53 (1967) (inconsistencies in alibi asserted at
trial and statements at time of arrest); People v.
Badge, 15 Mich. App. 29, 165 N.W.2d 901 (1968)
(pre-trial statement); State v. Edwards, 435 S.W.2d 1
(Mo. 1968) (reference to original interrogation of
defendant proper where related to evidence); Ervine v.
State, 463 S.W.2d 2 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (that
defendant had testified against himself in pre-trial
statements properly in evidence).
168 United States v. Izzi, 427 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1970)
(accusation that defendant had sought to disguise his
handwriting in giving exemplars); Hayes v. United
States, 368 F.2d 814 (9th Cir. 1966) (defendant's
conduct during agent's testimony); State v. Totress,
197 Ariz. 8, 480 P.2d 668 (1971); People v. Thomas,
65 Cal. 698, 423 P.2d 233, 56 Cal. Rptr. 305 (1967)
("regular smart aleck" proper as a characterization of
defendant's conduct during cross-examination); People
v. Garrison, 246 Cal. App. 2d 343, 54 Cal. Rptr. 731
(1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 915 (1967).
169 People v. Fortson, 110 Ill. App. 2d 206, 249
N.E.2d 260 (1969)-(that drinking shown by evidence
gave defendant a little extra power to perform rape);
People v. Porterfield, 13 ll. App. 2d 167, 268 N.E.2d
537 (1968) (illicit sexual relations with victim); Coates
v. Commonwealth, 469 S.W.2d 346 (Ky. Crim. App.
1971) (suggesting defendant charged with possession
only was trafficking in narcotics)*; People v. Pena, 3
Mich. App. 26, 141 N.W.2d 677 (1966) (rhetorical
question how many narcotics sales defendant had
There is some disagreement among the courts
concerning whether the use of invective or epithets
in characterizing the accused is proper, even when
based upon proven conduct.17 ° Whatever the view
of a particular jurisdiction, a great variety of dis-
paraging language has been permitted, 7' perhaps
made in 41 days between the sale charged and his
arrest, improper); People v. Damon, 24 N.Y.2d 256, 247
N.E.2d 651, 229 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1969) (implying that
because defendant had been in prison he was homo-
sexual or abnormal deviate)*; People v. Chance, 37
App. Div. 2d 572, 322 N.Y.S.2d 433 (1971) (suggesting
defendant charged with possession only was trafficking
in narcotics)*; People v. Canty, 31 App. Div. 2d 976,
299 N.Y.S.2d 524 (1969) (where prosecutor went
beyond merely asking jury to disbelieve defendant who
admitted committing adultery, and turned defendant's
admitted acts into equivalence of guilt of violating Ten
Commandments, he was using defendant's acts to
indicate his propensity to commit murder, not just to
Impeach his credibility); State v. Milbradt, 68 Wash. 2d
684, 415 P.2d 2, cerl. denied, 385 U.S. 905 (1966)
(references to homosexual tendencies proper where
discussed by defense psychiatrist).
270 Carter v. United States, 437 F.2d 692 (D.C, Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 912 (1971) (should avoid
inappropriate references); People v. Rodriquez, 10 Cal.
App. 2d 18, 88 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1970) (may use ap-
propriate epithets where warranted by the nature of
the case and the evidence adduced; prosecutor is
allowed to urge his case with vigor); People v. Elder, 25
Ill. 2d 612, 186 N.E.2d 27, cert. denied, 374 U.S. 814
(1962) (use of invective discouraged); People v. Jeffer-
son, 69 Ill. App. 2d 490, 217 N.E.2d 564 (1966) (ab-
stract only: proper to reflect unfavorably on accused
and to use invective); State v. Yates, 202 Kan. 406,
449 P.2d 575 (1968) (use of invective discouraged);
State v. Burnett, 429 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1968) (should
not apply unbecoming names to defendant); State v.
Turnbull, 403 S.W.2d 570 (Mo. 1966) (improper to
a pply personal epithets or engage in abusive vilification
of either parties or witnesses); State v. White, 151
Mont. 573, 440 P.2d 269 (1968) (should not use deroga-
tory epithets); State v. Miller, 271 N.C. 646, 157
S.E.2d 335 (1967) (should not indulge in vulgarities,
and should refrain from abusive, vituperative, and
opprobrious language, and from indulging in invective);
State v. Gibson, 75 Wash. 2d 174, 449 P.2d 692 (1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1019 (1970).
'71 United States v. Cook, 432 F.2d 1093 (7th Cir.
1970) (where defendant plotted to kill wife by putting
bomb on plane, proper to refer to him as a subhuman
man and a true monster with a rancid, rotten mind);
United States v. Lewis, 423 F.2d 457 (8th Cir. 1970)
(junk pusher); Downie v. Burke, 408 F.2d 343 (7th Cir.
1969) (big ape and gorilla); United States v. Wolfson,
322 F. Supp. 798 (D.Del. 1971) ("crooks," "viruses?
and "germs" proper); Miller v. State, 250 Ark. 199,
464 S.W.2d 594 (1971) (con artist); People v. Newman,
14 Cal. App. 3d 246, 92 Cal. Rptr. 205 (1971) (pill
peddler and terror to community); People v. Rodriquez,
10 Cal. App. 3d 18, 88 Cal. Rptr. 789 (1970) (smart
thief and parasite on the community); People v.
Walker, 247 Cal. App. 2d 554, 55 Cal. Rptr. 726,
cer. denied, 389 U.S. 824 (1967) (suede shoe boys and
aluminum siding racketeers); People v. Gairson, 246
Cal. App. 2d 343, 54 Cal. Rptr. 731 (1966), cert.
denied, 389 U.S. 915 (1967) (vicious murderous pig);
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because a reviewing court is reluctant to find
reversible error on characterization alone. Further-
more, such remarks may be appropriate if based
upon the charge which the evidence tends to
prove, rather than upon the conduct of the defend-
ant as shown by the evidence. A common example
is reference to one charged with armed robbery as
a potential murderer.ln An epithet which lacks a
reasonable foundation in the evidence or the
charge is improper; it is simply abusive and serves
only to inflame and arouse the passions and preju-
dices of the jury.1n
O'Bryant v. State, 222 Ga. 326, 149 S.E.2d 654 (1966)
(thug); People v. Myers, 35 Ill. 2d 311, 220 N.E.2d
297 (1966) (where defense counsel compared de-
fendant's conduct and ability to choose between right
and wrong with chimpanzee, dog, and trained animal,
based on psychiatrist's testimony, proper for prosecutor
to reply that defendant had morals of a snake and was
a slimy beast); Ferguson v. Commonwealth, 401
S.W.2d 225 (Ky. Crim. App. 1965) (beast); State v.
Kohuth, 287 Minn. 520, 176 N.W.2d 872 (1970)
(under some circumstances, it may be reversible error to
characterize defendant as offender; here, it was proper
to refer to defendant as robber where witness identified
him); State v. Tate, 468 S.W.2d 646 (Mo. 1971) (mean
punks and vicious men); Paul v. State, 483 P.2d 1176
(Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (goons); State v. Bradford,
256 S.C. 51, 180 S.E.2d 632 (1971) (mad dog); Grant v.
State, 472 S.W.2d 531 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (beast);
Olivia v. State, 459 S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Crim. App.
1970) (wolves, in sodomy prosecution); Easley v.
State, 454 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (savage).
But see Marzuach v. United States, 398 F.2d 548
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 982 (1968) (big fish,
improper); Miller v. State, 224 Ga. 627, 163 S.E.2d 730
(1968) (beast, improper); People v. Garreau, 27 11.
2d 388, 189 N.E.2d 287 (1963) (referring to defendant
as a pervert, weasel, moron, and telling jury that
defendant who raped his mother's friend, would rape
a dog and would rape each and every member of the
jury, there being no evidence in the record to support
such remarks)*; State v. McGregor, 257 La. 956, 244
So. 2d 846 (1971) (unpredictable animal, improper);
Carr v. State, 208 So. 2d 886 (Miss. 1968) (beastly
nature, improper); People v. Hickman, 34 App. Div.
2d 831, 312 N.Y.S.2d 644 (1970) (junky, rat, and
sculptor with a knife, improper); State v. Smith, 279
N.C. 163, 181 S.E.2d 548 (1971) (lower than the bone
belly of a cur dog)*.
1
7
2 People v. Carpenter, 131 Ill. App. 2d 187, 266
N.E.2d 478 (1970); People v. Sibley, 93 Ill. App. 2d 38,
236 N.E.2d 5 (1968). See People v. Romo, 256 Cal.
App. 2d 589, 64 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1967) ("potential
killers" where charged with assault with a deadly
weapon).
7 United States v. Birrell, 421 F.2d 665 (9th Cir.
1970) (where defense was insanity, that defendant
should not be turned loose on society because of his
homosexual proclivities invited a conviction because
defendant was an homosexual)*; United States v.
Hughes, 389 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1968) (defendant was
doubly vicious because, knowing he was guilty, he
demanded his constitutional rights, including right to
trial, at which victim of alleged homosexual extortion
ring was required to testify)*; People v. Trotter, 84 Ill.
The prosecutor may comment on the reputation
and character of the accused only when the defend-
ant has put such matters in issue, and the com-
ments must be reasonably justified by the evi-
dence. 7 4
If the defendant's physical appearance is gross
in nature, the physical attributes are certainly
obvious to the jury and emphasis should not be
added through prosecutorial comment.7 5 The
exception is where identification is put in issue by
the defendant himself or his counsel; under such
circumstances it may be appropriate for the
prosecutor to comment upon the appearance of the
defendant.
17 6
App. 2d 388, 228 N.E.2d 467 (1967) (referrence to de-
fendant as a dope peddler where only possession
charged)*.
'7 State v. Sorensen, 104 Ariz. 503, 455 P.2d 981
(1969) (where defendant testified and proscecutor did
not offer evidence of his bad reputation, commenting
that there were areas of character testimony which
would have been material but which defendant did not
discuss)*; People v. Bonham, 348 Ill. 575, 181 N.E. 422
(1932) (comment founded on evidence is proper where
matter is in issue); State v. Lawrence, 423 S.W.2d 807
(Mo. 1968) ("this man who has manifested dishonesty
in the past" was proper where prior convictions in evi-
dence, and was not as attack on defendant's character
and reputation); Poole v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 262,
176 S.E.2d 917 (1970).
115 Reed v. State, 197 So. 2d 811 (Miss. 1971) (should
refrain from commenting on defendant's appearance
when he is not a witness; here asking jury to look at
defendant and stating he sat through the whole trial
showing no emotion whatsoever)*; Commonwealth v.
Gordon, 431 Pa. 512, 246 A.2d 325 (1968) ("Did you
see those eyes on that killer?" improper).
178 United States v. Borcelli, 435 F.2d 500 (2d Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 946 (1971) (proper to com-
ment on defendant's crooked foot and posture in court-
room where there were testimony and films of crime
in evidence, and jury might have already noticed
facts pointed out); People v. Speck, 41 Ill. 2d 177, 242
N.E.2d 208 (1968); People v. Archibald, 129 Ill. App.
2d 400, 263 N.E.2d 711 (1970) (where defense argued
that state's identification was inadequate, proper to ask
jury to notice that defendant was a very identifiable
person); People v. Jefferson, 69 Il App. 2d 490, 217
N.E.2d 564 (1966) (defendant had worst face for an
armed robber any man could have, proper); People v.
Griffin, 29 N.Y.2d 91, 272 N.E.2d 477, 323 N.Y.S.2d
964 (1971). But see Chamberlain v. State, 46 Ala. App.
642, 247 So. 2d 683 (1971) (asking jury to remember
defendant as he appeared in line-up picture in which his
clothes were dirty and wrinkled, rather than the way
he was in court with a polish job put on him by his
lawyers, where not directed to issue of identity but was
an unfair comparison of his appearance in court with his
appearance in the picture, and imputed unethical con-
duct on part of defense counsel) ; Spencer v. State,
466 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (stating that
defense counsel would have had defendant in court with
sunglasses or with a sack over his head if he could have,
improper where identification in issue).
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Failure to Cooperate Before Trial
As indicated earlier, the prosecutor may prop-
erly refer to statements made by the defendant
before trial where such statements constitute a
waiver of the fifth amendment right to remain
silentYm The general rule, though, is that the
defendant's silence before trial is not a proper
subject for comment, at least his silence subse-
quent to arrest.'78 It is not dear whether the
defendant's decision to testify at the trial consti-
tutes a waiver of the right to remain silent before
as well as during the trial, thus making comment
on either situation proper.' 79
Similarly, the courts have generally condemned
remarks referring to the failure of the accused to
make' an exculpatory statement at the time of
arrest,"80 since this is merely another 'way of
17 Se note 167 supra, and accompanying text.
178 Giison v. United States, 399 F.2d 586 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (where defendant testified he did not want to
make a statement without presence of counsel, saying
"that's the action of an innocent man who went looking
for a job")*; People v. Haston, 69 Cal. 2d 233, 444
P.2d 91, 70 Cal. Rptr. 419 (1968) (commenting on
extra-judicial silence and evasive answers in face of
accusatory statements, and urging jury to draw adverse
inference)*; State v. Dearman, 198 Kan. 44, 422 P.2d
573 (1967) (discussing defendant's refusal to make a
statement at arrest without presence of attorney so as
to create an adverse inference)*; People v. Rolston,
31 Mich. App. 200, 187 N.W.2d 454 (1971) (rule regard-
ing failure to testify applies to pre-custody interroga-
tion, though any statement made before trial may be
admitted regardless of whether defendant takes the
stand; here permitting prosecution to prove that de-
fendant chose to exercise privilege to remain silent pre-
trial)*; People v. Williams, 26 Mich. App. 218, 182
N.W.2d 347 (1970) (asking jurors whether they would
have just sat there or would have said something when
approached by officer and told that he was investigating
crime)*; State v. Russell, 282 Minn. 223, 164 N.W.2d
65, cert. denied, 396 U.S. 850 (1969) ("But what harm is
there in talking if you are honest and above board and
have nothing to hide" was improper as comment on
codefendant's refusal to give name or answer questions
during interview after arrest); State v. Davison, 457
S.W.2d 674 (Mo. 1970); State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325,
273 A.2d 1 (1971) (improper to refer to defendant's
calling an attorney as not the act of an innocent man);
People v. Moore, 26 App. Div. 2d 902, 274 N.Y.S.2d
518 (1966); State v. Stephens, 24 Ohio St. 2d 76, 263
N.E.2d 773 (1970). But see, United States v. Marcus,
401 F.2d 563 (2d Cir. 1968) cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1040
(1969) (pointing out failure to answer questions before
trial was not a comment on failure to testify); State v.
Green, 70 Wash. 2d 955, 425 P.2d 913 (1967).
17 Compare People v. Bell, 32 Mich. App. 375, 188
N.W.2d 909 (1971) (where defendant testified at trial,
not error to comment that defendant refused to make
any statements after arrest; no violation of either state
or federal constitutions) willt People v. Rolston, 31
Mich. App. 200, 187 N.W.2d 454 (1971) and State v.
Stephens, 24 Ohio St. 2d 76, 263 N.E.2d 773 (1970).
180 United States v. Arnold, 425 F.2d 204 (10th Cir.
1970) (if all defendant was doing was an experiment
pointing out the defendant's silence. It has also
been deemed improper to comment upon the
defendant's invocation of the fifth amendment in
- prior judicial proceedings, regardless of whether
the defendant was the accused or a witness.m
In those situations in which the courts have held
that no privilege to refuse to cooperate exists,
comment on such refusal, if properly proved, is
permissible. Thus it is proper to point out that the
defendant refused to participate in a lineup,"2 or,
with the exception of the polygraph,"2 to remark
and not making a bomb, he would have told agents; not
invited by defense argument that agents never asked
defendant whether he was conducting an experiment)*;
United States v. Winters, 420 F.2d 523 (3d Cir. 1970)
(man without guilty knowledge would have denied
seeing bag containing stolen money); United 'States v.
Noland, 416 F.2d 588 (10th Cir. 1969) (failure to make
exculpatory statement at time of arrest)*; People _v.
Crawford, 253 Cal. App. 2d 524, 61 Cal. Rptr. 472,
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 1006 (1967) (failure to disclose al-
ibi when arrested); Ester v. United States, 253 A.2d
537 (D.C. Ct. App. 1969) (comment on failure to make
exculpatory statement after arrest prohibited; but
comment on defendant's conduct when he saw police
arrive was proper, since he was not then under arrest or
in custody); People v. Christman, 23 N.Y.2d 429, 244
N.E.2d 703, 297 N.Y.S.2d 134 (1969) (that defendant
had not told police of alibi at time of arrest)*; State
ex rd. Simos v. Burke, 41 Wis. 2d 129, 163 N.W.2d 177
(1968) (if defendant elects not to give notice of alibi
pursuant to notice of alibi statute, that fact cannot be
commented upon, and if he elects to do so and subse-
quently does not assert alibi at trial, this is not to be
commented upon either). But cf. State v. Crank, 13
Ariz. App. 587, 480 P.2d 8 (1971)' (suggests that lack of
exculpatory statement at time of arrest is proper for
comment); State v. Burt, 107 NJ. Super. 390, 258
A.2d 711 (1969) (proper to say if shooting had been
accidental, as defendant claimed at trial, he would have
told police officers at the earliest opportunity).
1 Stewart v. United States, 366 U.S. 1 (1961) (cross-
examination of defendant which disclosed his failure to
testify at two prior trials was in part reversible error);,
State v. Minamyer, 12 Ohio St. 2d 67, 232 N.E.2d 401
(1967) (refusal of defendant to testify before grand jury
when he was complaining witness)*; State v. Davis,
10 Ohio St. 2d 136, 226 N.E.2d 736 (1967) (defendant
refused to testify at his preliminary hearing)*; Messier
v. State, 428 P.2d 338 (Okla. Crim. App. 1967) (refusal
to testify in another's preliminary hearing); Dean v.
Commonwealth, 209 Va. 666, 166 S.E.2d 228 (1968)
(that defendant had invoked privilege in co-defendant's
case). See Granton 'v. State, 415 S.W.2d 664 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1967) (where defendant testified at punish-
ment stage, improper to remark on his failure to testify
at guilt stage). But cf. State v. Hines, 195 So. 2d 550
(Fla. 1967) (proper to cross-examine defendant regard-
ing his failure to testify at preliminary hearing).
1 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (no
privilege not to participate in line-up nor to speak for
identification purposes); United States v. Parhms, 424
F.2d 152 (9th Cir. 1970).
18 People v. Brocato, 17 Mich. App. 277, 169
N.W.2d 483 (1969) (neither results of polygraph nor
any references to such are proper or admissible);
State v. Perry, 274 Minn. 1, 142 N.W.2d 573 (1966)
(same).
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on the failure of the accused to cooperate in the
performance of certain experiments or tests. 84
Guilt
Consistent with the right to comment on the
state of the evidence in the case, it is proper for
the prosecutor to argue or express the opinion that
the accused is guilty, but only where the prosecu-
tor states or it is apparent that the opinion is
based solely on the evidence.s' As in other con-
texts, the prosecutor must not make the statement
one of personal belief, thereby suggesting to the
I" Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967) (taking
of fingerprints not violative of fifth amendment);
Newhouse v. Misterly, 415 F.2d 514 (9th Cir. 1969)
(breathalyzer test); People v. Sudduth, 65 Cal. 2d 543,
421 P.2d 401, 55 Cal. Rptr. 393, cet. denied, 389 U.S.
850 (1967) (same); State v. Holt, 261 Ia. 1089, 156
N.W.2d 884 (1968) (same); State v. Cary, 49 N.J. 343,
230 A.2d 384 (1967) (failure to give voiceprint for
identification); State v. Stanton, 15 Ohio St. 2d 215,
239 N.E.2d 92 (1968) (breathalyzer test); Waukesha v.
Godfrey, 41 Wis. 2d 401, 164 N.W.2d 314 (1969)
(same).
I's United States v. Smith, 441 F.2d 539 (9th Cir.
1971) (a summation of discussion of evidence is proper,
but personal belief is not); Adams v. State, 280 Ala.
678, 198 So. 2d 255 (1967) (trial judge attributing
personal beliefs to each side and sanctioning such
beliefs)*; State v. Abney, 103 Ariz. 394, 440 P.2d 914
(1968); Dunfee v. State, 242 Ark. 210, 412 S.W.2d 614
(1967); People v. Dillinger, 268 Cal. App. 2d 140, 73
Cal. Rptr. 720 (1968); Cokley v. People, 168 Colo. 52,
449 P.2d 824 (1969) ("trial courts should begin to take
cappropriate action against district attorneys who in
sing argument persist in conveying their 'personal
beliefs' based on their 'long experience' in criminal
matters"); Manning v. State, 123 Ga. App. 844, 182
S.E.2d 690 (1971); State v. McKeehan, 91 Idaho 808,
430 P.2d 886 (1967); People v. Anderson, 48 Ill. 2d
488, 272 N.E.2d 18 (1971); State v. Allison, 260 Ia.
176, 147 N.W.2d 910 (1967); Koonce v. Common-
wealth, 452 S.W.2d 822 (Ky. Crim. App. 1970);
Holbrook v. State, 6 Md. App. 265, 250 A.2d 904
(1969) (prosecutor has undisputed right to argue that
evidence convinces him of defendant's guilt, but should-
not assert his personal opinion of guilt based on any-
thing outside the evidence); Collins v. State, 87 Nev. 436
488 P.2d 544 (1971) (statements proper where made as
a deduction or conclusion from the evidence); People v.
Wade, 35 App. Div. 2d 401, 317 N.Y.S.2d 122 (1970);
State v. Stephens, 24 Ohio St. 2d 76, 263 N.E.2d 773
(1970); State v. Miller, 460 P.2d 874 (Ore. App. 1969)
(here, though a violation of a state bar rule, not
reversible error); State v. Quatrocchi, 103 R.I. 115, 235
A.2d 99 (1967); Smith v. Commonwealth, 207 Va. 459,
150 S.E.2d 545 (1966); State v. McGee, 52 Wis. 2d
736, 190 N.W.2d 895 (1971) ("we know who killed
decreased" improper); State v. Yancey, 32 Wis. 2d
104, 145 N.W.2d 145 (1966) (state of mind of counsel
is not evidence). See United States v. Hysohion, 439
F.2d 274 (2d Cir. 1971); State v. Pullen, 266 A.2d
222 (Me. 1970); People v. Sheehy, 31 Mich. App. 628,
188 N.W.2d 231 (1971) (request for verdict of guilty not
an assertion of personal belief); State v. Watkins, 156
Mont. 456, 481 P.2d 689 (1971). But see State v. Jones,
277 Minn. 174, 152 N.W.2d 67 (1967).
jury that there is other convincing evidence of the
defendant's guilt which is not before them.186 Ac-
cordingly, the test adopted by the federal courts
for determining the propriety of the statement is
whether the remark might reasonably lead the
jury to believe that there was other evidence
unknown or unavailable to it upon which the
prosecutor's belief rested187
While it is unclear whether the phrases "I
think" and "I believe" are proper,5 ' a statement
of personal belief is not proper merely because the
prosecutor offers it as fact without the use of such
phrases.189 Nor should the prosecutor emphasize
18 United States v. Schartner, 426 F.2d 470 (3d Cir.
1970) ("I have a duty to protect the innocent and to
see that the guilty do not escape, and I say to you with
all the sincerity I can muster that if you do not convict
the defendant the guilty will escape"); Devine v.
United States, 403 F.2d 93 (10th Cir. 1968); People v.
Conover, 243 Cal. App. 2d 38, 52 Cal. Rptr. 172
(1966) (would not have prosecuted defendant unless
personally believed him guilty); People v. Brachter, 88
Ill. App. 2d 108, 232 N.E.2d 132 (1967) (not going to
prosecute people who are innocent); People v. Bell, 84
Ill. App. 2d 48, 228 N.E.2d 574 (1966) (proper to say
could see no room for reasonable doubt); State v.
Schmidt, 259 Ia. 972, 145 N.W.2d 631 (1966) ("But if
you believe, as I do" improper); People v. Slater, 21
Mich. App. 561, 175 N.W.2d 786 (1970) ("I do know
this much: that fellow there is the guy who killed"
victim)*; People v. Pankin, 4 Mich. App. 19, 143
N.W.2d 806 (1966) (convinced beyond a reasonable
doubt of defendant's guilt, improper); State v. Moore,
428 S.W.2d 563 (Mo. 1968) (comment proper if it does
not indicate other knowledge); State v. Smith, 279
N.C. 163, 181 S.E.2d 548 (1971) (prosecutor knew when
to convict and when not to, improper); State v. Gairson,
484 P.2d 854 (Ore. App. 1971); Blackstock v. State, 433
S.W.2d 699 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (not going to pro-
secute people who are innocent); State v. Jacobsen, 74
Wash. 2d 36, 442 P.2d 629 (1968) (would not prosecute
unless sure of guilt); State v. Tollett, 71 Wash. 2d
806, 431 P.2d 168 (1967), cert. denied, 392 U.S. 914
(1968); State v. Walton, 5 Wash. App. 150, 486 P.2d
118 (1971) (had never used the term demand in argu-
ment but in this case the facts demanded a verdict of
guilty).
187 Schnitt v. United States, 413 F.2d 219 (5th Cir.
1969); Gradsky v. United States, 373 F.2d 706 (5th
Cir. 1967)*.
3 United States v. Barber, 303 F. Supp. 807 (D.
Del. 1969) (generally improper to use "I believe" or
"I personally believe"); State v. Prettyman, 198
N.W.2d 156 (Minn. 1972) (frequent prefacing of
sentences with "I think" and "I think you'll find that"
is impermissible even though appeared they were more
idle cliche than deliberate expressions of personal
opinion). But see McGlathery v. State, 435 S.W.2d 677
(Mo. 1969) (using "I think" several times was proper
where merely introducing what the prosecutor was
going to say); Collins v. State, 488 P.2d 544 (Nev.
1971) (not error to use "I feel," "I think," or "I
submit" as introductory phrases).
189 Harris v. United States, 402 F.2d 656 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (statements amounted to personal opinion and
were improper); People v. Montevecchio, 32 Mich.
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his personal assessment of the strength of the
case,190 or the various investigative procedures
which lead him to believe the defendant guilty.'9'
COM MNTING ON THE DEFENSE AND DEFENSE
COUNSEL
Failure to Produce Witnesses
Since the burden of proof is on the government,
the defense has the right to comment on the
state's unexplained failure to produce witnesses.'9
And even though the defense is not bound to
present a case, it has been pointed out that the
prosecutor may comment that no defense was pre-
App. 163, 188 N.W.2d 186 (1971) (remarks made as
factual statements)*.
90 United States v. Grunberger, 431 F.2d 1062
(2d Cir. 1970) ("I don't know of a case where the
evidence has been as strong"); People v. Bandhauer,
66 Cal. 2d 524, 426 P.2d 900, 58 Cal. Rptr. 332 (1967)*;
People v. Miller, 26 Mich. App. 665, 182 NMW.2d 772
(1970) ("one of the strongest cases, one of the most
obvious cases, these detectives have ever seen");
People v. Mantesta, 27 App. Div. 2d 748, 277 N.Y.S.2d
442 (1967) (never tried a robbery case which was as
clear-cut). But see Williams v. United States, 237
A.2d 539 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968) (proper to say prosecutor
felt strongly about case and it was "one of the strongest
cases I believe I have ever had"); People v. Burnett, 27
Ill. 2d 510, 190 N.E.2d 338 (1963) (proper to state
"there has never been a murderer in Cook County
proven more dearly guilty").
'9' United States v. Sutton, 446 F.2d 916 (9th Cir.
1971) (grand jury); McMillan v. United States, 363
F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1966) (government had already
determined guilt but because of technical legalisms
could not bring in all the evidence)*; People v. Yancy,
33 Mich. App. 352, 189 N.W.2d 827 (1971) (prosecu-
tor's office went through a complicated determination
on basis of existing evidence before it sought issuance
of a warrant, proper where statement indicated doubt
as to defendant's guilt immediately thereafter);
People v. Humphreys, 24 Mich. App. 411, 180 N.W.2d
328 (1970) (if in opinion of police and prosecution
defendant were innocent he would not be on trial)*;
State v. Jackson, 127 Vt. 237, 246 A.2d 829 (1968)
(information was brought after thorough investigation).
But see United States v. Meisch, 370 F.2d 768 (3d Cir.
1966) (defendant was arrested three months after
offense because state was "checking him out", proper);
Ross v. State, 419 Ala. App. 88, 238 So. 2d 887 (1970)
(if there had been any question it would have been
prosecutor's sworn duty to ask for a dismissal); Ramos
v. State, 419 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967)
('If I have an indictment and after observing it I do
not feel he's guilty-" proper where defense counsel
interrupted).
M United States v. Bronston, 326 F. Supp. 469
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (improper for prosecutor to offer
unsworn testimony as to the whereabouts of a witness,
and to comment on defendant's failure to call, but
instruction that witness was hostile to defendant, and
jury could draw adverse inference to state for failure
to call. cured the defect); Slater v. State, 43 Ala. App.
513, 194 So. 2d 93 (1966); People v. Gonzales, 125 I1.
App. 2d 225, 260 N.E.2d 234 (1970).
sented, as a fair reference to the state of the evi-
dence. 93 It has been specifically recognized as
proper for the prosecutor to note that the defense
did not use its power to subpoena witnesses, 9 4 or
that the defense failed to produce any witnesses or
specific witnesses.' 95 The latter comment is par-
ticularly appropriate and damaging when the
absent witness is a material one, 9 ' the most
common example being the alibi witness.19
'9 See notes 127-31 & 136 supra, and accompanying
text.
19 United States v. Panepinto, 430 F.2d 613 (3d Cir.
1970); State v. Hutchinson, 458 S.W.2d 553 (Mo.
1970); Santillan v. State, 470 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1971).
195Talbot v. Nelson, 390 F.2d 801 (9th Cir. 1968);
Pace v. State, 121 Ga. App. 251, 173 S.E.2d 464 (1970);
State v. Lincoln, 250 Ore. 426, 443 P.2d 178 (1968);
Spencer v. State, 466 S.W.2d 749 (Tex. Crim. App.
1971). See State v. Pullen, 266 A.2d 222 (Me. 1970);
State v. Dymond, 110 N.H. 228, 265 A.2d 9 (1970).
But see People v. Swift, 319 Il1. 359, 150 N.E. 263
(1926) (improper).
196 United States v. Seay, 432 F.2d 395 (5th Cir.
1970) (comment on failure to call defendants' wives,
who were present at time of arrest, not improper),;
Ignacio v. Guam, 413 F.2d 513 (9th Cir. 1969) (failure
of defense to call its own ballistics expert); People v.
Grant, 268 Cal. App. 2d 470, 74 Cal Rptr. 111 (1968),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 858 (1969) (material and logical
witness); State v. Allison, 147 S.W.2d 910 (Iowa 1967)
(avialable witness); State v. McLarty, 467 S.W.2d 58
(Mo. 1971) (material witness); Barron v. State, 479
P.2d 614 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (witness whose
testimony would be expected to be favorable); Miller
v. State, 458 S.W.2d 680 (Tex. Crim. A pp. 1970).
19, United States v. Welp, 446 F.2d 867 (9th Cir.
1971) (failure to call defendant's father who was in
court, and arguing for an adverse inference); Kroll v.
United States, 433 F.2d 1282 (5th Cir. 1970) (where
defense in mail fraud was that defendant tried to
protect investors' funds, proper to say that no in-
vestors were called to testify); United States v. Cox,
428 F.2d 683 (7th Cir. 1970) (proper to argue that
defendant's companion, who according to defendant's
exculpatory statements could have provided alibi,
remained anonymous); United States v. Banks, 426
F.2d 292 (6th Cir. 1970) (if defendant's alibi were
really true, others than his wife and brother could have
been called); People v. Chandler, 17 Cal. App. 3d 798,
95 Cal. Rptr. 146 (1971); People v. Romeo, 244 Cal.
App. 2d 495, 53 Cal. Rptr. 260 (1966) (could draw
adverse inference from failure to produce companions);
Miller v. State, 224 A.2d 592 (Del. 1966) (proper to
comment where state had affirmatively proved alibi
false, and defense made no effort to call presumably
accessible witnesses); People v. Nilsson, 44 Ill. 2d 244,
255 N.E.2d 432, cert. denied, 398 U.S. 954 (1970)
(unclear under Illinois law whether proper to comment
on failure to produce alibi witnesses); Frazier v. State,
3 Md. App. 470, 240 A.2d 306 (1968); State v. Artis,
57 N.J. 24, 269 A.2d 1 (1970); Simon v. State, 406
S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (where defendant's
brother was called by-state and defense did not cross-
examine, proper to argue that if defendant's version of
the crime were trie he would have asked his brother to
support his story). See Alsobrook v. State, 43 Ala. App.
473, 192 So. 2d 478 (1966). But see Simon v. United
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In limiting the above, the courts have empha-
sized that any comments on an absent witness
may be improper where the witness is equally
available or accessible to the government, though
the presumptions and burdens in proving availa-
bility are not dear."' If the witness is equally
accessible it is not error for the prosecutor to
reply to a question propounded by defense counsel
during summation.199 If defense counsel's question
concerns the whereabouts of certain witnesses it is
proper for the prosecutor to ask why the same
persons were not produced by the defense.
200
Moreover, where the defendant attempts to ex-
plain the absence of a witness while testifying, the
prosecutor may then refer to that absence, al-
though such commentary is not otherwise per-
mitted.
20°
Although it is generally improper to refer to the
fact that certain co-defendants failed to testify,
202
the courts have permitted remarks concerning the
States, 424 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (improper to
refer to failure to call alibi witness where equally
accessible to both sides).
19 United States v. Arendale, 444 F.2d 1260 (5th
Cir. 1971) (adverse inference proper if witness not
equally available); Wynn v. United States, 397 F.2d
621 (D.C. Cir. 1967) (proper where (1) peculiarly within
the other party's power to produce and (2) would
elucidate transaction); Slater v. State, 43 Ala. App.
513, 194 So. 2d 93 (1966) (failure to call equally
accessible or available witness is not proper subject for
comment; available or accessible does not mean
merely amenable to subpoena, and depends upon a
party's superior means of knowledge of existence and
identity of witness, of testimony that might be ex-
pected, or upon relationship of witness to the party;
here, refusing defense permission to comment upon
refusal of state to call eyewitness who was a relative of
victim and thus not equally accessible, where prosecutor
only gave unsworn testimony as to reasons for ab-
sence)*; Conyers v. United States, 237 A.2d 838
(D.C. App. Ct. 1968) (proper if peculiarly within the
power of the other party to produce); People v. Carr,
114 Ill. App. 2d 370, 252 N.E.2d 912 (1969) (proper
where fair inference could be drawn that more acces-
sible to defense); Commonwealth v: DeCaro, - Mass.
-, 269 N.E.2d 673 (1971) (proper where indisputably
available to defense); State v. Houston, 451 S.W.2d 37
(Mo. 1970) (improper where equally accessible); State
v. Heiser, 183 Neb. 665, 163 N.W.2d 582 (1968).
"I See, infra, notes 244-49 and accompanying text.2 0 People v. Mirmelli, 130 111. App. 2d 1, 264 N.W.2d
470 (1970); Easley v. State, 454 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. Crim.
App. 19705. See State v. Murray, 200 Kan. 526, 437
P.2d 816 (1968); Commonwealth v. Subilosky, 352
Mass. 153, 224 N.E.2d 197 (1967) (reading statement
of absent policeman was invited by defense state-
ments); State v. Glisan, 465 P.2d 253 (Ore. App. 1970);
State v. Lane, 4 Wash. App. 745, 484 P.2d 432 (1971)
(argument that defense would have subpoenaed wit-
nesses if their testimony favorable was invited by
defense statements regarding withholding of evidence).
2101 People v. Swift, 319 1Il. 359, 150 N.E. 263 (1926).
failure of a defendant to produce his co-defendants
as witnesses. 23 The courts have been harsher where
the absent witness was not a defendant, but one
who would have to incriminate himself.204 Where
the uncalled witness is the defendant's spouse, the
propriety of a comment on the failure to call will
depend upon the particular statute creating the
husband-wife privilege. 2 5
While the court may permit reference to the
failure of the defense to produce a witness or wit-
nesses, especially in light of the currently con-
fused state of the law, it is dangerous for the
prosecutor to go further by arguing that the testi-
mony would have been adverse.206 It is also perilous
202 See note 142 supra, and accompanying text.
203 Berry v. State, 123 Ga. App. 616, 182 S.E.2d 166
(1971) (proper); Minor v. Commonwealth, 478 S.W.2d
716 (Ky. Crim. App. 1972) (argument that defendant
had not put his co-defendant on stand, while not
condoned, was not reversible error); State v. Hudson,
253 La. 992, 221 So. 2d 484 (1969) (where codefendant
pleaded guilty at beginning of trial, he could have been
called and failure to do so was proper subject of com-
ment).
24 United States v. Smith, 436 F.2d 787 (5th Cir.
1971) (where defendant had previously escaped, it
was improper in his prosecution for forgery to refer to
failure to call certain witnesses where the court could
not grant them immunity from prosecution for harbor-
ing and assisting a fugitive); Bradley v. United States,
420 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (improper to argue that
adverse inference could be drawn from failure to call
Witnesses who would have had to incriminate them-
selves); Morrison v. United States, 365 F.2d 521
(D.C. Cir. 1966) (where a defense witness invokes
privilege on stand and government refuses to grant
immunity, court should instruct both sides not to make
a missing witness argument). See generally cases cited in
notes 116, 118 & 119, supra.
2015 United States v. Seay, 432 F.2d 395 (5th Cir.
1970); People v. Powell, 14 Cal. App. 3d 693, 92 Cal.
Rptr. 501 (1971) (comment improper in view of trial
court's prior ruling); People v. Coleman, 71 Cal. 2d
1159, 80 Cal. Rptr. 920, 459 P.2d 248 (1969) (under
statute, there is not privilege not to testifyfor spouse);
James v. State, 223 Ga. 677, 157 S.E.2d 471 (1967)
(where defendant could not require wife's presence as
witness)*; State v. Levy, 160 N.W.2d 460 (Iowa 1968);
State v. Freeman, 198 Kan. 301, 424 P.2d 261 (1967)
(court would not reverse where not clear from record
that missing witness was actnally defendant's wife, but
remark was nevertheless improper); Gossett v. Com-
monwealth, 402 S.W.2d 857 (Ky. Crim. App. 1966)
(improper)*; State v. Jones, 257 La. 966, 244 So. 2d
849 (1971) (proper to comment on fact spouse refused
to testify); Robinson v. State, 489 P.2d 1358 (Okla.
Crim. App. 1971); Green v. State, 454 S.W.2d 750
(Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (proper).
226 See People v. Carpenter, 13 Ill. App. 2d 187, 266
N.E.2d 478 (1970) and People v. Sanford, 10 Ill. App.
2d 101, 241 N.E.2d 485 (1968), both permitting some-
what questionable references to the failure to call certain
witnesses because the prosecutor made no suggestion
that their testimony would have been adverse. See
also case cited in note 119 subra.
HENRY B. VESS
to argue for an adverse inference unless the prose-
cutor has obtained an advance ruling from the
court.
2 07
Failure to Produce Evidence
The same general rules governing the failure of
the defense to produce witnesses also apply to its
failure t4produce evidence. 218 Howevtr, the ques-
tion of accessibility has not received as much
attention here.209 One reason for this is that the
prosecutor's remarks are more often viewed as
invited by defense counsel,210 though it must be
remembered that the defense attorney may, and
indeed must, comment on the government's failure
to produce material, evidence.21' Two remarks
commonly made concern the defendant's knowl-
edge of the whereabouts of a missing gun,212 and
207 Gass v. United States, 416 F.2d 767 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (should obtain advance ruling).20 Salzman v. United States, 405 F.2d 358 (D. C.
Cir. 1968) (proper to argue that blood-soaked shirt
described by complainant and one described by officers
who visited defendant in hospital were the same, and
that subsequent disappearance of shirt evidenced a
consciousness of guilt); State v. Morgan, 444 S.W.2d
490 (Mo. 1969) (defense produced no evidence to
show that any of state's evidence was incorrect,
proper); State v. Sinclair, 49 N.J. 525, 231 A.2d 565
(1967).
209 Simon v. State, 406 S.W.2d 460 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1966) (failure to produce readily available
evidence a proper subject for comment). See People v.
Green, 7 Mich. App. 346, 151 N.W.2d 834 (1967)
(proper to argue that there was no evidence of a
weapon being found on the victim, where it was
obvious that if something had been found it would
have been introduced by the defense to support its
story); Commonwealth v. White, 442 Pa. 461, 275
A.2d 75 (1971) (prosecutor's statement that he had an
idea that defendant "could tell us where that weapon
is" was excusable where the remark was not knowingly
false, followed from state's theory that defendant was
the killer, and was made in the heat of argument).
210 United States v. Cedar, 437 F.2d 1033 (9th Cir.
1971) (reference to failure of defendant to offer a
better map, where counsel criticized the government's
map); People v. Durso, 40 Ill. 2d 242, 239 N.E.2d 842,
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1111 (1968) (failure to produce
evidence on a material matter injected into the case
by counsel gives rise to a right of response); State v.
Wrose, 463 S.W.2d 792 (Mo. 1971) (proper to argue in
response that professionals do not leave fingerprints);
State v. Summerour, 107 R.I. 142, 264 A.2d 329 (1970)
(failure to produce evidence that robber had goatee,
where made in response).
21 See note 192 supra.
212 People v. Williams, 40 Ill. 2d 522, 240 N.E.2d 645,
cert denied, 393 U.S. 1123 (1968) (that defendant could
not afford to allow murder weapon to turn up and per-
mit examination by ballistics expert, proper); Common-
wealth v. White, 442 Pa. 461, 275 A.2d 75 (1971);
State v. Burke, 101 R.I. 103, 220 A.2d 508 (1966),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1110 (1968) (that prosecution
knew that gun used by defendant was in mud at the
bottom of a pond, improper); State v. Dombrowski, 44
the absence of fingerprints. 2 In both situations
the prosecutor is taking advantage of an oppor-
tunity to place blame for the government's failure
to produce evidence on the defense. Whatever the
remark, the prosecutor must be certain that it is
supported as much as possible by the evidence in
the case. For example, it is not proper to attribute
the absence of fingerprints to the defendant unless
it has been shown that there were no fingerprints.
2 14
Defense Counsel
It is permissible for the prosecutor to character-
ize the defense presented.2s However, he has less
latitude when the focus of his argument turns
from the defense generally to the defendant's
counsel.
Consistent with this approach, it has been held
improper for the prosecutor to comment in argu-
ment on defense counsel's objection to the admis-
sion of evidence or testimony216 or to portions of
the prosecutor's summation.2 17 Speculation on the
Wis. 2d 486, 171 N.W.2d 349 (1969) (improper to
infer that defendant could produce missing gun).
213 State v. Wrose, 463 S.W.2d 792 (Mo. 1971);
State v. Foster, 2 N.C. App. 109, 162 S.E.2d 583
(1968) (absence of fingerprints and establishment of
alibi were evidence of professionalism)*.
214 People v. Beier, 29 11. 2d 511, 194 N.E.2d 280
(1963) (that defendant must have wiped her prints
from the gun was highly improper in the absence of any
evidence that there were no prints on gun or that it had
been wiped clean); People v. Roberts, - Ill. App.
2d_, 272 N.E.2d 768 (1971).
211 United States v. Hysohion, 439 F.2d 274 (2d
Cir. 1971) (insult to jury's intelligence, proper); State
v. Rosen, 110 N.J. Super. 212, 265 A.2d 151 (1968)
(smoke screen, proper); State v. Persiano, 91 N.J.
Super. 299, 220 A.2d 116 (1966) (same); Blankenship v.
State, 432 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968)
(trumped-up defense, proper). See United States v.
Marcello, 423 F.2d 993 (5th Cir.), cert. denied. 398
U.S. 959 (1970) (insult to jury's intelligence, im-
proper); People v. Lombardi, 20 N.Y.2d 266, 282
N.Y.S.2d 519, 229 N.E.2d 206 (1967) (defense "born of
desperation, and despair, filled with deceit, devoid of
decency, devoid of truth, foul and vile," improper).
See text accompanying notes 120 to 139 supra for a
discussion of the potentia- conflict between the right
to characterize the defense and the defendant's right
not to testify at trial.
216 People v. Sanders, 96 Il. App. 2d 166, 238 N.E.2d
180 (1968) (evidence); Commonwealth v. Balakin, 356
Mass. 547, 254 N.E.2d 422 (1969) (testimony); State
v. Jones, 277 Minn. 174, 152 N.W.2d 67 (1967) (evi-
dence); Sharp v. State, 421 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1967) (testimony).
217 United States v. Hughes, 441 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.
1971) (improper: "one of the main reasons for objecting
to counsel's argument is because this distracts your
thinking from what I am saying. This is one reason that
some of those objections were made."); People v.
Wilson, 116 Ill. App. 2d 205, 253 N.E.2d 472 (1969)
("having thoroughly screwed up my argument,"
improper).
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reasons why counsel waived opening statement or
summation is also not condoned.as
It is also improper to reflect unfavorably on the
role of defense counsel, implying the use of im-
proper or unethical tactics,22 9 where such remarks
are not justified by the evidence.220 Personal
attacks on defense counsel are highly improper.22
If the defense attorney takes the stand, his testi-
mony is a proper subject for comment under the
rules applicable to commenting on witnesses gen-
erally.m
218People v. Fuerback, 66 Ill. App. 2d 452, 214
N.E.2d 330 (1966)*; People V. Matthews, 33 App.
Div. 2d 679, 305 N.Y.S.2d 919 (1969) (opening state-
ment); Wyatt v. State, 491 P.2d 1098 (Okla. Crim.
App. 1971) (same).
United States v. Wilshire Oil Co. of Texas, 427
F.2d 969 (10th Cir. 1970) (confusing issue and throw-
ing sand in juror's eyes); United States v. Marcello,
423 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Di-
Giovanni, 397 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393
U.S. 924 (1968) (cheap trick); Cline v. United States,
395 F.2d 138 (8th Cir. 1968) (dishonest); Chamberlaifn
v. State, 46 Ala. App. 642, 247 So. 2d 683 (1971);
State v. Zumwalt, 7 Ariz. App. 348, 439 P.2d 511
(1968) (that defense counsel not an officer of court as
prosecutor was); People v. Savage, 84 Ill. App. 2d 73,
228 N.E.2d 215 (1967) (repeatedly asserting that
defense counsel was employing tactics designed to
confuse jury)*; Reidy v. State, 9 Md. App. 169, 259
A.2d 66 (1969) (defense was a fiction manufactured by
defense counsel)*; People v. Damon, 24 N.Y.2d 256,
247 NE.2d 651, 299 N.Y.S.2d 830 (1969) (sandbagging
witnesses); Bray v. State, 478 S.W.2d 89 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1972)*; Grant v. State, 472 S.W.2d 531 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1971) ("defense lawyer's job is to try to get
your eye off the defendant," improper).
220 State v. Reed, 157 Conn. 464, 254 A.2d 449 (1969)
(proper to state that defense counsel's style of cross-
examination deterred people from coming into court
to testify, a fair comment on the record); People v.
Speck, 41 Ill. 2d 177, 242 N.E.2d 208 (1968) (cross-
examination of expert witness was an exhibition to
confuse jury, proper); People v. Toliver, _ fI. App.
2d _.., 273 N.E.2d 274 (1971) (where defense was that
defendant had been involuntarily drugged by his com-
panion, and did not have the requisite mental capacity
to commit crime, proper to argue that a defendant who
has been advised by a good attorney will not deny his
presence at the crime scene but will raise this defense);
State v. Smith, 431 S.W.2d 74 (Mo. 1968) (throwing
dust in jurors' eyes proper).
2 Adams v. State, 192 So. 2d 762 (Fla. 1966) (counsel
had perverted and distorted things, and had violated
his oath as a lawyer and as a human being)*; People v.
Kirk, 361 Ill. 2d 292, 222 N.E.2d 498 (1966) (counsel
taking doctrine of Adolph Hitler, in that if enough lies
were told by enough people, they would be believed);
Bonnenfant v. State, 86 Nev. 393, 469 P.2d 401 (1970)
(impolite pun on counsel's name); People v. Lombardi,
20 N.Y.2d 266, 229 N.E.2d 206, 282 N.Y.S.2d 513
(1967) ("great defender of civil liberties" and dis-
honest)*; Dupree v. State, 219 Tenn. 492, 410 S.W.2d
890 (1967) (in spite of highly improper defense argu-
ment that he would not represent defendant if he
thought him guilty, response that defense counsel
lied when he said he believed defendant innocent)*.
20 People v. McBride, 130 Il. App. 2d 206, 264
N.E.2d 446 (1970) (took stand to impeach witness).
COMN ENTING ON THE DUTY OF THE JRY
The prosecutor may not instruct the jury in
the law,223 but may instruct it as to its duty in the
case since the prosecutor is responsible for law
enforcement in the community. M It is proper to
dwell upon the evil results of the crime and to
urge a fearless administration of the criminal
law,225 and the prosecutor may remind the jury
that it is there to protect the life and limb of
every citizen, and that the people look to it for
the protection against crime.226 It is proper for the
prosecutor to urge the jury to impose severe
punishment where it is the province of the jury to
assess or recommend punishment.m But because
the jury verdict is to be reached solely through
impartial deliberation on the evidence presented
at trial, it is not proper for the prosecutor to
suggest that the jury may consider matters outside
the record, especially the existence of post-trial
procedures, which might encourage the jury to
render a guilty verdict.as
22 See note 38 supra, and accompanying text.
2 State v. Williams, 107 Ariz. 262, 485 P.2d 832
(1971); People v. Escarega, 273 Cal. App. 2d 853, 78
Cal. Rptr. 785 (1969) cert. denied, 397 U.S. 975
(1971) (proper to comment on serious and increasing
menace of criminal conduct and necessity of jurors'
strong sense of duty).
225 People v. Hairston, 46 I. 2d 348, 263 N.E.2d
840 (1970); State v. Evans, 406 S.W.2d 612 (Mo.
1966); Randolph v. State, 464 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1971).
126 People v. Bailey, 76 Ill. App. 2d 310, 222 N.E.2d
268 (1966); State v. Vermillion, 446 S.W.2d 788 (Mo.
1969).
O People v. Sullivan, 345 I. 87, 177 N.E. 733 (1931);
State v. Royster, 57 N.J. 472, 273 A.2d 574 (1971);
Robinson v. State, 415 S.W.2d 180 (Tex. Crim. App.
1967); State v. Cerny, 78 Wash. 2d 845, 480 P.2d 199
(1971).
=s Evalt v. United States, 359 F.2d 534 (9th Cir.
1966); State v. Gaines, 6 Ariz. App. 561, 435 P.2d 68
(1967) (that co-defendant was on probation); People
v. Modesto, 66 Cal. 2d 695, 427 P.2d 788, 59 Cal.
Rptr. 124 (1967); Zide v. State, 212 So. 2d 788 (Fla.
App. 1968) (probation); Faust v. State, 222 Ga. 27,
148 S.E.2d 430 (1966) (no references to reviewing
courts should be made except to cite their decisions);
People v. Panczko, 20 Ill. 2d 86, 169 N.E.2d 333 (1960)
(referring to punishment for offense as negligible);
People v. Krogol, 29 Mich. App. 406, 185 N.W.2d 408
(1971) (appeals); State v. Lewis, 443 S.W.2d 186 (Mo.
1969) (defendant should get heavy sentence because of
possibility of parole)*; People v. Slaughter, 28 App.
Div. 2d 1082, 285 N.Y.S.2d 146 (1967) (by pleading
insanity defendant thought he would be committed and
be on street again in 30 days)*; State v. Dickens, 278
N.C. 537, 180 S.E.2d 844 (1971) (appeals could go on
until Doom's Day); Herandy v. State, 487 P.2d 1368
(Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (by good behavior and donat-
ing blood, defendant could get 10 year sentence reduced
to 3 1/2 years, improper and justified reduction of
sentence from 10 to 3 years, since prosecutor had mis-
led jury); Lime v. State, 479 P.2d 608 (Okla. Crim.
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APPEALS TO SYMPATHY AND PREJUDICE
It is obviously improper for the prosecutor to
do or say anything in summation the sole effect of
which is to inflame the passion of or arouse the
prejudice of the jury.221 Such remarks may encour-
age the jury to render a verdict based on its emo-
tional response to unadmitted evidence which has
no relationship to the guilt or innocence of the
accused, rather than a verdict based upon reason-
ing from the record. The questions for review are
to what extent, for what reasons, and with what
effect were the arguments advanced.s20 While
caution against such comments is always required,
App. 1971) (parole); Williams v. State, 461 P.2d 997
(Okla. Crim. App. 1969) (statute governing credits for
good conduct which required that jury be instructed
as to its provisions and permitted prosecutor to com-
ment on it in argument was a legislative encroachment
upon judicial power and unconstitutional); Wilson v.
State, 458 P.2d 315 (Okla. Crim. App. 1969) (credit
for pre-trial incarceration); Bivens v. State, 474 S.W.2d
431 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971) (that state has no right to
appeal, improper); Graham v. State, 442 S.W.2d 922
(Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (parole); Simms v. State, 492
P.2d 516 (Wyo. 1972) (that state has no right to
appeal, improper). See Rowe v. State, 250 Ind. 547, 237
N.E.2d 576 (1968) (if defendant were convicted of
lesser offense only, he could be out in two years)*;
Napier v. Commonwealth, 426 S.W.2d 121 (Ky.
Crim. App. 1968) ("if you decide he's guilty, whatever
you do, don't hang up on the punishment and make us
try this case over again," improper). But see Terhune
v. State, 117 Ga. App. 59, 159 S.E.2d 291 (1967) (that
jury was not concerned with board of corrections, or
with pardon and parole board, but only with guilt or
innocence, proper).
29 United States v. Fullmer, 457 F.2d 447 (7th Cir.
1972)*; United States v. Gambert, 410 F.2d 383 (4th
Cir. 1969) (suggesting that judge believes defendant
guilty)*; State v. Beers, 8 Ariz. App. 534, 448 P.2d 104
(1968); People v. Harris 270 Cal. App. 2d 863, 76
Cal. Rptr. 130 (1969) (improper to state that the
weapon was not being introduced for security reasons
where there was no basis for such statement); Thomp-
son v. State, 194 So. 2d 649 (Fla. App. 1967); Cames v.
Commonwealth, 406 S.W.2d 849 (Ky. Crim. App.
1966)*: People v. Slaughter, 28 App. Div. 2d 1082, 285
N.Y.S.2d 146 (1967); State v. Bentley, 1 N.C. App.
365, 161 S.E.2d 650 (1968); Seeley v. State, 471 P.2d
931 (Okla. Crim. App. 1970) (great number of traffic
deaths in drunk driving prosecution); State v. Mancini,
108 R.I. 261, 274 A.2d 742 (1971) (prejudice obviously
inheres if remarks are totally extraneous to issues in
case and tend to inflame and arouse passions of jury);
Conboy v. State, 455 S.W.2d 605 (Tenn. App. 1970);
Wright v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 75, 175 N.W.2d 646 (1970)
(reading profanity which witness attributed to de-
dendant during course of crime may have been un-
necessary).
2s People v. Hyde, 1 Ill. App. 3d 831, 275 N.E.2d
239 (1971) (improper to refer to wife or family of
murder victim whether reference is by evidence or
argument, but mere fact that evidence of such appears
in trial incidentally or is the subject of comment does
not automatically require reversal).
it has been said that special care is required in the
prosecution of sex offenses.D1
No attempt should be made to pressure the
jury, such as by referring to the actions of other
juries or to public sentiment regarding either the
particular case or the jury system in general.m It
has also been deemed improper to refer to the
victim of the crime or the victim's family.m Fur-
thermore, the prosecutor should not refer to the
jurors or their families, hypothesizing the com-
mission of the crime at issue against them.u4
Comments exciting racial, religious, or class preju-
dice have been repeatedly condemned,u 5 as have
23 People v. Fortson, 110 Ill. App. 2d 206, 249
N.E.2d 260 (1969); People v. Askar, 8 Mich. App. 95,
153 N.W.2d 888 (1967).
21 Wiggins v. State, 43 Ala. App. 382, 191 So. 2d 30
(1966) (low public esteem for the jury system); Burk-
head v. State, 206 So. 2d 690 (Fla. App. 1968) (that
there was a general feeling in the community that there
was no justice, improper); People v. Letterich, 413
Ill. 172, 108 N.E.2d 488 (1952) (referring to other
juries and possible public disapproval if jury did not
convict); State v. Lamar, 260 Ia. 957, 151 N.W.2d 496
(1967) (speed with which quilty verdict had been
returned in similar cases); State v. Raspberry, 452
S.W.2d 169 (Mo. 1970) (personal dangers might exist
for jurors and their families if defendant acquitted);
State v. Watson, 20 Ohio App. 2d 115, 252 N.E.2d 305
(1969) (asking jury to take account of community
sentiment); Perbetsky v. State, 429 S.W.2d 471 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1968) ("society demands that the defendant
be punished" was proper, not referring to the specific
local community); Hughes v. State, 409 S.W.2d 416
(Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (discussing public opinion
regarding this case).
State v. Hughes, 389 F.2d 535 (2d Cir. 1968);
People v. Floyd, 1 Cal. 3d 694, 464 P.2d 64, 83 Cal.
Rptr 608 (1970); People v. Hyde, 1 IIl. App. 3d 831,
275 N.E.2d 239 (1971); Lime v. State, 479 P.2d 608
(Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (victim's family); Perry v.
State, 464 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (what
victim's family would want as punishment); Ramos v.
State, 419 S.W.2d 359 (Tex. Crim. App. 1967) (family,
improper). But see Commonwealth v. Gerald, 356
Mass. 386, 252 N.E.2d 344 (1969) (expressing regret
that rape victim had been subject to degradation and
humiliation because of public trial, proper).
m State v. Dillon, 104 Ariz. 33, 448 P.2d 89 (1968);
People v. Jones, 7 Cal. App. 3d 358, 86 Cal. Rptr. 516
(1970) (sons of jurors and their girlfriends threatened);
Clarke v. United States, 256 A.2d 782 (D.C. Ct. App.
1969); Grant v. State, 194 So. 2d 612 (Fla. 1967)
(murder of jurors)*; Adams v. State, 192 So. 2d 762
(Fla. 1966) (murder of juror's families); Johnson v.
State, 226 Ga. 511, 175 S.E.2d 840 (1970) (if defendant
given only a life sentence, he might kill a juror or a
member of juror's family); People v. Teague, 66 Ill.
App. 2d 338, 214 N.E.2d 522 (1966) (rape of jurywomen
and families of jurymen); Ader v. State, 225 N.E.2d
171 (Ind. 1967) (killing of sons of jurors); State v.
Paxton, 453 S.W.2d 923 (Mo. 1970) (murder of jurors).
But see Parks v. State, 400 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1966) (rape of jurywomen and families of jury-
men, proper).
u5 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150 (1940) (class prejudice); United States v.
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appeals to the interests of the jurors as taxpayers2e 3
or as members of a particular community.n 7
Homer, 423 F.2d 630 (9th Cir. 1970) (asking whether
defense counsel was trying to let defendants hide
behind their race, improper); Brent v. White, 276 F.
Supp. 386 (E.D. La. 1967) (reference to rape victim as
a white girl where defendant was black was not pre-
judicial where she testified and it was evident that she
was white); Fisher v. State, 241 Ark. 545 408 S.W.2d
894 (1966), ceri. denied, 389 U.S. 821 (196) (argument
that never before in county had black received a life
sentence upon conviction, not error where jury recom-
mended a 15 year sentence); People v. Brown, 86 Ill.
App. 2d 163, 229 N.E.2d 922 (1967) (must be a show-
ing of non-black jury for contention of racial pre-
judice to warrant consideration on appeal); State v.
Kirk, 205 Kan. 681, 472 P.2d 237 (1970); Irwin v.
Commonwealth, 446 S.W.2d 570 (Ky. Crim. App.
1969) (argument that defendants had been hiding
because they knew "the jig was up" was proper where
clear there was no derogatory intention); State v.
Alexander, 255 La. 941, 233 So. 2d 891 (1970) (mis-
pronouncing 'Negroes" not improper); Riley v. State,
83 Nev. 282, 429 P.2d 59 (1967) (no showing of racial
bias to black defendant in prosecution for rape of white
girl where prosecution referred to race only once, while
defense dwelled on it); People v. Hunter, 20 N.Y.2d 789,
230 N.E.2d 734, 284 N.Y.S.2d 93 (1967) (no error in
refusing to allow defense to argue on racial dissimilarity
of complainant and defendant as a point to be con-
sidered by jury in determining reliability of identifica-
tion); People v. DePasquale, 54 Misc. 2d 91, 281
N.Y.S.2d 963 (1967) (reference to race, nationality or
religion may be prejudicial even though not so in-
tended, and should be avoided unless relevant to a
matter in issue); Biggers v. State, 219 Tenn. 553, 411
S.W.2d 696 (1967), aff'd by equally divided Court, 390
U.S. 404 (1968) (argument that rape would not have
been prosecuted in many parts of the country since
both parties were black, improper); Rodgers v. State,
468 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. Crim. App. 1971) (identifying
witnesses were black and could more certainly identify
defendant who was black than could non-blacks,
improper); Thornton v. State, 451 S.W.2d 898 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1970) (asking if white robbery victim
would have gotten out of car at night for 3 "nigger
men" if they did not have guns, improper); Joyner v.
State, 436 S.W.2d 141 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969) (since
defendant was black and trial commenced only a few
days after Detroit riots of 1967, arguing that the
United States was on the verge of anarchy)*; Yanez v.
State, 403 S.W.2d 412 (Tex. Crim. App. 1966) (Latin
American punk, improper). But see Montgomery v.
State, 447 P.2d 469 (Okla. Crim. App. 1968) (argument
referring to witness as a Negro and of African descent
was not error where not derogatory); Salinas v. State,
458 S.W.2d 933 (Tex. Crim. App. 1970) (argument
referring to race was a plea for law enforcement and
equal protection).
211 People v. Strayhorn, 35 Ill. 2d 41, 219 N.E.2d
517 (1965) (expense of bringing in witnesses); State v.
Perry, 274 Minn. 1, 142 N.W.2d 573 (1966) (taxpayer's
money would be wasted if no conviction); State v.
Garske, 74 Wash. 2d 901, 447 P.2d 167 (1968) (that
society had paid half million dollars prosecuting the
defendant). .e Taglianetti v. United States, 398 F.2d
558 (1st Cir. 1968).
mVierecle v. United States, 318 U.S. 236 (1943)
(strong dictum that appeals to patriotism in time of
war constitute misconduct); Taulbee v. Common-
While it is generally permissible to argue that a
conviction would deter others from the commission
of similar crimes,38 it has been held improper to
suggest that if the defendant were acquitted he
would commit further crimesn 9 or that a verdict
of guilty would serve as a good example to young
people.240 On the other hand, the prosecutor may
comment on the brutal nature of the crime,24'
wealth, 438 S.W.2d 777 (Ky. Crim. App. 1969) (if
jury wanted a Clark County lawyer to come over and
defend a Clark County thief who broke into an Estill
County place of business, that was their business)*;
Gibson v. State, 430 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Grim. App.
1968) (in prosecution for assault with intent to kill,
argument that "we have another shooting on our hands
right here in Dallas, the place that the world is referring
to as the murder capital of the world," improper). See
State v. Foster, 2 N.C. App. 109, 162 S.E.2d 583
(1968).
13 Embrey v. State, 283 Ala. 110, 214 So. 2d 567
(1968); Reed v. State, 119 Ga. App. 368, 166 S.E.2d
900 (1969); Hamilton v. Commonwealth, 401 S.W.2d
80 (Ky. Crim. App. 1966) (proper to refer to effect of
leniency by juries); State v. Harris, 413 S.W.2d 244
(Mo. 1967); Faucett v. State, 468 S.W.2d 92 (Tex.
Grim. App. 1971) (telling jury they controlled heroin
problem and up to them whether they wanted it in
their community). But see State v. Clark, 291 Minn.
79, 189 N.W.2d 167 (1971) (improper to argue that
conviction was necessary to stop the kind of conduct
which defendant had committed); State v. Burnett,
429 S.W.2d 239 (Mo. 1968) (render a decision which
would serve as a warning, improper); People v. Moore,
26 App. Div. 2d 902, 274 N.Y.S.2d 518 (1966) (should
acquit if wanted to live in a community where crime
ran rampant); State v. Peterson, 255 S.C. 579, 180
S.E.2d 341, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 860 (1971) (that
prosecutor had other murder cases and what was done
in this one would affect the outcomes of the others
was improper); Bowling v. State, 458 S.W.2d 639
(Tenn. Crim. App. 1970) (predictions as to conse-
quences of acquittal on lawlessness in community);
State v. Huson, 73 Wash. 2d 660, 440 P.2d 192, cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 1096 (1968) (jury would be responsi-
ble for many killings if the defendant were set
free).
no1 Russell v. State, 233 So. 2d 154 (Fla. App. 1970)
(would kill again)*; Chavez v. State, 215 So. 2d 750
(Fin. App. 1968)"; Martin v. State, 223 Ga. 649, 157
S.E.2d 458 (1967); Avey v. State, 1 Md. App. 178, 228
A.2d 614 (1967); People v. Askar, 8 Mich. App. 95,
153 N.W.2d 888 (1967); Lime v. State, 479 P.2d 608
(Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (would kill again); State v.
Key, 256 S.C. 90, 180 S.E.2d 888 (1971) (defendant
would kill prosecution witness if acquitted); State v.
Bishop, 128 Vt. 221, 260 A.2d 393 (1969); State v.
Walton, 5 Wash. App. 150, 486 P.2d 1118 (1971).
But see State v. McDermott, 202 Kan. 399, 449 P.2d 545
(1969) (referring to fear of victim's stepdaughter if
defendant were acquitted proper where in evidence).
240 People v. Panczko, 20 Ill. 2d 86, 169 N.E.2d 333
(1960).241 People v. Washington, 71 Cal. 2d 1061, 458 P.2d
479, 80 Cal. Rptr. 567 (1969); People v. Nemke, 46 Ill.
2d 49, 263 N.E.2d 97 (1970); State v. Williams, 276
N.C. 703, 174 S.E.2d 503 (1970). But see Tenorio v.
United States, 390 F.2d 96 (9th Cir. 1968) (comment
on destruction and human waste resulting from heroin,
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point out the number of crimes that go unpun-
ished,?A and stress the responsibility of the jury
for law enforcementYO
MrIIGATING FACTORS
In addition to the above limitations, there are
several doctrines which may affect the attitude of
the trial and reviewing courts toward a remark
which on its face would seem improper. These
doctrines to some extent broaden the bounds of
propriety while at the same time imposing some
new limitations.
RETALIATORY STATEMENTS AND REMARKS
When counsel believes that opposing counsel
has' made an improper comment, it should be
called to the attention of the court as soon as pos-
sible through an objection 2  However, it is well
established that the prosecutor has the right to
make a fair reply to an argument previously made
by the defense. Furthermore, the defense has no
grounds for objection at trial or complaint on
review where the prosecutor's remarks were in-
vited or provoked by the improper comments of
the defense, even though the prosecutor's remarks
would otherwise be improper. 45 This principle
applies generally to all the limitations discussed
above.
2 46
improper); Perez v. State, 466 S.W.2d 283 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1971) (worst murder prosecutor had ever seen,
improper).
2 United States v. Shirley, 435 F.2d 1076 (7th Cir.
1970) (increasing crime rate); State v. Towner, 202
Kan. 25, 446 P.2d 719 (1968).
2 Wilson v. Commonwealth, 411 S.W.2d 33 (Ky.
Crim. App. 1967); Commonwealth v. Feiling, 214 Pa.
Super. 207, 252 A.2d 200 (1969). See also cases cited
note 238, supra.
2" People v. Bimbo, 314 Ill. 449, 145 N.E. 651
(1924).
2A United States v. Homer, 423 F.2d 630 (9th Cir.
1970); United States v. Balistrieri, 403 F.2d 472 (7th
Cir. 1968); Lane v. State, 46 Ala. App. 637, 247 So. 2d
679 (1971); Ricks v. State, 242 So. 2d 763 (Fla. App.
1971); State v. Horsey, 180 N.W.2d 459 (Ia. 1970);
People v. Hardaway, 108 Ill. App. 2d 325, 247 N.E.2d
626 (1969); State v. Magee, 201 Kan. 566, 441 P.2d 863
(1968); Hunt v. Commonwealth, 466 S.W.2d 957
(Ky. Crim. App. 1971); Hunt v. State, 12 Md. App.
286, 278 A.2d 637 (1971); People v. Anderson, 29
Mich. App. 578, 185 N.W.2d 624 (1971); Cannon v.
State, 190 So. 2d 848 (Miss. 1966); State v. Ellifrits,
459 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. 1970); Pacheco v. State, 82 Nev.
172, 414 P.2d 100 (1966); State v. Oland, 461 P.2d 277
(Ore. App. 1969); State v. Gibson, 75 Wash. 2d 174,
449 P.2d 692 (1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1019 (1970);
State v. Riley, 151 W. Va. 364, 151 S.E.2d 308 (1966).
21United States v. Hestie, 439 F.2d 131 (2d Cir.
1971) (inadmissible evidence); United States v. Zum-
pano, 436 F.2d 535 (9th Cir. 1970) (excluded evi-
The courts have recognized, however, that this
rule does not convert an improper remark into a
proper one; an improper remark is still improper,
even in retaliation.217 But response or invitation is
a factor to be considered in evaluating the impact
of the remark on the jury and determining possible
prejudice to the defendant.2 8 Further, this is not
to suggest that any remark offered in response to
an improper defense comment will be considered
specially. The prosecutor's statement must be a
fair reply in order to avoid the danger of reversible
error.24 9
dence); United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971) (referring to a
stipulation regarding documents not in evidence even
though stipulation had been made for one purpose and
was commented upon for another); Rooks v. State,
250 Ark. 561, 466 S.W.2d 478 (1971) (improper in-
ference); People v. McIntyre, 256 Cal. App. 2d 894,
64 Cal. Rptr. 530 (1967) (inadmissible report); Kurtz v.
People, 494 P.2d 97 (Colo. 1972) (comment on failure
to testify invited); State v. Sage, 162 N.W.2d 502
(Ia. 1968) (failure to testify); State v. Forichette, 279
Minn. 76, 156 N.W.2d 93 (1968) (statement not in
evidence); State v. Richards, 467 S.W.2d 33 (Mo.
1971) (matter not in evidence); State v. Miller, 460
P.2d 874 (Ore. App. 1969) (unintroduced evidence);
State v. Harrison, 83 S.D. 440, 160 N.W.2d 415 (1968)
(defendant's unavailability before trial); Mays v.
State, 428 S.W.2d 325 (Tex. Crim. App. 1968) (prior
convictions); State v. Allen, 72 Wash. 2d 42, 431
P.2d 593 (1967), cert. denied, 391 U.S. 924 (1968)
(ownership of weapon); State v. Fisher, 4 Wash. App.
512, 483 P.2d 166 (1971) (statements not supported
by evidence); State v. Yancey, 32 Wis. 2d 1047, 145
N.W.2d 145 (1966) (guilt).
21 People v. Graves, 263 Cal. App. 2d 719, 70 Cal.
Rptr. 509 (1968) (prosecutor has no right to correct
defense misstatements with misstatements of his
own); People v. Douglas, 36 App. Div. 2d 994, 320
N.Y.S.2d 977 (1971).
m Patriarca v. United States, 402 F.2d 314 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1022 (1968); State v. Swanson, 9
Ohio App. 2d 60, 222 N.E.2d 844 (1967).
219 United States ex rel. Mitchell v. Pinto, 438 F.2d
814 (2d Cir. 1971) (prosecution characterization of
defendant's silence as a circumstance which jury could
consider went beyond fair response to defense argument
that counsel had advised defendant not to testify);
United States v. Arnold, 425 F.2d 204 (10th Cir.
1970)*; Schultz v. Yeager, 293 F. Supp. 794 (D.N.J.
1967), aff'd, 403 F.2d 639 (3d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 961 (1969) (defense comments on failure to
testify did not justify continouous and repeated
references to such by prosecution); State v. Neil, 102
Ariz. 289, 428 P.2d 676 (1967); State v. Smith, 101
Ariz. 407, 420 P.2d 278 (1966) (failure to testify)*;
People v. Hill, 66 Cal. 2d 536, 426 P.2d 908, 58 Cal.
Rptr. 340, cert. denied, 389 U.S. 993 (1967); People v.
Flynn, 302 Ill. 549, 135 N.E. 101 (1922); State v.
Wright, 251 La. 511, 205 So. 2d 381 (1967) (defense
comments on failure to testify did not justify con-
tinuous and repeated references to such by prosecu-
tion)*; Dupree v. State, 219 Tenn. 492, 410 S.W.2d
890 (1967) (defendant's guilt)*; State v. Dennison, 72
Wash. 2d 842, 435 P.2d 526 (1967). But see Carter v.
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APPELATE REvIEw oF THE RECORD
Curing and Preserving Improper Argument
The rule generally applicable in the criminal
law, that a failure to make a timely objection
waives consideration of the alleged defect on
review, applies to prosecutorial conduct during
argument.2 50 The recognized exception to this rule
is also applicable; that is, failure to object does
not effect a waiver where the error is such that it
could not have been cured and a refusal to review
would deprive the defendant of a fair trial 51
The courts are only slightly receptive to the
contention that an objection merely places greater
emphasis on the subject matter of the alleged
transgression.2 2 The defense attorney is thus left
State, 488 P.2d 1306 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (defense
discussion of flight justified state's discussion of failure
to testify); People v. Ruppuhn, 25 Mich. App. 62, 180
N.W.2d 900 (1970) (defense argument regarding
credibility of witnesses justified state's argument on
defendant's character).
250 Harris v. United States, 402 F.2d 656 (D.C.
Cir. 1968); United States v. Chamley, 376 F.2d 57
(7th Cir. 1967); State v. Totress, 197 Ariz. 8, 480
P.2d 668 (1971); People v. Goodwin, 261 Cal. App. 2d
723, 68 Cal. Rptr. 247 (1968); State v. Brown, 94
Ida. 352, 487 P.2d 946 (1971); People v. DeKosta,
- Ill. App. 2d -, 270 N.E.2d 475 (1971); Jones v.
State, 262 N.E.2d 538 (Ind. 1970) (failure to object
means defense attorney did not think remark preju-
dicial); Barnett v. Commonwealth, 403 S.W.2d 40
(Ky. Crim. App. 1966); State v. Pullen, 266 A.2d 222
(Me. 1970); People v. Miron, 31 Mich. App. 142, 187
N.W.2d 497 (1971); State v. Forichette, 279 Minn. 76,
156 N.W.2d 93 (1968); Bonnenfant v. State, 86 Nev.
393, 469 P.2d 401 (1970); State v. Sparrow, 276 N.C.
499, 173 S.E.2d 897 (1970); Paul v. State, 483 P.2d
1176 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971); State v. Gairson, 484
P.2d 854 (Ore. App. 1971); Commonwealth ex rd.
Sprangle v. Maroney, 423 Pa. 589, 225 A.2d 236
(1967); State v. Kindvall, 191 N.W.2d 289 (S.D. 1971);
Randolph v. State, 464 S.W.2d 658 (Tex. Crim. App.
1971); State v. Jackson, 127 Vt. 237, 246 A.2d 829
(1968); Brown v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 512, 158
S.E.2d 663 (1968), Wright v. State, 46 Wis. 2d 75,
175 N.W.2d 646 (1970).
2M United States v. Fuentes, 432 F.2d 405 (5th
Cir. 1970); Brown v. State, 118 Ga. App. 617, 165
S.E.2d 185 (1968); People v. Romero, 36 Ill. 2d 315,223
N.E.2d 121 (1967); People v. Montevecchio, 32 Mich.
App. 163, 188 N.W.2d 186 (1971); Davis v. State,
413 P.2d 920 (Okla. Crim. App. 1966); State v. Franks,
74 Wash. 2d 413, 445 P.2d 200 (1968).
25 United States v. White, 444 F.2d 1274 (5th
Cir. 1971) (prosecutor was not intending to comment
on defendant's failure to testify, but because of point
at which defense attorney objected, it seemed he was);
Garris v. United States, 390 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (failure to object did not waive error since ob-
jection would have given improper remarks undue
emphasis)*; United States ex rd. Chiarello v. Mancusi,
288 F. Supp. 178 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (court noted that
ambiguous reference to failure to testify would probably
never have been noticed by jury but for assiduous
in a dilemma, where the choice may be between
waiving the error or making the prosecutor's
point. This situation is further complicated by the
requirement that an objection be timely, complete
and specificSn
Assuming an objection is made,M the prosecu-
objection by defense); State v. Costello, 415 S.W.2d 816
(Mo. 1967) (error not properly preserved even though
defense attorney's reluctance to object within the
hearing of the jury was understandable); State v.
Polsky, 82 N.M. 393, 482 P.2d 257, cert. denied, 82
N.M. 377, 482 P.2d 241 (1971); State v. McGee, 52
Wis. 2d 736, 190 N.W.2d 893 (1971); cf. United States
v. Grunberger, 431 F.2d 1062 (2d Cir. 1970) (no waiver
where "it is understandable that defense counsel may
wish to avoid underscoring a prejudicial remark in the
minds of the jury by drawing attention to it"); State
v. Fowler, 110 N.H. 110, 261 A.2d 429 (1970) (recog-
nizing that an immediate objection may draw attention
to remark); State v. Davidson, 44 Wis. 2d 177, 170
N.W.2d 755 (1969) (proper for trial judge to elect
not to emphasize remark by repeating it to jury, where
objection was made at end of argument).
25 Samuels v. United States, 398 F.2d 964 (5th
Cir. 1968) (objection at end of argument not timely);
United States v. Bully, 282 F. Supp. 327 (E.D. Va.
1968) (failure to specify grounds); Emerson v. State, 281
Ala. 29, 198 So. 2d 613 (1967) (failure to specify im-
proper portions); State v. Williams, 107 Ariz. 262, 485
P.2d 832 (1971) (objection made after jury retired was
not timely); Jones v. State, 248 Ark. 694, 453 S.W.2d
403 (1970) (not timely if raised after jury retires);
Clay v. State, 122 Ga. App. 677, 178 S.E.2d 331 (1970)
(waived where did not state basis for objection);
State v. Williams, 276 N.C. 703, 174 S.E.2d 503
(1970) (exceptions not taken before verdict are lost);
State v. Bumpers, 270 N.C. 521, 155 S.E.2d 173 (1967)
(failure to object during argument); Carter v. State,
488 P.2d 1306 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971) (must move to
exclude and ask for instruction to disregard in addition
to objecting to preserve remark); State v. Mancini,
108 R.I. 261, 274 A.2d 742 (1971) (failure to request
cautionary instruction waives error, even if objection);
Bryant v. State, 455 S.W.2d 235 (Tex. Crim. App.
1970) (error not raised until motion for new trial
waived); Sharp v. State, 421 S.W.2d 663 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1967) (failure to specify grounds); Russo v.
Commonwealth, 207 Va. 251, 148 S.E.2d 820 (1966)
(must object at time of argument and ask for instruc-
tion to disregard); State v. Noyes, 69 Wash. 2d 441,
418 P.2d 471 (1966) (failure to request mistrial in
addition to objection); State v. Ruud, 41 Wis. 2d
720, 165 N.W.2d 153 (1969) (waived where failed to
move for mistrial before Verdict).
24 Since the failure of the court to take action is an
implied ruling of propriety, State v. Shuttle, 126 Vt.
279, 230 A.2d 794 (1967), the trial court may have the
duty to act sua sponte where an objection is not made
and the argument is so prejudicial that it may be a
denial of a fair trial, especially where the defendant is
appearing pro se. United States v. Jenkins, 436 F.2d
140 (D.C. Cir. 1970); United States v. Smith, 433
F.2d 1266 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Cook, 432
F.2d 1093 (7th Cir. 1970); United States v. Wolfson,
322 F. Supp. 798 (D. Del. 1971); Grubbs v. State, 265
N.E.2d 40 (Ind. 1970); Conway v. State, 7 Md. App.
400, 256 A.2d 178 (1969); State v. Williams, 276
N.C. 703, 174 S.E.2d 503 (1970).
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-tor's transgression is considered cured where the
trial court sustains the objection and either ad-
monishes the jury to disregard, instructs the jury
to disregard, or rebukes the prosecutor, or any
combination of these which the trial court believes
necessary to remove possible prejudice. 55 It is
only when the error is so fundamental that it can-
Inot be cured by these methods that the trial
court need resort to the more drastic remedy of
mistrial.
Besides corrective action by the court, it has
been held in some cases that the prosecutor256 or
even the defense attorney257 had taken sufficient
action to himself remedy the error.
Miscellaneous Considerations A~ffecting the Appel-
late Decision
In determining whether substantial prejudice to
the defendant resulted from the prosecutorial sum-
mation, reviewing courts have looked to six other
factors besides the law and the exact words used.
First, the courts consider the strength of the evi-
dence in the case, applying the standard harmless
beyond a reasonable doubt.n8 Thus, if the review-
ing court finds overwhelming evidence of guilt, it
will probably uphold the conviction, even though
it may point to some improprieties which were
properly preserved and before the court on re-
255 United States v. Haili, 443 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir.
1971) (instruction); United States v. Strauss, 443 F.2d
986 (1st Cir. 1971) (explaining what prosecutor meant);
Turner v. United States, 441 F.2d 736 (5th Cir. 1971)
(sustaining objection); United States v. DiGiovanni,
397 F.2d 409 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 924
(1968) (rebuke and instruction); People v. Hail, 1
Ill. App. 3d 949, 275 N.E.2d 196 (1971) (objection
and later instruction); McCuley v. State, 272 N.E.2d
613 (Ind. 1971) (admonishment usually cures); State v.
Franklin, 459 S.W.2d 314 (Mo. 1970) (failure to
instruct suna sponte to disregard after sustaining objec-
tion was not error).
26 Withdrawing and/or apologizing for remarks:
United States v. Crane, 445 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1971);
Nolan v. United States, 423 F.2d 1031 (10th Cir.
1970); Tellis v. State, 84 Nev. 587, 445 P.2d 938
(1968); State v. Green, 255 S.C. 548, 180 S.E.2d 179
(1971); Morris v. State, 432 S.W.2d 920 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1968). Correcting misstatement: United States
v. Smith, 441 F.2d 539 (9th Cir. 1971); United States
v. Barber, 303 F. Supp. 807 (D. Del. 1969).
211 United States v. Huidson, 432 F.2d 413 (9th
Cir. 1970); Grant v. State, 472 S.W.2d 531 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1971) (noting that improper remark was
discussed by defense in summation); State v. Huson,
73 Wash. 2d 660, 440 P.2d 192 (1968) (defense made
no objection but in summation told jury prosecution
summation was unfair and an inflammatory tirade);
Deja v. State, 43 Wis. 2d 488, 168 N.W.2d 856 (1969).
25. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
view.259 But if the case is a close one, the court
will be more likely to reverse.26 Some courts con-
sider the punishment imposed in determining
whether the jury was improperly influenced by the
summation. Where an affirmative answer to this
question appears and there is overwhelming evi-
dence of guilt, the conviction will be sustained but
the sentence will be modified.
2 6
1
Second, the court will consider the remarks in
the context of the entire summation or a large
part of it in order to determine the true extent
and meaning of the disputed comments. 2 62 Lengthy
and repeated remarks are much more likely to
result in reversal than are single or isolated refer-
ences.=
Third, the appellate court will consider whether
the trial judge took the proper corrective action
on the one hand, or further compounded the
error by overruling the defense objection or by




2159 United States v. White, 444 F.2d 1274 (5th
Cir. 1971); United States v. Jones, 433 F.2d 1107
(D.C. Cir. 1970); People v. Morse, 70 Cal. 2d 711, 452
P.2d 607, 76 Cal. Rptr. 391, cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944
(1969); People v. Acker, 127 IEI. App. 2d 283, 262
N.E.2d 247 (1970); People v. Miron, 31 Mich. App.
142, 187 N.W.2d A97 (1971); People v. Douglas, 36
App. Div. 2d 994, 320 N.Y.S.2d 977 (1971); State v.
Thompson, 278 N.C. 277, 179 S.E.2d 315 (1971);
Batgs v. State, 483 P.2d 1384 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971);
State v. Gairson, 484 P.2d 854 (Ore. App. 1971);
Commonwealth v. Camm, 443 Pa. 253, 277 A.2d 325
(1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1046 (1972); State v.
Kindvall, 191 N.W.2d 289 (S.D. 1971); Briggs v.
State, 463 S.W.2d 161 (Tenn. App. 1970).
260 United States v. Arendale, 444 F.2d 1260 (5th
Cir. 1971); People v. Humphreys, 24 Mich. App. 411,
180 N.W.2d 328 (1970).26
1 Webb v. Commonwealth, 451 S.W.2d 397 (Ky.
Crim. App. 1970); State v. Allison, 1 N.C. App. 623,
162 S.E.2d 63 (1968); Herandy v. State, 487 P.2d
1368 (Okla. Crim. App. 1971).2
12 Hollbrook v. United States, 441 F.2d 371 (6th
Cir. 1971) (in context, remark did not have meaning
attributed to it by appellant); State v. White, 102
Ariz. 162, 426 P.2d 796 (1967); Pace v. State, 121 Ga.
App. 251, 173 S.E.2d 464 (1970) (reviewing court,
would not consider remark where record did not show
it in context); State v. Squires, 248 S.C. 239, 149 S.E.2d
601 (1966).
261 Scott v. Perino, 439 F.2d 1066 (6th Cir. 1971)
(lengthy and vigorous remark); United States v. Cook,
432 F.2d 1093 (7th Cir. 1970) (isolated); United States
v. Elmore, 423 F.2d 775 (4th Cir, 1970) (same);
Rodriquez-Sandoval v. United States, 409 F.2d 529
(1st Cir. 1969) (repeated); Schultz v. Yeager, 293 F.
Supp. 794 (D.N.J. 1967), ayt'd, 403 F.2d 639 (3rd Cir.
1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 961 (1969) (same); People
v. Ellis, 65 Cal. 2d 529, 421 P.2d 393, 55 Cal. Rptr.
385 (1966) (repeated).
21 Shaddox v. State, 244 Ark. 747, 427 S.W.2d 198
(1967) (failed to cure sufficiently); Smith v. State, 118
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Fourth, the court may take into account the




It may be that a misstatement in a short trial is
not serious error, since the jurors should have an
independent recollection of the evidence. On the
other hand, a lengthy argument after a long trial
is more likely to be imperfect, and minor trans-
gressions in this setting may also be excused.
Fifth, the court may consider the atmosphere of
the courtroom throughout the trial, and may be
more reluctant to find reversible error where the
case was "hotly contested" on both sides.
266
Finally, where the error in summation alone is
not sufficient to require reversal, the court may
then examine the cumulative effect of this impro-
priety in conjunction with other errors which
occurred during the rest of the triaVl
Ga. App. 464, 164 S.E.2d 278 (1968) (same); People v.
McLean, 2 III. App. 3d 307, 276 N.E.2d 72 (1971);
Rowe v. State, 250 Ind. 547, 237 N.E.2d 576 (1968)
(overruled); Dill v. State, 10 Md. 362, 270 A.2d 489
(1970) (same); Reidy v. State, 8 Md. App. 169, 259
A.2d 66 (1969) (failed to cure sufficiently); State v.
Casados, 188 Neb. 91, 195 N.W.2d 210 (1972); People
v. Christman, 23 N.Y.2d 429, 244 N.E.2d 703, 297
N.Y.S.2d 134 (1969) (overruled).265 United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310
U.S. 150 (1940) (noting trial was a prolonged one);
United States v. Heidson, 432 F.2d 413 (9th Cir. 1970)
(trial lasted less than two days); People v. Hancock, 326
Mich. 471, 40 N.W.2d 689 (1959) (hotly-contested two-
month trial); People v. Kearns, 280 N.Y. 763, 21
N.E.2d 525 (1939) (18-day trial).2,6 Clark v. United States, 391 F.2d 57 (8th Cir.
1968); People v. Johnson, 241 Cal. App. 2d 423, 50
Cal. Rptr. 598 (1966); Kostal v. People, 160 Coo. 64,
414 P.2d 123, cert. denied, 385 U.S. 939 (1966); State
v. Hamilton, 249 La. 392, 187 So. 2d 417 (1966).
26 See, e.g., People v. Smith, 246 Cal. App. 2d 489,
54 Cal. Rptr. 740 (1966).
CONCLUSION
It is clear that some fine distinctions have been
made by the courts in an effort to reconcile the
prosecutor's dual roles as impartial representative
of the people and vigorous advocate for the state.
The prosecutor may fail to meet both obligations
in a particular case, performing one task to the
exclusion of the other. The appellate court, how-
ever, does not sit primarily to enforce ethical or
moral standards (though it may frequently speak
to the question of what constitutes propriety), but
rather to determine whether; all things considered,
the defendant did in fact receive a fair trial. The
case law of a particular jurisdiction will reveal
few if any forms of speech or conduct during sum-
mation which are per se reversible error. It will
suggest many forms which are potentially reversi-
ble error and generally improper. It is the com-
bination of these with the particular facts of a
case which will dictate the limits of propriety for
the prosecutorial dosing argument.
The most important learning to be gained by a
study of the foregoing is that most prosecutorial
conduct and comment is considered by reviewing
courts in the context in which it occurred. Given
the disparate approaches by the various jurisdic-
tions in which these cases arose, it is impractical,
if not impossible, to generalize upon the result
which will be reached in any given case. Neverthe-
less, in most cases there is evident in the court
decisions an honorable effort to protect the defend-
ant's right to a free and unbiased trial, while at
the same time refraining from excessive impinge-
ment on the prosecutor's obligation to vigorously
present his case.
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